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P R E F A C E 
This study sets out to examine the order of categories and 
values, structuring men's thought and perception at a fundamental 
level although not systematically formulated, in terms of which the 
Transkeian magistrates viewed the African communities under their 
governance. It is thus an essay in colonial administration, but 
the critical focus has been narrowed and is centred primarily upon 
the ideas and assumptions the magistrates used in the business of 
··" administration to explain society, government and law. At the same 
time, a major concern of this work has been to place the particular 
problem with which it deals - the elucidation of magisterial ideas 
and attitudes •within a wider framework of contemporary social and 
political thought, to fit them into the matrix of Victorian culture 
as it conditioned and shaped the administrators' perceptions and 
responses touching the indigenous black population. A methodologi-
cal pitfall opens here, of assimilating individual or local currents 
of ideas to more general patterns - the 'climate of opinion' or what 
Matthew Arnold called the 'main movement of mind' of the age; of 
trying to press disparate, multifarious and often carelessly formu-
lated ideas and assumptions into a conceptual framework or theoreti-
cal construct that was independently arrived at and presented as 
given. The mode of procedure followed was one that allowed the 
source material to suggest broader patterns and larger perspectives 
according to which it could be most intelligibly and satisfyingly 
ordered; one also that wove together various logically independent 
concepts and general propositions, derived from general studies of 
the topic and period, and brought them to bear on the Transkeian 
situation. In this way it is hoped that the main features and con• 
tours of the magisterial mind have been rendered with as much pre• 
cision of detail and emphasis as the demands of analytical depth and 
conceptual rigour would permit. 
• 
The rather loose sense of period which the title conveys 
is meant to refer, more or less, to that period of time spanning the 
annexation of the Transkeian territories, whose extreme points are 
fixed by the years 1872 and 1894; but the writer has on many occasions 
strayed beyond these bounds, regarding them as useful markers rather 
than definitive frontiers. Indeed, these two dates are in only a 
limited sense major turning points in the history of the Transkei. 
It can be argued that the extension of white control beyond the Kei 
was a gradual process, that the course of incorporation by which the 
African communities were included in the Cape Colony took place across 
a broad range of aspects, economic, religious, social, as well as 
political. They are processes which long antedated 1872 and which 
have continued beyond 1894 up to the present time. The period 
described as the late nineteenth century spans, in addition, the 
active careers of four outstanding magistrates, namely Charles 
Brownlee, Matthew Blyth, Henry Elliot and Walter Stanford; and much 
of the argument of the work has been developed with special reference 
to the members of this distinguished quadrumvirate. 
In constructing this thesis, it was found to fall almost 
naturally into a tripartite division. The first chapter offers a 
brief historical introduction to the annexation of the Transkeian 
territories, a process conceived as an extension of white control in 
the interests of the stability of the Cape's eastern frontier. The 
problem of control in the area is considered in its military, politi-
cal and administrative dimensions, and the range of African responses 
to white encroachment - from passive obstruction to more organized, 
articulated forms of political resistance ... examined briefly in turn. 
Chapter two outlines the dominant theoretical framework 
within which Victorian social thinkers and, by extension, colonial 
administrators sought to order their experience and understanding of 
culture contact: for social evolutionism could accommodate diverse 
modes of social organization while maintaining the essential unity 
o~ mankind; without impairing at the same time the absolute validity 
of western civilization. The conservative respect of the magistrates 
for traditional social arrangements found institutional expression in 
the unique 'native territorial system' that was fashioned for the 
administration of Transkeian Africans in the 1880s and 1890s. This 
was complemented by a characteristic concern for social reform and 
progress that would elevate the indigenous people in the cultural 
scale towards the superior life of western society. Both these con-
servative and reformist strains were caught up in and held together 
by the pervading administrative ethos of a benevolent paternalism, 
the illiberalism of which is considered specifically in relation to 
magisterial attitudes to the drink question. 
Law and the administration of justice in the territories 
form the substance of chapter three. The issues involved in the 
recognition and codification of African customary law are discussed 
with particular reference to magisterial evidence given before and 
the final report drafted by the Cape Native Laws and Customs 
Commission of 1883. Thereafter, the judicial structure of resident 
and chief magistrates' courts established in the Transkei and the 
legal system enforced there are examined historically as to genesis 
and development; and from a study of the responses of the Cape 
officials to the organization of judicial administration are derived 
some of the central tenets of the magistrates' doctrines of juris-
prudence. Once again, the significance of social evolutionary 
theory as a conceptual framework within which the administrators 
attempted to order the interaction of two diverse cultures reappears 
iri the field of law and justice. For in moulding the legal and 
judicial systems to the social circumstances of the African people 
and in harmonizing them with the needs of the society they served, 
the magistrates in the territories drew upon the categories of 
current social thought to understand and give effect to the legal 
requirements of a traditional or rather transitional society newly 
incorporated in the wbite polity. While accordingly the men on the 
ground conceded relative merit to tribal laws and customs within the 
circumstances of the tribesman's time and place, at the same time 
the absolute validity of western norms and values was reasserted in 
their characteristically moral appraisal of African customary 
practices: the relation between law, morality and liberty as estab-
lished by the magistrates being examined in a subsection entitled, 
familiarly enough, 'Law and the Enforcement of Morals'. In con-
clusion, a review is undertaken of major areas of discussion and 
some significant patterns that emerge overall are highlighted. 
At this point, I would like to thank Dr. Christopher 
Saunders and Professor Colin Webb of the History Department and the 
staff of Special Collections, Jagger Library, for the assistance and 
encouragement they have given me in the course of research. 
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CHAPTER 0 NE 
THE ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSKEIAN TERRITORIES 
AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROL 
i The Extension of White Control 
Beyond the Kei, 1872-1894. 
In 1872 the Cape Colony initiated a cautious forward 
movement across the Kei that was to draw the clusters of independent 
African chiefdoms beyond that river within the White polity. 1 By 
1894, when Pondoland was at length annexed, the extension of colonial 
rule over the territories between the Kei and Natal and the progress-
ive contraction of this enclave wedged between the two white states 
had been carried forward to an end, and the Cape and Natal colonial 
borders met. 
Already at the beginning of the 1870s, the preconditions 
of this process of sub-imperialism clearly existed. White influence 
and white intervention beyond the Cape's eastern boundary was of long 
standing; and the pressure of the white presence, though of varying 
intensity, scope and length of time, had probably gone unfelt by none 
of the traditional societies. In the territories the Cape had con-
ducted re-settlement schemes which had transformed areas neighbouring 
on the frontier into convenient dumping-grounds for colonial Mfengu 
and Thembu emigrants, as well as displacing the conquered Gcaleka 
under Sarili; while along the southern Drakensberg an autonomous 
Griqua state had been set up under white aegis. This gradual pene-
tration of white control was marked by the devices of informal 
empire, of residents and diplomatic agents, who acted as the shock 
troops of the colonial advance, preparing the way for the political 
incorporation of the chiefdoms within the Cape Colony. That step 
• 
1 This chapter owes much to c.c. Saunders, 'The Annexation of the 
Transkeian Territories, 1872-1895 1 (Oxford D.Phil., 1972). 
2 
few colonists doubted the Molteno Government would undertake. 
Besides the obvious fact of past involvement which, it was widely 
held, could neither be abandoned nor reduced without the loss of con• 
trol, one concern loomed greater than others in the considerations 
of the Government in Cape Town. As Charles Brownlee, the first 
Secretary for Native Affairs, whose shaping hand is apparent in the 
formulation and conduct of his ministry's 'native policy', declared, 
'The main object in view is to maintain peace on our borders and the 
longer peace is maintained the less probability is there of war '. 2 
Concern for the stability of its eastern frontier precluded 
the Cape from allowing the continuance of independent African rule and 
determined the Government in favour of intervention beyond the Kei. 
What undoubtedly gave particular shape and force to this policy 
decision was a complex of factors existing at.the turn of the decade 
which helped to create·a trans-Keian situation of increasing in-
stability. There was the ever-present danger of border disputes 
between Mpondo and Mpondomise, Bhaca and Mpondo; an almost constant 
state of hostility between Gcaleka and Thembu, overlaid by rivalry 
between the chiefs Sarili and Ngangelizwe, and between Thembu and 
Mpondo; the intrusion of many African newcomers into Nomansland in 
the 1860s, coupled with the imperial designs of Adam Kok; and the 
death of the Mpondo chief,. Faku. QAs it happened, the turbulence and 
dislocation in the t·erri tories ~]in good measure the very con-
sequence of the white intervention which has already been described.Q 
Moreover, the presence of groups of Xhosa and Thembu on both sides 
of the frontier menaced the security of the Colony's eastern dis-
tricts, and it was deemed better to control a whole chiefdom cluster 
rather than be at the mercy of political events beyond .the Kei which 
might unsettle or provoke a section within the Colony. 
2 Cape Archives, N.A.840: Brownlee to Colonial Secretary, 2 May 
1873 (part printed in~. A.10- 173, copy of which is enclosed). 
3 
Already in May 1873, writing some months after taking 
office, the Secretary for Native Affairs put forward the argument 
that the Cape Government should extend control beyond the Kei •only 
under circumstances when the peace and tranquility of our borders 
are endangered by the acts of our neighbours', but he included by way 
of exception the incorporation of those 'weak tribes imploring our 
protection, and desirous of becoming British subjects', as well as 
the emigrant communities who might be regarded as British subjects 
already. In a confidential annexure to his report Brownlee proposed 
the Colony set about enlarging its influence by gaining a foothold 
beyond the Mbashe. The tribes of the Gatberg area were already, 
arguably, British subjects by virtue of earlier residence in British 
territory, they were afraid of external attack, and occupied a stra-
tegic position on the Colony's borders. To Brownlee'm mind, this 
area should become ' ••• a strong advanced outpost, from which we can 
gradually extend our influence and protection to such tribes as 
desire it ••• overawe the Pondos, support the Tambookies and 
Umhlonhlo [~ Mpondomise chiefQ; and prevent any combination for evil 
between the Amapondas and Kreli'. 3 
That the Molteno Government was committed to a cautious 
and prudent advance east of the Kei, calculated to secure 'peace on 
our immediate frontier, and among the border tribes beyond', 4 was 
dictated by two factors; on the one hand, by the tactical argument 
that any rash assertion of control might create the very instability 
which white rule was intended to remove, and, on the other, by the 
constitutional necessity of working through the Imperial Government, 
relations between which and the Colony were as yet unclarified. 
3 
4 
In the event, by mid-1876, the Cape found herself in 
Cape Archives, N.A.840: Brownlee to Colonial Secretary, 2 May 
1873 (part
1
printed in £Ee., A.10- 173, copy of which is enclosed). 
~' G.21- 75, p.132. 
4 
de facto possession of all Fingolandt Thembuland and Nomansland, 
colonial influence extending along the south of the Drakensberg, as 
far as Natal. The rapidity of this advance had outstripped cautious 
expectation and the success amply justified Brownlee's conviction. 
expressed a mere three years previously, that '••• there is every 
reason to believe that our influence and government will be extended 
to Natal without violence or bloodshed'. 5 This rapid and success-
ful accomplishment of the Government's aim to stabilise the frontier 
zone owed much to a particular set of circumstances in the terri• 
tories, conditions presenting the Colony with an opportunity to 
intervene. In Nomansland, J.M. Orpen, magistrate sent to the 
Gatberg area in accordance with Brownlee's proposal of 1873, seized 
the initiative and pushed the territory towards political incorpora-
tion. In Thembuland, an advantage was offered when Ngangelizwe for 
the second time rashly provoked the danger of a Gcaleka attack and 
promptly appealed for 'British protection'. As regards Fingoland, 
where Matthew Blyth ruled the a~enable Mfengu with the virtual 
authority of a colonial magist.rate, and also the Idutywa Reserve, 
considered since the 1850s as a colonial settlement, both seemed ripe 
for annexation. Their location immediately across the Kei on the 
threshold of the territories ensured their early inclusion in any 
initial advance the Colony made beyond the frontier. But f'or 
Charles Brownlee, the addition of a large black population to the 
Cape by mid•1876, if not by conquest, then apparently by consent, 
meant that ' ••• more than 450,000 ~frican~) have of their own free 
will and choice placed themselves under our authority, being desirous 
of securing the peace and.good order which British rule ensures to 
them'. 6 Although the Cape Government did not consider the use of 
5 Cape Archives, N.A.840: Brownlee to Col. Sec., 2 May 1873. 
6 Cape Archives, P.M.O. 259: Memorandum by c. Brownlee, 
7 July 1876, p.17. 
5 
armed force to hasten the incorporation of the remaining independent 
tribes along the coastal plain, thus wrapping up the work of annexa-
tion in the Transkeian Territories, the expectation was held that 
the Gcaleka, Bomvana and Mpondo would in time come peacefully under 
colonial sway. The self-evident blessings of the Pax Capensis en-
joyed by the absorbed tribes, the security, prosperity, and freedom· 
from despotic chiefly government. would, Brownlee wps assured, per-
suade and impel the independent chiefdoms to seek subjection to white 
rule. Indeed, in his view, the\3'hole thrust of colonial policy, 
tending towards the pacification of the frontier zone, would in the 
logic of things convince them of their interest to remain 'at peace 
and on friendly terms with us and those who are under@(} •• •? 
As it happened, the course of annexation, set in motion ~Y 
the Molteno Government in the early 1870s and proceeding smoothly/by 
I 
1876 towards the achievement of its objectives, ·was to be deflected 
and delayed. 
1..,.._ 
The extenslon of white control was forcibly challenged 
by African resistance movements in the war of 1877-78 and the 
rebellion of 1880-81. This resistance of the traditional societies 
effectively dispelled the belief that the annexation process would be 
a peaceful one, and; by rudely shattering the Cape's confidence in 
I\ 
her ability to sustain an imperial role, gave rise to alternative 
solutions to colonial rule. In addition to the Cape's unwillingness 
to push ahead with the work of expansion, another major cause of de-
lay was Imperial intervention in the course of incorporation. The 
Colonial Office enmeshed the question of the Transkeian Territories 
in Southern African con;federation schemes by making Cape support for 
the projected confederat~on a prior condition of her annexation of 
Thembuland and Gcalekaland. Then, alarmed by the fear that the 
Cape left to her own devices would precipitate an African uprising, 
7 9:f_, G.21- 175, p.131. 
6 
London required that British approval be given the form of government 
accorded the territories once they were brought within the Colony. 
While, then, resolutions had been introduced in the Cape Parliament 
in 1875 declaring the expediency of annexing Fingoland, the Idutywa 
and Nomansland, and those relating to Thembuland in 1876 1 this triad 
of factors interposed to set the process of incorporation off-course. 
In the event, Fingoland, the Idutywa Reserve and Griqualand East 
were annexed to the Cape Colony by an act of 1877, as enforced by 
proclamation in 1879; and Thembuland and Gcalekaland, the latter 
'obtained by conquest' as a result of the 1877-78 war, by act and 
proclamation of 1885. The subjection of the Mpondo chiefdom in 
1894 rounded off the incorporative process. 
Intervention in the interests of the security of the 
Colony's eastern marches formed the dynamic principle of Cape policy, 
for the Government believed that the extension of white rule would 
impose stability on the frontier region and remove the threat of war, 
which might easily engulf the lands on both sides of the Kei. It 
was generally assumed that independent African rule which the Cape 
sought to bring to an end was endemically anarchic and, indeed, in 
contemporary accounts the superimposition of colonial control 
represents almost the enactment of a Hobbesian political philosophy. 
Surveying the Southern African arena in a broad historical sweep, 
with an obsessive focus on the Difagane, Brownlee reflected, in an 
official memorandum, on the 'process of conquest and aggrandisement, 
destroying and building up' which he thought had regulated the 
political relations of the indigenous societies of South-Eastern 
Africa 'probably••• for centuries;. 8 The stark picture Brownlee 
• 
presented of remorseless tribal warfare, a near pathological 
8 £EE, G.21-'75, p.122. 
7 
political instability, draws upon features of the conventional 'state 
of nature~ that philosophical device employed by political thinkers' 
to explain the logical presuppositions of civil society. But where-
as philosophers did not regard such a state of nature seriously as a 
historical hypothesis, for Brownlee its historical reality was well 
grounded. The human nature he postulated of the 'barbarous tribes' 
was one actuated by a restless striving for power, precedence and 
domination: homo homini lupus. Proceeding to a dubious generic 
statement, he characterised the indigenous communities as motivated 
by • ••• aggression, love of conquest, extermination of conquered 
tribes, or ruling them with stern despotism'. 9 .Just as Hobbes had 
attempted to deduce a prescriptive civil philosophy from psycho-
logical maxims, so for the policy-makers this state of anarchy beyond 
the Kei necessitated the imposition of control and the institution in 
the territories of civil society, as the only logically consistent 
step to ensure lasting peace and eliminate the arbitrary constraints 
which characterized the state of nature. In the words of the 
Bishop of St. John's, 'We have the right to assume that supervision 
which is implied in constituting ourselves the central power of 
government over the whole country. It is our duty to take upon 
ourselves that position, and not to perform it would be to leave the 
Kafir races ••• to their savagedom and interminable intertribal 
warfare'. lO 
The imperatives of control and the interests of stability 
dictated a course of intervention by the Cape in both intra- and 
inter-chiefdom disputes. Civil warfare among the Mpondomise was 
exploited by the expan~J.M. Orpen as a first step towards --
hustling the whole of Nomansland into the colonial embrace. Shortly • 
after taking up his appointment in the area, he succeeded in con-
9 £E!:., G. 21- '7 5, p .121. 
10 Ibid., G.4-Ca3, Appendix c, p.85, q.8. 
8 
vincing the warring chiefs, Mditshwa and Mhlontlo, that 'British 
protection' would restore peace; and, dramatising their sporadic 
encounters, persuaded Brownlee that this extension of Cape rule would 
arrest a major shift in the local balance of power in favour of the 
Mpondo, who had been allied with the stronger chief, Mditshwa. As 
the Mpondo were known to be hostile to white encroachment, Brownlee 
considered that they should not be allowed to take advantage of 
Mpondomi~e rivalry to assert or reclaim influence in Nomansland, and 
so agreed to the reception of the chiefs as British subjects. 
Two decades later, a struggle for power in Pondoland be-
tween the paramount Sigcawu and an influential councillor; Mhlangaso, 
indirectly prompted Cape ingression, for on this occasion the concern 
for stability was more immediately experienced by Natal than by her 
sister colony. Tile political crisis affecting the chiefdom only 
began to present the threat of 'anarchy and confusion' 11 to neigh-
bouring areas in the early 1890s and even then the Cape-ruled terri-
tories were not much affected. But Natal could not ignore a civil 
war being fought on her border, and to anticipate the contingency of 
Natal intervention, the Cape took the decision to step in and 
establish its rule. 
The penetration of colonial influence was directed towards 
the defined objective of regulating and harmonising political re-
lations among the chiefdoms. Initially this was secured by the 
Cape's intervening as an arbiter in conflicts between tribes through 
the mediation of its agents, by exercising a protective function 
over groups traditionally friendly to the Caper~'. over those who had 
newly sought out the British connection against hostile neighbours, 
or by dispensing advice and exerting diplomatic pressure favourable 
to colonial interests. It is in such terms that the gradual in-
volvement of the Cape in the long history of conflict between the 




Thembu and Gcaleka can be understood. When Ngangelizwe, a young 
man with expansionist visions, became paramount chief, tensions be-
tween the two chiefdoms, expressed in cattle-thieving disputes and 
skirmishes, grew more pronounced and frequent. To defuse the in-
herited antagonism, Ngangelizwe's councillors arranged a diplomatic 
marriage between the two royal houses. Unfortunately, in 1870 
Ngangelizwe, in one of his periodic outbursts of aggression, so 
brutally ill-treated his wife, the daughter of Sarili, that she fled 
to her father, permanently maimed. Fearful of Kreli's vengeance, the 
Thembu paramount petitioned the Cape High Commissioner to send an 
officer to reside with him, and in consequence, E.B. Chalmers took up 
his appointment as resident with Ngangelizwe in February 1871, initi-
ally to prevent hostilities between him and Sarili. In the following 
year, Ngangelizwe asserted a traditional claim to the country of the 
Bomvana, whose chief Moni regarded Sarili as his titular superior; and 
when Ngangelizwe raided him, appealed to Sarili for military assist-
ance. Sarili promptly advanced through Thembuland and though Cape 
Town was alarmed that he might make extensive territorial gains, the 
chief withdrew his army. A duly chastened Ngangelizwe asked his resi• 
dent in November for 'British protection', but when the loss .of author-
ity entailed in his submission to white rule was spelt out to him, the 
request was withdrawn. A commission appointed to investigate the 
conflict maintained it was of the greatest importance for the Colony 
that Ngangelizwe's position should not be further weakened. As an 
ally of the Colony, he should be built up as a counteractive force 
to the newly realised power of the Gcaleka. Then, in August 1875, 
relations between Thembu and Gcaleka reached crisis-point once more, 
but this time Ngangelizwe's irresponsible actions brought about the re-
c\tl>tion of the Thembu as British subjects. After a niece of Sarili had 
been beaten to death on his orders, Ngangelizwe was confronted with the 
unwelcome prospect of retaliatory action by the Gcaleka, followed by 
10 
defeat and loss of territory as a likely result. This prospect did 
not please the Cape Ministry either, for it had no wish to see the 
hostile Gcaleka gaining more land and dominating the frontier zone. 
So when at the prompting of his missionary, Ngangelizwe renewed his 
appeal for protection, the Cape acceded to the request and assumed 
control over Thembuland. 
The Cape Government was clearsighted enough in estimating 
the sober· realities of power to recognise that 1'•rhile the peoples of 
large areas had been persuaded to come under colonial rule voluntar-
ily, the grounds of submission were not a mere value preference for 
civilized white government or the flattering transference of politi• 
cal allegiance away from chiefly despotism. The small-scale African 
chiefdoms had accepted British protection, either seeking assistance 
against external aggression or.else reluctantly convinced by the 
pressure(jof circumstances that no other alternative lay_open. As 
Brownlee remarked, 'With all the tribes who have placed themselves 
under our rule it has been simply a matter of expediency or necess-
i ty '. 12 In Nomansland, where as a result of the arrival of many 
African new-comers in the 1860s land was scarce and border disputes 
between the various qroups in occupation were frequent by the end of 
the decade, it is obvious that the extension of white control bore 
the promise of adva.ntage for some tribes. For the weaker chiefs 
British protection most likely offered the sole guarantee of the re-
tention of their lands and the integrity of their chiefdoms against 
Griqua domination. But a closer understanding of what such pro-
tection would involve did not serve to lessen African ~~~~~t~de:i' 
over the ba~gain struck. The formerly autonomous tribes soon found 
the consequences to be ever-increasing pressures disruptive of the 
fabric of traditional society and, for the chiefs, the gradual erosion 
and curtailment of their independent powers, particularly in the 
12 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/3: Report of c. Brownlee for 1880. 
11 
judicial sphere. In the case of the Thembu, as the immediate 
danger of Gcaleka hostility receded, the price which the chiefdom 
had paid for protection was estimated higher than they had reckoned 
for. Disaffection with Cape rule mounted as the tribesmen came to 
realize that they had irretrievably lost their independence when 
they had· only sought protection. . Official annoyance provoked by the 
ingratitude of its charges who depreciated the magnanimously bestowed 
blessings of white rule was voiced, for example, by Brownlee of the 
Mpondomise: 
••• we have come in between tribes who were constantly 
fighting with each other, each seeking to obtain what 
the other had; we have interfered to save them, and 
instead of feeling grateful each tribe is dissatisfied 
because we do not give it that which it could not ob-
tain by years of fighting and bloodshed although we 
have secured to all parties that which they possessed 
when we intervened and they have since enjoyed peace 
and prosperity.13 
On the colonial side, the problem was how to avoid becoming embroiled 
in traditional local conflicts, serving the interests of one chief-
dom in its rivalry with another, to the detriment of those larger 
concerns of stability and peace. For 'the tribes would be deriving 
the benefit of our interference and protection, in matters which 
suited them, and at the same time remaining independent and following 
their own inclinations in other matters'. 14 The restrictions on 
all-embracing control imposed by the limited liability of the Cape's 
" role as policeman during the period when colonial control lay lightly 
over the area underlined the weaknesses of the system of informal 
rule through agents and residents. Likewise the increasing diffi• 
culty~ the Cape found in maintaining a neutral image, as an arbiter 
able to put to good effect its claim to impartiality in the settle-
ment of conflict, and yet at the same time wield influence in the 
wider interests of peace or interfere if necessary 'in behalf of the 
13 Cape Archives, N.A.843: S.N.A. to Magistrate with Umhlonhlo, 
7 December 1876. 
14 1!2.!.Q.., N.A.841: S.N.A. to Resident with Gangelizwe, 3 November 
1874 .. 
12 
15 common good', pointed to the desirability of extending colonial 
control over the tertitories as a whole. Only by incorporating the 
independent chiefdoms within the white polity could complete over-
sight of the cond3bt of foreign relations among the tribes be obtained, 
traditional hostilities regulated and reduced1 and colonial faith in 
its 'aptitude for control of subordinate races' vindicated. 16 
At the same time, the Cape Government required assurance 
that each extension of white authority would not bring further border 
disputes in its wake. The Bhaca first asked for protection in 1873 
but their subsequently renewed request was only granted in early 
1876; Jojo and the Xesibe had to wait even longer. Both the Xesibe 
, 
and Bhaca had quarrels with the Mpondo, and the Cape had no desire 
to inherit these. Even after a Cape magistrate had taken up resi-
dence in Xesibe country, the Government was wary of intervening in 
") 
support of the Xesibei,J'who were the target of Mpondo raids across an 
undefined border, as it wanted to avoid entanglement in a war with 
the Mpondo. But the refusal to intervene weakened the Cape's 
prestige in the eyes of both the Xesibe whom the administration was 
nervously restraining and who were thus hamstrung by the very 
'protection' they had sought, and also of the Mpondo, who found they 
could raid with impunity. As Brownlee urged, 'If we do not grant 
the Xesibes [the protect ion] which we promised them in taking them 
over, we do an injustice to them and bring ourselves into contempt 
with those who plunder and dispossess the Xesibes, notwithstanding 
that they are nominally under our protection'. 17 Caution, too, 
would have to be exercised in case too premature an advance of white 
control, especially without clear evidence of local consent, might 
provoke resistance and prove counterproductive of the very ends for 
15 Cape Archives, N.A.841: S.N.A. to Gangelizwe, 11 August 1875. 
16 .!2.!2.•, C.M.K. 2/11: Report of W.E. Stanford for 1896. 
17 ..!!?is!•, C.M.K. 2/3: Report of c. Brownlee for 1880. 
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which such extension had been intended. 
It was in the war of 1877-78 and the rebellion of 1880-81 
that the problem of colonial control in the Transkeian territories 
came to be posed directly as one of military force. By mid-1876 
the Cape had advanced her rule and realized her objectives east of 
the Ke.i with a rapidity and success that seemed to ensure the in-
evitable completion of the work of annexation through the gradual and 
peaceful extension of white control. The rounding off of the in-
corporative process it was thought would bring a more assured and 
permanent stability to the frontier zone, but the Colony did not con-
template armed intervention to hasten the course unless compelled to 
do so. Tile Government realised that the eventuality of war had not 
been precluded by the steps already taken, but it was believed that 
the Cape had achieved a position which enabled her to limit any con-
flict that might break out. Were war to come it would provide the 
opportunity for further advance, but the Government held to the ex-
pectation that the Gcaleka, Bomvana and Mpondo would in time come 
peacefully into the colonial fold. 
Indeed, the initial skirmishing that blew into a full-scale 
war, in which the Colony and the Gcaleka were the major antagonists, 
evidently caught the whites unaware; however once war had been 
declared, the Cape determined to take full advantage of the occasion 
it presented to deal with the Gcaleka in such a manner that they 
would never again disturb the frontier. On the part of the Africans, 
the struggle represented an armed movement of resistance to the en-
croachment of white control which threatened the continued political 
independence of the chiefdoms; but in the event the military power 
of the Gcaleka was to be finally broken and all their country taken 
under de facto Cape rule. The successful prosecution of the war 
was, nevertheless, not to afford lasting stability in the territories, 
14 
for two years later the Colony found itself with a major rebellion 
on its hands. In 1880 the Transkeian territories erupted in a 
desperate attempt to throw off white supremacy and for a time it 
seemed that the Cape's whole position east of the Kei was in jeopardy. 
Soon after the commencement of the Basutoland war in September 1880, 
the Sotho in the Matatiele district of Griqualand East rebelled, 
followed shortly by the Mpondomise in the Qumbu and Tsolo districts, 
and some of the Thembu in Thembuland proper and Emigrant Thembuland. 
Even without Basutoland, the area in revolt was far larger in extent 
than that involved in the 1877-78 war. As it happened, the Colony 
proved militarily able to suppress the Transkeian rebellion unaided, 
and once hostilities had ended early in 1881 the Government proceeded 
to reassert its control, though the territories would long remain un-
settled. After this critical phase in the history of Transkeian 
annexation passed, no very militant political resistance was ever to 
be mustered against the colonial regime, although fears in the Cape 
of another African rebeliion remained very much alive. Recurrent 
rumours of an armed black solidarity against colonial rule fuelled 
the war-scare that periodically flared up and swept the frontier. 
J. A. de Wet, ·the Secretary for Native Affairs, had a hostile reception 
from the Thembu in September 1884 and later told the House they had 
been on the verge of revolt. Early in 1885 Blyth reported a wide-
spread combination was forming on both sides of the Drakensberg and 
that the rejection of .another Sotho demand for Matatiele would serve 
as a signal for an uprising from the Caledon to the Indian Ocean. 18 
Though such alarms proved false if not groundless, they .registered 
the traumatic impact with which war and rebellion had undermined the 
Cape's imperial confidence in her ability to rule a large black popu-
lation beyond the Kei. 
18 C.C. Saunders, 'Annexation of the Transkeian Territories', p.328. 
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The extent of colonial involvement in the territories, it 
was soon realised, committed the Cape Colony to an all-incorporating 
extension of control, any reduction in which would endanger the whole 
position it had gained. This commitment had propelled a cautious 
but steady forward movement across the Kei until the critical events 
of 1877-78 and 1880-81 temporarily exhausted the Colony's imperial 
buoyancy and put paid to the belief that once the Cape had thrown 
its rule over the territories they would automatically become an area 
of stability. The feeling gained ground that the Cape should be 
relieved of the military and financial burdens of empire that had 
clearly proved too much for her, either by transference of the terri• 
tories to Britain or else abandonment. 
The idea of retrocession had first arisen out of the oppo-
sition to Premier Sprigg's Disarmament Act, called with unintentional 
irony the '~t for the better preservation of peace Wi~Jthe Colony', 
as fear of the proverbial war of the races and the desire to safe-
guard African interests gave impulse to a movement for direct British 
rule of the territories. Then, in early 1883, the Scanlen Govern-
ment declared itself in support of retrocession of the Transkei, in 
line with the abandonment of Basutoland, and in the meantime pursued 
a policy of laissez-faire and non-intervention with regard to the 
dependencies. Magistrates stationed beyond the Kei took a firm 
stand against what Walter Stanford, then in charge of Engcobo, called 
'the present 01etting matters drift'' policy of the Government 1 • 19 
To one current solution which proposed the complete abandonment of 
the territories and their reversion to independent African rule, the 
1
men on the g~ound were strenuously opposed, certain that such a 
course would precipitate anarchy and instability, quite couqter-
productive of the ends which the extension of white control had been 
intended to achieve, and likely to endanger white interests in the 
19 Stanford Papers: Dl, Stanford to J. Frost, 11 May 1884. 
16 
area. Stanford wrote,'it would be the worst possible policy to 
withdraw control and lose all that has now been gained. Central 
authority either Imperial or Colonial must be maintained'. 20 In 
view of the Scanlen ministry's measures of non-intervention and 
prospective retrocession, some magistrates declared themselves in 
favour of transference to the Imperial Government, a step thought 
doubly desirable, because the Cape faced the inevitable prospect of 
future rebellion, and for this her military resources were inadequate. 
Eventually, so Stanford believed, the government of the territories 
would revert to the Cape, a course for which the history of British 
Kaffraria formed a precedent; and with African resistance checked, 
'probably with the hardest work over'. 21 However, after the Scanlen 
Government had been defeated at the polls on the very issue of retro-
cession, the process of annexation was resumed by its successor. 
Past involvement of the Colony excluded the alternative of disengage-
ment from the territories, the strategic importance of which was a 
major reason for colonial control. 
The reassuring completeness with which the Cape had won 
military control over the indigenous communities did not extend, 
however, to the wider and more intricate scope at which the Cape 
aimed in attaching the African people to the colonial connection 
through a loyalty strong enough to cause them to transfer allegiance 
wholly from the old to the new order. As the Cape's ambitions ex-
panded to include the more complex aspects of the transformation of 
traditional society, its interlocking at numerous vital points with 
the white polity, so the problem of control, now no longer military, 
became complicated by all 'the grave difficulties that must attend 
the efforts to raise a people from barbarism'. 22 For the Africans 
20 Cape Archives, l/ECO: 5/1/1/3: Report of W.E. Stanford for 1883. 
21 Stanford Papers, Dl: Stanford to E.J. Byrne, 15 April 1884. 
22 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 2/62: Blyth to S.N.A., 4 November 1880. 
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the conflict of wills between white and black became a matter of 
retaining what was left of the fading power to fashion their own 
destinies and conduct their own lives in their own ways, of which 
political independence seemed an emblem and guarantee, instead of 
comprehensively adopting the vision of civilization and progress 
favoured by the administration, ~nd for this the obstructive re-
sources in their hands were many and varied. One such response was 
a dogged attachment to traditional social modes which magistrates 
categorized as an innate conservatism, a recalcitrance to the demands 
of change and modernization. Here the administration's authority 
though not overtly challenged met with passive obstruction. At the 
other end were more organized, articulated forms of political re-
sistance, rejecting white control and asserting African independence 
of action, which because they did not assume the militancy of re-
bellion could not be answered or treated with the immediacy and sim-
plicity of military force. 
On the African side, war and rebellion had demonstrated 
the futility of the attempt to use military resistance to halt white 
encroachment. In Thembuland, black opposition to colonial rule was 
channelled into a protest movement among the Thembu, spearheaded by 
the Rev. Nehemiah Tile, that was both political as well as separatist-
religious, and had the active support of the paramount chief, 
Ngangelizwe. This included in its programme the withdrawal of all 
but one of the magistrates, and the reception of the Thembu tribe 
by the British Government. Petitions organized by Tile sought in 
effect a return to the period of a British resident in ·Thembuland, 
before colonial protection was extended to the area and before the 
onerous magisterial jurisdiction existing in Thembuland in the 1880s 
had been introduced. For the traditional leadership had found that 
the establishment of Cape rule entailed the whittling away of their 
independent powers and the curtailment of their jurisdictional 
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authority. In March 1884, Stanford reported to the Secretary for 
Native Affairs ' ••• a growing feeling in favour of a transference of 
the Native Territories to the Imperial Government '. 23 In the 
current debate on retrocession, he was himself in favour of such a 
step, and adopted a cautious attitude of attentisme, offering no dis-
couragement to the chiefs and headmen who met with him to discuss the 
issue. But once the Scanlen ministry had fallen, the newly appointed 
Secretary for Native Affairs, de Wet, on a tour of the territories, 
quite firmly disabused the Thembu paramount of any idea of retro-
cession and reasserted the reality of colonial control. By the end 
of 1884, the Chief'Magistrate of Thembuland, H.G. Elliot, was speaking 
of the 'total collapse of agitation';24 but on Tile's return to his 
former position in the chiefdom by late 1890 there began a revival in 
the fortunes of his independent church that was however to prove 
short-lived. With his death in 1891, attempts to organize the Thembu 
to exert pressure on the Government for greater~onr~fatjli}l.--~J 
system of white suzerainty seem to have ended. 
Towards the new class of Christian, educated evolues, of 
whom Tile was a member, the administration displayed a marked am-
bivalence, stemming from a basic inconsistency of attitude which 
desired African emancipation from the tribal system at the same time 
as fearing its consequences. Through contact with white society, 
the evolues had acquired new political skills of organization and 
propagandization, an articulation which could be put at the service 
of a wider vision and new social horizons, or which could provide a 
medium for the expression of tribal African grievances, as in Tile's 
case. As for the latter, the administration reassured itself of the 
political innocuousness of the Thembu protest movement by tendentious-
ly representing the educated leadership as a radical minority group 
23 Stanford Papers, Dl: Stanford to J.W. Sauer, p.166. 
24 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 1/82: Report of H.G. Elliot for 1884. 
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who had tricked the Thembu into a mistaken belief of white oppression 
against their better judgement. By a process of isolation, this 
cadre could be safely separated out from the mass of traditional 
tribesmen: their loyalty to the white government was never really in 
question, though for a time misrepresented or perverted by the de-
based rhetorical arts of the radical clique. The Chief Magistrate, 
Ell~ reported that: 
considerable stir was caused throughout the Territory 
by the mischievous agitations of certain semi-educated 
tiatives (of no position or influence in the Tembu 
Tribe) who obtained a hearing by representing them-
selves as champions of the oppressed natives, and that 
from their education and intercourse with the white 
rr.en, they were acouainted with their designs, and knew 
how to frustrate them. When these persons first 
appeared upon the scene they met with little countenance, 
or credence, from the bulk of the people, and to the 
end of their short reign ••• were strenuously opposed 
by all the more sensible Chiefs and trusted Councillors 
of the Tembu Tribe. They nevertheless worked upon the 
shattered and debilitated mind of the Chief Ngangelizwe, 
and by making use of his name (no matter what the tribal 
opinion of Ngangelizwe personally may have been, his 
position was revered), succeeded in calling together at 
various times considerable numbers of natives ••• when the 
agitators endeavoured to convince the people that they 
were being sorely oppressed by Government, and that if 
they were only firm and united, Government would abandon 
this Territory, as it had done Basutoland •••• 
(The Secretary de Wet ts meeting with the Thembus 
in late 1884 J caused a total collapse of agitation, and 
was assuring and encouraging to all loyal men (which I 
consider the mass of the Tembus to be). The tribe, 
fearing that what had been advanced in its name might 
mislead Government, brought pressure to bear upon 
Ngangelizwe, who ••• publicly repudiated all that had 
been said in favour of separation from the Colonial 
Government, by expressing their loyalty to it~ and 
asking for a continuation of its protection.2~ 
Political protest of a different order, the first stirrings 
of an African nationalism, was observed among a small group of edu-
cated Mfengu in the Nqamakwe and Tsomo districts of the Transkei, 
who had absorbed the influence of and established contact with the 
new African elite in the Eastern Cape. 'Some of them had been hold-
ing meetings t'o discuss their alleged grievances, and had elected a 
25 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 1/82: Report of H.G.'Elliot for 1884.· 
20 
President and Secretary and were apparently in communication with 
the Native Political Association that has been I believe formed in 
the Colony'. 26 The Chief Magistrate of the territory expressed 
concern that the political movement was engendering a polarisation 
of white and black, by spreading propaganda among the 'semi-educated 
class' claiming that 'they are an oppressed people and that the 
. . . 
actions and intentions of both the Government and its officers in 
these Territories is nothing but evil'. 27 A similar mechanism of 
re-assurance to Elii~t 1 s was employed by Blyth, which had the effect 
of guaranteeing the loyal attachment of the mass of the people and 
the traditional rulers (now co•opted into the white bureaucracy), 
at the expense of isolating the black protest group. 'All the most 
influential and best of the Fingoes are indignant at the course pur• 
t28 sued by this small section•••• The administration could rely 
on the passive deference of the tribesmen to the new order, for the 
overwhelming military force which the Cape had brought to bear in the 
war and rebellion must have convinced them of the futility of armed 
resistance on traditional lines. But the novel and more subtle 
forms of protest against white rule, shaped and organized by the 
educated evolues, presented the Cape Government with a renewed 
challenge though one expressed now in a westernized form. An ironic 
reversal had taken place. While the tribesmen became inured to Cape 
rule, displaying what Burke once called 'a sort of heavy, lumpish 
acquiescence in government', the focus of opposition shifted to an 
educated minority, one product of the civilizing impulses on which 
the Cape had pinned such high hopes in extending its rule. 
The attitude to the evolues carried over into the 
26 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 2/67: Blyth to U.S.N.A., 14 June 1887. 
The South African Native Political Association, founded in early 
1883, was an early African political organization. 
27 .!.!2!!!•, C.M.T. 2/68: Report of Matt. Blyth for 1887. 
28 .!1?.!!!·• c.M.T. 2/67: Blyth to u.s.N.A., 14 June 1887. 
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magisterial prescriptions regarding African education. The ·whole 
thrust of education, it was felt, should be designed to acculturate 
the traditional people along European lines, but nevertheless along 
lines appropriate to the African's position within the new dispen-
sat ion. The primary concern, in the aims and conduct of African 
education, was to entrench and perpetuate the subordinate status of 
Africans in the white-controlled society fashioned with the incorpora-
tion of the territories within the Colony. Magistrates, for in-
stance, severely criticized the 'bookish' academic fare provided by 
the mission schools and the kind of African who emerged from them, in 
terms of an implicit premise that blacks constituted a natural 
labouring class. 'Book-learning' unfitted the African for 'the 
social position his circumstances suited him for' and educated him 
beyond his station in 'the social economy'. 29 They held that ad-
vanced education only isolated the young man from his people and, 
because of the inequality of opportunities existing in the Cape, 
frustrated him in his search to find a job commensurate with his 
skills and proficiency. As one magistrate remarked, 'these are the 
men really who are found at the head of these agitations which are 
termed anti-European•. 30 Education was not conceived by the admin• 
istration; as it was by progressive blacks, as the road to social 
mobility and personal advancement in the new society. Rather it was 
seen as a process whereby African entry into the white society could 
be controlled in accordance with the white conception of the Africans' 
subordinate status as a separate community in the new order. 
The overriding concern of the Cape for stability did not 
brook the challenge of black resistance nor countenance any right of 
29 
30 
.Q!f,, G.43- 179, Report of W. Ayliff, S.N.A.; G.17- 178, p.43. 
South African Native Affairs Co~mission, Appendix c, vol. 2, 
Minutes of Evidence, no. 13313 LN.O. Thompson]. 
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resistance that might invalidate the colonial claim to control or 
• 
undermine the legitimacy of colonial rule. The administration 
would admit of no conditional limitation in fact to the extent of 
political obligation on the African side or of political authority 
on the Colony's side. For the fundamental grounds of obligation and 
authority were so heavily weighted in the Colony's favour as to im• 
pose an almost absolute duty of obedience on the ruled and an abso-
lute right to govern on the rulers. 
In order to define the terms of discussion, a distinction 
can be drawn between criteria that are formal and general and those 
that are substantive and specific. As regards the latter, the 
Government derived its title to rule from and rested the legal ob-
ligation of obedience on varying grounds. Tilere was, first of all, 
the right of conquest to rule over the vanquished, as in the case of 
Gcalekaland which came under colonial rule as an inevitable conse• 
quence of the war of 1877-78. On the outbreak of hostilities in 
October 1877, the High Commissioner issued a proclamation deposing 
Sarili and forfeiting his country. in order to justify retrospectively 
the invasion of Gcalekaland; and once the territory had fallen by 
force of arms into the Cape's possession, formal steps were taken to 
annex Gcalekaland to the Colony. Mi·li tary conquest gave an absolute 
right to persons and property, enabling the Government to relocate 
the Gcaleka in the greatly reduced northern portion of the tribal 
patrimony. With those chiefdoms on the other hand which had volun-
tarily consented to come under its rule the Cape acknowledged the 
political necessity of respecting their vested rights, though when 
it suited the interests of colonial control such claims were paid 
scant regard and even unilaterally abrogated as in the case of the 
Emigrant Thembu. 
Political relations between Colony and chiefdoms were also 
regulated by formal conditions of cession, involving the transference 
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of sovereign authority and voluntary submission of the tribesmen to 
Cape rule. These bound the contracting parties to a strict obser-
vance of terms, although when the Cape felt sufficiently assured of 
its control the conditions could be adjusted or ignored as circtm• 
stances appeared favourable. The conditions dravm up on the re-
ception of the Thembu provided, for instance, that Nsiangelizwe and 
his sub-chiefs should be recognised and paid salaries; but for a 
time the Cape would not abide by the clause and had the paramount 
deposed, until political considerations, in fact heightening Thembu 
disaffection, prompted the Government to reinstate Ngangelizwe. 
Again, while the conditions had reserved to the chiefs judicial 
powers to settle law suits, excepting serious criminal cases, subject 
to the right of appeal to the magistrate, the Government's construction 
of the clause, namely that the magisterial courts exercised both 
original and appe'llate jurisdiction, effectively reduced the chiefs 
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to civil arbitratorst for !:~9n appeal from the tribal courts all cases 
were heard de novo. The conditions of cession, then, provided a 
formal definition of relations, a common area of initial agreem~nt 
within which the Cape could manoeuvre as occasion presented itself 
to thrust the Thembu along the road to a magisterial take-over of 
traditional authority. 
Title to authority also rested 1~on the claim of long 
establishment, the fact of earlier residence in British territory, 
by virtue of which some African groups could arguably be regarded as 
British subjects anyway. Thus, the Idutywa had since 1858 been 
looked upon as in some sense a colonial off-shoot and its residents 
knew themselves as 'Government people'. As for Fingoland, although 
independent territory, it had been settled by colonial Mfengu who 
on their exodus had been promised that they would 'continue British 
subjects'. 31 
31 c.c. Saunders, 'The Annexation of the Transkeian Territories', 
p. 51. 
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A more general duty of ·obedience was located in the utility 
of colonial government. As Brownlee wrote of the Thembu, 'while on 
the one side they have received benefits, on the other they have in• 
curred obligations to the power that has protected them'. 32 At 
other times, an indefeasible right to authority was asserted simply 
on the ground of the realities of power, proven by military super-
iority; and with shrewd discernment, unflattering to the civilizing 
pretensions of a white imperial power, it was realised that the 
Africans obeyed only while and since it was their interest to do so. 
The Cape's refusal to admit any justification of black 
resistance that challenged the legitimacy of its authority or the 
supremacy of its power can be illustrated in the case of both the 
Emigrant Thembu and the Mpondomise who rebelled in 1880. The 
Emigrant Thembu had crossed the Indwe on the understanding and with 
the inducement that they would be independent of British rule, but 
found themselves brought gradually and insidiously under complete 
magisterial control despite the frequent protests of their chiefs. 
In 1878 co~trol was tightened further when Emigrant Thembuland was 
divided into two districts, with a second magistrate. A year later 
not only were they disarmed and made to pay hut tax, but appeal 
cases were instituted from the chiefs' to the magistrates' courts. 
In 1880 their petition against prospective annexation was ignored and 
unaware that the parliamentary bill would not receive the~mperial 
assent, the Emigrant Thembu most probably assumed it would soon take 
effect and introduce into their country the full force of colonial 
law. Goaded to this point the majority of the chiefs led their 
people into rebellion. The Cape Colony had stubbornly ignored their 
guaranteed rights which it had proceeded unilaterally to revoke, as 
one former agent, E.J. Warner, contended, 'simply because GovEirnment 
32 Cape Archives, N.A.843: S.N.A. to C.M. Thembuland, 2 February 1877. 
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thought some alteration necessary' in the interests of white contro1. 33 
To objections at the colonial take-over voiced by Warner and echoed 
by Stanford and Elliot, the Government argued in justification of its 
action that in a strictly legal sense the Emigrant Thembu had for-
feited their title to independence as not all the colonial Tambookies 
had left the Queenstown district in 1864. But nothing could dis-
guise the fact that the extension of Cape rule represented more a 
usurpation than a voluntary delegation of authority, a dictation of 
terms by a powerful neighbour who had arbitrarily transformed the 
political status of Emigrant Thembuland. 
Likewise the Mpondomise who had accepted British protection 
discovered its consequences to be an ever-tightening web of control 
subversive of the traditional social and political order. The 
Mpondomise chiefs had keenly resented the magisterial usurpation of 
their powers and the assumption of authority over their people. The 
·tactless and undiplomatic handling of Mhlontlo by the hapless adminis-
trator. Hope, who gave his life and name to the rebellion, had served 
to estrange even the better disposed of the two leading chiefs. 
On their rebellion, Brownlee could present a weighted and selective 
interpretation of past relations between the Cape ar.1 Mpondomise, 
which allowed of no other conclusion but that the tribesmen had 
'without any complaint, or assigned reason taken up arms against the 
34 
Government ' • By a strict adherence to the terms of cession and a 
liberal fulfilment of its governmental responsibilities, the Cape had 
rescued the people from Mpondo aggression and factional conflict, 
taken them over at their own request, secured them in possession of 
their tribal patrimony, and bestowed the peace and prosperity of 
white rule on tribesmen who had, in turn, failed to observe 'the 
obligations undertaken by them, namely those of loyalty, and sub-
ordination to Government'. 
33 .Q:E, G.4- 1 83, Minutes of Evidence, no. 6250. ,~~~A 
34 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/3: Brownlee to U.S.N.A., 10 October\~ 
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The Pondomise were taken over by~seven years since, 
when broken and scattered by other tribes [;] since 
then they have enjoyed peace and prosperity, and the 
broken members of the tribe have returned to the 
country from which they were expelled •••• The people 
had no grievance, but having been strengthened under 
the protect ion obtained from us, they :) • • • took adv an ... 
tage of the Basuto rebellion to endeavour to establish 
independence from our rule, and which we had never 
sought to impose on them, but which at their earnest 
and oft repeated application had been extended to them 
simply as an act of favour and mercy to themselves'.35 
Once African resistance to the extension of white rule had 
been forcibly checked, the Cape proceeded with the reirnposition of 
control so as to reaffirm and entrench its authority and preclude the 
recurrence of war or rebellion. After the 1877-78 war magisterial 
control of the Transkeian territories was strengthened by the 
creation of three chief magistracies. The Government reorganised 
and rationalised the administrative structure of the areas under its 
rule by a process of centralization and amalgamation of the hitherto 
unco-ordinated districts. Gcalekaland was united with Fingoland and 
the Idutywa to form the chief magistracy of the Transkei; Bomvanaland 
and Emigrant Thembuland were both included in the newly created chief 
magistracy of Thembuland; and when Brownlee was appointed Chief 
Magistrate of Griqualand East he was informed that the bounds of his 
jurisdiction would run to the Gatberg and include the Xesibe country 
as well. At the same time a rearrangement of personnel was effected 
which enabled the Cape to tighten its control of tribal law adminis-
tration among the incorporated chiefdoms. 
As a further instrument of control, the Cape insisted on 
disarming the tribes east of the Kei but succeeded only in exacer-
bating relations between its officials and the people among whom they 
were stationed. The Gcaleka and the Ngqika were disarmed before 
being allowed to settle in Gcalekaland, and the Mfengu and Emigrant 
35 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/3: Brownlee to U.S.N.A., 7 April 1831. 
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Thembu were persuaded, despite much resentment, to surrender their 
guns. Thembuland proper and Griqualand East were not systematically 
disarmed, as the Zulu war and the Moorosi rebellion broke out and the 
Government realised that, with Cape troops fully occupied; disarming 
tribes near the Mpondo would leave them defenceless against their 
hostile neighbours. 
After the 1880-81 rebellion, which for a time had seemed to 
imperil the Cape's whole position in the area, the Government gave 
itself earnestly and defensively, in an atmosphere of continued un-
rest and threatened renewal of war, to the task of considering and 
implementing me~~ures which would safeguard and stabilize white con-
trol. The major administrative undertaking tackled in the post-
rebellion years concerned the relocation of rebel Africans. On the 
principle that rebellion should involve the forfeiture of land and 
territorial rights, tribesmen who had surrendered were not permitted 
to reoccupy their patrimony but were resettled in defined locations 
under government-appointed headmen. In this regard, Walter Stanford 
fashioned a new instrument of administrative control, the ward system, 
which after its successful adoption in the Engcobo district was 
widely canvassed and extended to other magisterial divisions. The 
subdivision of th~ district into small wards' each with a headman in 
charge who was directly responsible to the magistrate, was made 
possible by the confiscation of the tribal lands on the rebellion of 
the local chief, Dalasile. In line with the general instructions 
issued from Cape Town after the revolt, that 'Personal influence 
arising from national or tribal position should not be allowed to 
become permanent', 36 the ward system worked towards undermininq the 
traditional authority structures inasmuch as it reduced the tribal 
headmen to the status of functionaries within the white•dominated 
36 Cape Archives, N.A. 915: U.S.N.A. to all Chief Magistrates, 
15 September 1881. 
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bureaucratic hierarchy. Appointment to office was sanctioned by 
Stanford on the recommendation of two 'leading headmen' in the dis-
trict, his n.c.o.Gs, and in many cases commoners were given position. 
As for the rebel chiefs, the Government ordered that both those cap-
tured and those who surrendered were to be stripped of all title to 
recognised authority and once released were to be placed under the 
watchful surveillance of the local magistrate and forbidden to 
'gather a following around them or to reacquire political influence 
among their former people'. 37 
The Cape also resorted to the classic technique of divide 
and rule, as the general instructions declared: 'If in the late 
disturbances there has been an attempt among the different tribes to 
combine against the Government, it becomes an important consideration 
to determine in what way such combinations in the future can be either 
averted or weakened ••• and to ascertain whether the power of 
national sympathy strengthened as it will be by congregating in one 
locality all of a particular tribe, can be reduced or subjugated by 
the combination in one settlement of different native nationalities'. 38 
Divide et impera was the administration's tactical response to the 
projected fear of 'combination' which haunted the magisterial mind 
particularly after the rebellion had debilitated official confidence. 
Many alleged to have discerned such a combination behind the revolt, 
widely interpreted as an organised conspiracy against the Colony, 
although the lack of cooperation between the rebel groups suggests 
there was in fact no plot. Some months prior to the eruption, 
Brownlee had drawn attention to the danger the enforcement of oppress-
ive measures such as the Disarmament Act presented, as a unifying 
focus by which previously localized African opposition to the white 
order could be mobilized in a militant black front. 'Hitherto in 
37 Cape Archives, N.A. 916: U.S.N.A. to Acting C.M. Transkei, 
27 June 1884. 
38 .!!?i£.., N.A. 915: U.S.N.A. to all Chief Magistrates, 15 September 
1881. 
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all wars and rebellions we have been enabled to localize resistance 
to our authority, and our strength has consisted in the disunion of 
the various tribes, whom we have thus been enabled to use against 
each other, but should any trouble arise from the disarmament act, 
it needs no prophet's eye to see that a common ground of resistance 
to us will be established and that we must be prepared for a General 
Resistance'. 39 After the rebellion the relocation of Africans who 
had taken up arms was deliberately exploited by the Government to 
fragment compact chiefdoms and intersperse the tribesmen, so that a 
district like Engcobo came to represent a patchwork intermixture of 
. . 40 
various groupings. By the mid-1890s considerable internal move-
ment, resettlement and migration, had assisted the declared govern-
ment policy of undermining the tribal system; and with the gradual 
erosion of the political integrity of the formerly independent 
African chiefdoms were removed the means to mobilise them 'in con-
41 cert'. 
All the same, the spectre of combination, refusing to be 
laid, reappeared in such novel, non-traditional forms as African 
participation in the Transkeian conciliar system and representation 
in the colonial parliament. A common objection to the General 
Council, a body established for limited black self-government, was 
voiced for example by Elliot who argued that it bore seeds of 
'political danger' in bringing 'the tribes together'; 42 by another 
administrator, of conveying to Africans an exaggerated sense of 
their 'real importance and [their] strength numerically in South 
- ' 43 Africa • Likewise Elliot's cautious advocacy of limited black 
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belief that 'there is no virtue in numbers', rested upon an argument 
that foresaw in a combination of black voting powers the likelihood 
of white-black polarity and a consequent political collision. Con-
flict between black and white societies had thus been transposed 
from the context of the frontier, where white had thrust back black 
by an overwhelming military superiority, to that of the political 
arena where blacks by strength of number and a rediscovered racial 
solidarity might rout the white overlord and recover in the colonial 
legislature what had been lost through conquest or cession. Both 
with regard to the conciliar system and parliamentary franchise, the 
alarm went out that whites who had resolutely removed the means and 
opportunity for combination among the African chiefdoms and had de-
cisively swept away black resistance to the extension of white con-
trol were now with thoughtless liberality providing westernized 
institutional forms, through which blacks might renew their opposition 
and realize common aims, and so they were encompassing their own 
downfall. Techniques of white control would have to be correspond-
ingly developed as Africans were emancipated from the tribal system 
and entered the new white-dominated society: such bec-ame the task of 
successive Union and Republican governments in twentieth century 
South Africa. 
ii The Administrative System of Control 
in the Transkeian Territories 
As the territories were progressively incorporated in the 
Cape, colonial control came to be structured in a unified adminis-
trative system which was almost military in form and spirit. The 
edifice of bureaucratic rule was hierarchically organised, reaching 
its apex in the office of the Secretary for Native Affairs~ with 
'" power devolved downwards through a d:i!sciplined chain of command that 
u 
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ran from the Chief Magistrate to the district magistrate to the 
government-appointed headman at the base. 
In the unitary form of government that was established, 
the executive was made the sole custodian of authority and vested 
with wide-ranging powers. The various Annexation Acts provided for 
the introduction of Cape laws to the newly-acquired territories, but 
the Cape Government was permitted to modify these laws by proclamation, 
a Shepstonian device first adopted for use in Basutoland. Laws made 
by the Cape Parliament after annexation applied only if specifically 
extended by proclamation of the Governor-in-Council. The only 
safeguard against arbitrary executive action was the provision that 
the proclamations had to be laid before Parliament in the next 
session after they were issued. The Transkeian territorial form of 
government, which ran quite counter to the liberal doctrine of the 
separation of powers, represented in fact an extreme type of the con-
centration of bureaucratic authority. At the level of the magis-
terial district, the officer of the Native Affairs Department united 
both executive and judicial functions, and wielded paramount influence 
in and full control over his jurisdictional area. This inclusion of 
all local governmental powers in a single hand the administration 
usually justified by analogy with the African political tradition, in 
which the chief invariably bore the sword of justice in his own 
person. Only at the level of the superior courts, after the Cape 
Supreme and Eastern Districts Courts in 1882 were given concurrent 
jurisdiction with the Chief Magistrates' Courts, was the judiciary 
kept distinct, for until then appeal had been taken to and the power 
of review held by the Secretary for Native Affairs. 
Cp1pm~a~ cpntrol, it was believed, could only be effectively 
exe~cised by men on the ground vested with full undivided powers, 
acting from personal observation and experience, and linked into a 
military chain of command. F!.ln::tioning in this way, the magisterial 
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system appeared to guarantee a strong, simple, paternal rule, devoted 
to the pacification and civilization of the indigenous African 
communities. 
During the period of informal rule, prior to the co-
ordination of the territories into a closely structured administrative 
unit, Cape officials, in the absence of any legal sanction, had ex-
ercised authority over the chiefdoms with which they were stationed 
by means of 'moral suasion'. As a rule, on taking up their appoint-
ments, the diplomatic agents and residents were instructed by Cape 
Town 'to obtain such an influence over Chiefs and people that you may 
in course of time be enabled to exercise a beneficial control in the 
internal affairs of the Tribe, and in what relates to the Tribe in 
connection with other independent Tribes, and with whom there may at 
present be no Residents'. 44 The force of circumstances put a 
premium on character and personality as factors determining adminis-
trative act ion and the q1.1ali ty of i.1fluence exerted. Thus an agent 
like Matthew Blyth was able, by the sheer force of his masterful 
personality, to exchange his vaguely-defined advisory capacity for 
the real coin of political power, ruling the Mfengu community'with 
the virtual authority of a 'paramount chief'. The influence of the 
agents varied of course from tribe to tribe, according to their amena-
bility to colonial rule; the degree of exposure to political pressures 
that forced the tribesmen to accept supervision from a Cape official 
and later to seek 'protection'; the relative advantage the chiefdom 
calculated could be derived from the British connection against ex-
ternal aggression. From a combination of these factors, neither the 
resident with Sarili, the superintendent of the Idutywa Reserve, nor 
the Tambookie agent, exerted an influence comparable with that of the 
Fingo agent. But the basic formula of informal white rule remained 
44 Cape Archives, N.A. 840: S.N.A. to w. Wright, 18 September 1873. 
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constant: the exercise of authority 'through personal influence, 
4-
backed and supported by the well disposed among the people'. ~ 
However, the absence of a formal administrative organization 
in the territories and the reliance on the personal capacity of Cape 
officials to work informally in co-operation or competition with 
traditional rulers formed, as it came to be realised, but a passing 
phase in. a process of increasingly more direct and more embracing 
rule, which had been gathering apace since the end of the 1860s. 
Colonial control had at first lain lightly upon the area, but the 
territories were to be brought more firmly and closely under Cape 
rule through the superimposition of the bureaucratic structure of 
district magistrates working under a chief magistrate. The extension 
of control can be seen, then, as a movement from informal rule resting 
upon the personal influence of scattered agents to a bureaucratic-type 
authority with the executive welded into a strict chain of command. 
The wide ranqe of discretionary powers previously lodged as of necess-
ity with the men on the spot gradually gave way to a growing uniform-
ity of administrative usages, a greater centralization of executive 
control, a clearer line of demarcation between judicial, executive 
and other (diplomatic, fiscal) functions, and an increased displace• 
ment of indigenous practices by colonial ones. As one officer 
astutely commented on one aspect of the trend: 'Up to the present 
many matters as to which there is no law have been regulated by the 
personal rule of the Magistrates •••• The men are the same but times 
are changed, and more and more the Magistrate in a native district 
ceases to be a ruler and becomes an administrator of law'. 46 The 
heroic age of the Cape civil servant in the territories was passing. 
As the government of men came to be modified in the 
45 Cape Archives, N.A. 844: S.N.A. to Magistrate at the Idutywa, 
6 December 1877. 
46 Ibid., C.M.T. 1/277: Report of the Acting Chief Magistrate 
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direction of the administration of things, such change was obviously 
deplored by the magistrates. For it robbed the district officer of 
local initiative and of the plenitude potestatis he had once enjoyed 
as a benevolent autocrat dwelling among his people; and it reduced 
him to a regulated functionary in a bureaucratic system. It was 
claimed, for example, that apart from his extensive judicial powers, 
the Chief Magistrate was 'a mere nonentity', acting simply as an 
official channel of communication between the district magistrates 
and Cape Town. He was bound to report and receive instructions on 
wide-ranging matters in dispute or in question referred to him for 
decision or direction by magistrates; he carried no voice in the 
appointment or transfer of any official serving under him; and he 
could not incur or authorize any expenditure, no matter how urgent 
or necessary, without first obtaining permission from the Secretariat. 
Centralization and concentration of the power of government in Cape 
Town, all the encumbering procedural formalities of bureaucratic rule, 
were impeding the vigour and efficiency of magisterial control. To 
remedy this, the simple logic of paternalism demanded that the men on 
the ground should be invested with such powers 'as will command the 
11 respect of the natives (]:)enable them to look up to the magistrates 
~to feel that they really have Chiefs over them'. 47 
 
Indicative of the same trend towards bureaucratization and 
away from patriarchalism was the official rule sent out from head-
quarters that magistrates were not to venture forth from their posts 
without superior permission. This invited criticism from district 
officers on similar grounds. It removed the magistrates from the 
closeness to their people in ways that had made government seem a 
tangible and beneficial thing, approachable, effective and sympathetic. 
Such an action, so one argued, had 'completely crippled them in their 
47 ~ape Archives, C.M.K. 2/5: 
LW.B •. Chalmers] for 1884. 
Report of the Acting Chief Magistrate 
usefulness as officers on whose good management ~,i=.~------S strict super-
vision of the natives under their charge, the Govt. c::_:_--J the country 
' 48 at large so very much depend • It was important 'if Govt. is to 
be considered otherwise than as a punishing and taxing master, that 
officers should be encouraged, nay required, to travel about and make 
themselves as thoroughly acquainted with their respective districts 
as possible and let the Natives see that they take an.interest in 
their welfare'. 49 Colonial control, it was felt, could be most 
adequately maintained through this type of personal and paternal rule, 
which brought the district magistrate into intimate contact and under-
standing with his people. 
Another feature of the administrative system which commended 
itself to the men on the ground was the way in which the local 
officers acting at a considerable distance in extra-colonial African 
country were knit together into a highly disciplined force. The 
military chain of command was valued as a means of ensuring the 
maximum energy and unity of purpose and action, which Blyth, that 
noted disciplinarian, considered 'so essential a factor in dealing 
with Natives•. 30 
But direct control of a vast black population could by no 
means be maintained by a handful of widely dispersed white magistrates. 
It was politically and administratively desirable therefore to make 
an accommodation with the traditional ruling ;lite and to harness 
them to the bureaucratic system, extending the line of command down-
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As white rule was extended beyond the Kei, the congeri~s 
of independent African chiefdoms lost their a~tonomy and were in-
corporated within a common bureaucratic structure. Political re-
lations in the area underwent a fundamental transformation. The 
decentralized pattern of pre-colonial political organization gave 
way to a tightly co-ordinated and clearly defined administrative unit 
ultimately ruled from Cape Town and immediately controlled by dis-
trict and chief magistrates. 
Animated by the principle that, as one magistrate expressed 
it, 'chieftainship and civilization are essentially antagonistic', 
Cape 'native policy' had long kept in view the steady aim of abolish-
ing chieftainship and had long rung its death knell.
51 
This ob-
jective was carried over into the Transkeian Territories, where 
government policy and administrative practice worked steadily but 
surely towards destroying the power of the chiefs and with it the 
autonomy of the chiefdoms. The rationale of the official attitude 
was contained in a multiple indictment of the institution. It was 
regarded as inimical to white supremacy and white civilization, which 
were readily equated; basically antithetical to them. Chiefs were 
seen as focusing the conservative and primitive energies of tribalism 
against beneficent white rule, acting as a brake on the desirable 
progressive development of the tribesmen from barbarism to civili• 
zat ion. As the lynch-pin of the tribal system, which it was the 
Cape's civilizing mission to transform, the administration looked to 
the ultimate destruction of chieftainship as necessary and in-
evitable. Any reduction in chiefly power, it was believed, entailed 
a corresponding increment in magisterial authority, and magistrates, 
jealous of their own powers, worked to ensure that the tide flowed 
in their direction. The criticism, for example, levelled against 
the introduction of colonial procedure in the territorial courts was 
51 £EE_, G.33- 179, p.90. 
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partly governed by the fear of a consequent diversion of cases to the 
courts of the chiefs whose authority might thereby revive. 52 Again, 
even the limited jurisdiction granted chiefs in Thembuland under the 
terms of cession was regarded as an embarrassment to the adminis-
t ' t. 53 rators pres ige. Matthew Blyth's authoritarian rule over the 
acephalous Mfengu came to be universally reckoned as a paradigmatic 
state of affairs, and this Chief Magistrate's successful administration 
was attributed to the very fact that he had no tribal chiefs to 
contend with. 
The colonial magistrates also justified their opposition to 
the institution of chieftainship by arguments of chiefly despotism, 
contending that it was innately incapable of affording good govern-
ment, or of maintaining a scrupulous respect for the rules governing 
the exercise of power, and so for t9is reason the African communities 
failed to satisfy the criteria of a capacity for independence. On 
the whole little understanding was shown of the checks and balances 
built into the traditional political system. 
But the full weight of the magistrates' opposition lay be-
hind the conviction that chiefs were dangerous potential foci of re-
sistance. In the white mythology, chiefs assumed the guise of in-
veterate intriguers,c=~~ rebellion, spearheading African pro-
test to white rule and endlessly plotting in diplomatic concert to 
bring about the long-awaited 'war of the races'. The locus~classicus 
of chiefly resistance was the Thembu-Mpondomise Rebellion of 1880-81. 
Brownlee, characteristically setting chiefs apart from commoners in 
terms of their response to the introduction of colonial rule, could 
describe it thus: 
The people as a rule were satisfied with the change, 
they enjoyed peace, prosperity and protection from 
arbitrary and unjust treatment. 
52 CPP, G.3-'84, Report of W.E. Stanford, p.125. 530 Ibid., G.3- 184, p.124. 
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The Chiefs and those dependent on them V!ere dis-
satisfied, they could no longer confiscate property 
and their adherents having no opportunity in sharing 
in the unjust actions of the Chiefs fell from them •••• 
The Chiefs desired a revolution and a return to the 
old state of affairs, with all its disadvantages the 
people did not concur, and the Chiefs would have re-
mained powerless had we not in the disarmament act 
come to their aid, and they were not slow to take the 
advantage of this measure to suit their purposes.54 
The official policy of eroding the institution of chief-
tainship was effected by imposing a bureaucratic structure on the 
territories that cut across tribal boundaries and all but ignored 
the old political units. The Transkeian administrative system was 
explicitly based on the arbitrarily defined magisterial districts and 
their subdivisions, the locations, and into this structure the.area 
of chiefly jurisdiction was not formally integrated. Rather, the 
bureaucratic chain of command extended downwards from the chief 
magistrate to the district magistrate to the location headman, whose 
position fell directly under the authority of the magistrate, and so 
it effectively bypassed the chief. In the Transkeian territorial 
system the chiefs, then, came to occupy an ambiguous position. 
The circumscription of chiefly authority was aimed at three 
main areas, limiting the judicial and executive competence of the 
chiefs, establishing economic co.ntrols, and stabilising the pro-
cesses of accession and deposition. In the important sphere of 
judicial decision-making the chief's authority was drastically cur-
tailed, and while often possessing the power to try petty civil 
cases, he had no power to enforce his decisions and, in addition, 
appeal lay to the magistrate's court where cases were heard de novo. 
On submission to colonial rule, the chiefs or those recognised by 
the Government were awarded annual stipends and lost their traditional 
right to tribute which had drawn chief and people together in the 
bonds of gift relationship. The withdrawal of tributecut deeply 
54 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/3: Report of C. Brownlee for 1880. 
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into the whole nature of the relationship between them and had rami-
fying effects on the nature of the chief's prestige. Lastly, al-
though recruitment to chieftainship was still to be governed by the 
hereditary principle, it was his formal recognition accorded by the 
Government that involved the chief in the chain of positional 
authority mediated through the magistrate and secured to him any 
residual power within the externally derived bureaucratic system. 
In such ways as these the Cape demonstrated its determination and 
ability to erode the legitimacy ~nd reduce the authority of tradition-
al chieftainship. 
Nevertheless, chieftainship was to display a remarkable 
vitality and resilience, even in the face of colonial blows, and 
though convinced of the incompatibility of chiefship and modern 
civilized government, yet the Cape thought it neither expedient nor 
practical to extirpate it.' Instead it was considered politic to 
utilise the tribal rulers by harnessing them to the white adminis-
tration, which would maintain overall control. In his capacity as 
Secretary for Native Affairs; Brownlee had urged the adoption of this 
policy with regard to the chiefs, for if their prestige were ignored 
'an influence would always be at work, generally perhaps imperceptible, 
but liable at any fitting opportunity to break out into active oppo-
sition'. 55 As a principle this was to guide the Government, for 
example, in its decision to reinstate Nqangelizwe as paramount chief. 
Amid mounting Thembu disaffee;tion, it was realised that the chiefs 
had been given an issue c§.B:3, which they had been able to unite the 
people behind them. In an attempt to restore popular confidence in 
white rule, Ngangelizwe was recognised in November 1876 as paramount, 
but subject to the conditions under which the tribe had come under 
'British protection', for there was no intention of allowing him to 
rule with his former authority. Events like this brought home to 
55 f.E.!:, G.16~'76, p.103. 
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the magistrates a sense of the essentially popular bases of the · 
chief's authority, his traditional value as a communal symbol, the 
popular respect his person and office were accorded. Stanford, for 
one, deplored the rash cry of colonial politicians for the thorough-
going suppression of chieftainship, whi~h would meet with widespread 
African resistance; and while he did not support at the other extreme 
the retention of the institution, he argued that as civilizing im-
pulses were brought to bear on the tribal system, the chiefs would 
gradually lose such legitimacy as the displaced values of traditional 
society had once served to bolster. In the meantiree it should be 
government policy to 'control them, making their authority sub-
( J 56 servient to ours and cutting it down as opportunity offers'. 
Brownlee was of a similar opinion: 'It is an anomaly that people in 
a British Colony should recognize a higher authority than that of 
Govt. GJ still with the natives the recognition of Chieftainship is 
a power so strong, and sacred that it cannot be removed or eradicated 
by enactments or restrictions, t-ime can bnly remove this difficulty, 
d . d . • f . ' t t 57 an a JU 1c1ous use o circums ances •••• 
In their account of the tribal system, magistrates revealed 
an almost Burkean sense of society as an- organically integrated whole 
with long-standing institutions, chieftainship foremost among them, 
supported by traditions and prejudices which worked to cement African 
society-together. They held to no hopes of a sudden transformation 
of the political and social life of the indigenous communities, 
carried through by the weapon of law, but looked instead to the civil-
izing impetus of white rule to effect the gradual displacement of 
·-a 
tthe power and influence of Chieftainship among the Natives'.::> 
Until such time as the Cape had succeeded in its policy of weaning 
56 Stanford Papers, Dl: Stanford to J. Walker, 24 July 1879. 
57 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/3: Brownlee to U.S.N.A., 10 October 1881. 
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the people from the chiefs, the Government must needs manifest its 
determination to regulate the competence of chiefship, to cauterize 
its potential as the prime-mover and focus of resistance, and turn 
the prestige and traditional loyalties that surrounded the office to 
the advantage of white control, in other words, to tolerate it for 
the sake of its practical governmental value. 
Whenever possible the magistrates attempted to work with 
the chiefs in their districts, particularly in matters affecting the 
tribe as a whole. The desire on the Government's part to attach the 
chiefs to the-administration, to secure their fealty and assistance, 
was expressed in the award of stipends, the grant of farms, and the 
many ways of rewarding and disciplining some pour encourager les 
Magistrates would encourage the practice of admissio or 
audience, by which chiefs visited the district office frequently 
'for the purpose of giving and asking news, discussing matters of 
59 interest to the tribe, and expressing loyalty to Government' In 
fact, most of the traditional chiefs', excepting those who had rebelled 
against Cape rule, were recognised by the Government and involved in 
the administrative line of command as paid functionaries of the 
Native Affairs Department. In all, chiefs were not unimportant 
within the total administrative system; but although they continued 
to exercise civil and limited criminal jurisdiction and to command 
the loyalties of the tribesmen, political power had shifted irreversi-
bly in favour of the white rulers. 
If the chiefs occupied an ambiguous place within the 
bureaucratic system, then that of the location headmen was pivotal, 
for they formed the front-line ranks of the Transkeian administration, 
positioned immediately beneath the magistrate and directly respons-
ible to him for the peace and well•being of their locations. With-
out them, the implementation of the policy of direct white rule would 
59 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 1/84: Report of H.G. Elliot for 1889. 
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have proved beyond the powers of the handful of districts magistrates. 
As Stanford remarked, headmen were 'as essential to successful 
management of natives as good non-commissioned officers in military 
forces'. Minor officials tied into the white administration, they 
represented 'the outcome of changing circumstances among the native 
tribes and [were] as a rule more amenable to Colonial ideas and 
methods than hereditary chiefs. The authority of the Headmen is 
derived from Government and they are dependent on Govt. support to 
maintain it'. 60 
In the ward system devised by Stanford in the Engcobo dis-
" trict, the role of the headman was clearly defined and apparent. 
After the rebellion of 1880-81, Stanford proceeded with the sub-
division of Engcobo into 59 wards, with the assistance of two influ-
ential headmen and his administrative adjutant. On their recommenda-
tion, he appointed headmen in charge of the wards whose duties in• 
eluded both administrative and minor judicial functions. These com-
prised the collection of hut tax, the protection of location stock 
against theft and police work, the distribution of residence sites 
and arable lands, the settlement of minor land disputes, and arbi-
tration in 'trifling' civil cases arising in their wards. They were 
also required to act as assessors, sitting with the magistrate's 
61 court. As a technique of local administrative control, the use of 
headmen was invaluable in the day-to-day government of the tribesmen, 
for colonial authority could only be effectively exercised through 
their mediation and agency. They formed the baseline of the edifice 
of bureaucratic rule which the Cape had superimposed on the Transkeian 
territories and it was on their shoulders that. the pyramidal structure, 
extending upwards in a chain of command towards the political and 
60 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/6: Stanford to U.S.N.A., 9 February 1888. 
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administrative apex in.Cape Town, finally rested. 
The not uncommon misrepresentation of tribal government as 
an unlimited and arbitrary chiefly despotism provided a convenient 
justification for the authoritarian system of magisterial control in 
the territories. According to the Bishop of St. John's, 'the people, 
having been accustomed to the autocracy of the chiefs, would require 
. 62 
to be treated autocratically by the Government'. The Cape could 
at the same time boast that unlike in traditional society, African 
subjects in the Transkei, even if they took no part in government, 
enjoyed a precious liberty, for the law was certain and stable and 
administered by impartial courts. White rule was animated by a wise 
fatherliness which strove to ensure 'security of life and property 
and equality before the law for all people', the ends of government 
most usually defined with regard to the territories. 63 
Nonetheless, some magistrates clearly recognised the genius 
of tribal government in the way it allowed for the democratic in-
volvement of all the adult me~bers of the community. Elliot, for 
instance, remarked, 'Native self-government is far more constitutional 
and under the control of the populace than it is generally understood 
t b I 64 o e • This was ~dduced as reason for the political need to 
temper the Cape's benevolent despotism, to consult the people to ex-
plain government intentions to them, ·and to allow for strictly regu-
~ 
lated participation in localQ)r~ssgs of goverrs.ment. What was re":" 
quired were forms of political intercourse between rulers and ruled 
making for good government. 
The ideal relationship between administration and people 
62 CPP, G.4- 183, Appendix C, p.79, q.13. 
63 Ibid., G.4- 183, Appendix C, p.84, q.8 [Bp. of St. John's]. 
See also Cape Archives, N.A. 846: S.N.A. ·to C.M. Thembuland, 
4 September 1879. 
64 ~·, G.4- 183, Appendix c, p.56, q.l. 
44 
was construed in highly personal and moral terms; as one of loyalty 
of the former to the latter, and of confidence and trust in the 
Government's benevolent intentions. It betokened the inauguration 
of a golden age when 'wars and troubles will end and peace and civili-
zation progress on a sound basis'. 65 The amity of the link, however, 
was in no way a qualification of its resolutely hierarchical 
character. It was simply thought politically desirable to maintain 
an atmosphere of good feeling between governors and governed, and 
this the magistrates sought sedulously to cultivate. A feeling 
widespread among the community that their interests were being ade-
quately cared for was regarded as an important psychological condition 
of stable government. 
As it happened, after the passage of the Disarmament Act, 
African confidence in the white system was deeply undermined and a 
wide gulf blown open between the people and their rulers. At the 
time, Stanford wrote, ' ••• our hold on the native mind is lowered 
many degrees. ·There is some fear of us left yet, but nearly all 
belief in the 1'nobility" of the ''white peoplelf is gone, and particu-
larly in that institution of ours called 0 Y1e. Government'' have they 
lost faith'. 66 On returning to Fingoland after his term as Chief 
Magistrate of Griqualand East, Blyth was much struck by the discontent 
among the Mfengu occasioned by disarmament. Prompted by an anxiety 
to overcome this very hiatus that existed between people and adminis-
tration, Blyth proposed regular consultatory meetings between the 
magistrates and individual headmen 'whose presence would certainly 
have a gratifying & advantageous influence over the Native populace'. 67 
After the outbreak of rebellion he reiterated rtn argument he had long 
advanced that the Africans in the territories should 'feel that they 
65 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 2/63: Report of Matt. Blyth for 1882. 
66 Stanford Papers, Dl: Stanford to J. Walker, 9 July 1879. 
67 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 2/62: Blyth to S.N.A., 16 May 1879. 
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have some power and voice in their own government '.
68 
Indeed, -a 
constant burden in Blyth's reflections on African administration was 
the political wisdom of 'governing the people through themselves'~-
and the folly of direct white rule, without the mediation of the 
traditional rulers or the participation of the tribesmen. As agent 
in pre-annexation Fingoland, Blyth, true to his self-assumed rble of 
paramount chief, had followed the procedure of submitting proposed 
regulations to his people, so as to secure c~ consensus and the popular 
involvement of the Africans in the decision-making process, before 
dispatching the measures to Cape Town for the approval of the Govern-
ment. 'Even in old Kafir times, all laws were discussed by the 
people before being put in force'. 69 In these ways Blyth revealed 
his awareness of the importance of thorough discussion in the tribal 
decision-making processes of government. 
As Fingo agent and later as Chief Magistrate, his fertile 
mind began toying with schemes of local self-government that would 
secure several ends. They would be a means of attaching the loyalty 
of the Africans to the white bureaucracy. They would provide a way 
of bringing local men of influence into the district administration 
and serve as a useful instrument of administrative devolution. 
Local self-government was also to be a means by which Africans would 
be allowed to take a great step forward in the management of their 
own affairs, an·agency of popular political education 'to train them 
in habits of civilization, and good Government'. 70 It would provide 
strictly-controlled institutions for limited political self-expression 
and for the sponsorship of locally-financed welfare schemes. Ideas 
such as these had long been forming in Blyth's mind. As early as 
1873 he had expressed the hope that the Mfengu 'may be gradually 
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become educated to enable them in time to receive a form of Self 
Government, a step so necessary to the progress and well being of a 
people'. 71 
Seizing the opportunity that a proposal by headmen of the 
Butterworth district for a plan of local taxation presented, Blyth 
summoned the leading Mfengu headmen together in early 1882. In 
bringing to bear the wealth of creative ideas on the nascent scheme, 
Blyth elaborated a distinctive system of local self-government which 
came to carry the impression of this remarkable magistrate and his 
forceful administrative style. He proposed a scheme of local 
taxation to pay for roads, hospitals, schools and other district 
needs. Headmen from each Fingoland district were then formed into 
local committees, each of which was to meet monthly, under the chair-
manship of the resident magistrate, and elect ten members to attend 
a quarterly meeting at the chief magistracy, where matters of more 
general concern might be discussed and any expenditure over £25 author-
ized. 72 As a scheme of local taxation the Fingoland District Fund 
was quite successful, but the minutes of the meetings reveal that the 
magistrates dominated the meetings and gave the headmen little oppor-
t . t t . th . . d t. 1 t th . . 73 uni y o air eir views an ar 1cu a e eir grievances. 
Blyth himself could claim that the district meetings 'result 
in a mutual feeling of confidence & good understanding' between the 
74 people and the magistrates. Inspired by the relative success of 
the scheme, a vision grew in his mind of its gradual evolvement into 
a 'Representative Council where ••• questions affecting the Govern-
ment of the whole Distr'ict could be discussed, and regulations framed 
71 Cape Archives, N.A. 151: Blyth to S.N.A., 3 September 1873. 
72 ..!2.!£., C.M.T. 2/63: Blyth to S.N.A., 13 February 1882. 
73 c.c. Saunders, 'The Annexation of the Transkeian Territories', 
p.340. 
74 Cape Archives, C .. M.T. 2/66: Blyth to U.S.N.A., 27 August 1885. 
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from time to time, as required •••• On such intimations, the 
Scanlen Ministry agreed to give pound for pound on the principle of 
parity to assist the Fund, but in fact the whole scheme rested on no 
legal foundation, and Blyth continually requested the Government to 
rectify this anomalous position by proclamation. However, it was 
considered politically undesirable to legalize the levy for to the 
mass of the people a compulsory tax would be looked upon as yet another 
burdensome colonial imposition. 76 In 1886 the Ministry of the day, 
pursuing an economic policy of retrenchment, withdrew the grant, and 
with a dwindling income from the voluntary subscriptions of 'the 
better class of people', Blyth expressed the fear that within a short 
77 time the Fund would entirely collapse. 
temporarily spent. 
The creative impulse seemed 
With regard to the territories as a whole, similar schemes 
were devised independently in districts outside the Transkeian Chief 
Magistracy by enterprising magistrates. In Engcobo, Stanford was 
in the habit of calling meetings of headmen and people, before which 
proposed local rules and regulations were presented for discussion 
78 and then put to the vote. Magistrates were qenerally agreed on 
the necessity of concedin0 to the African population some form of 
local self-government, and their replies to a circular of the 1883 
Cape Native Laws and Customs Commission, relating to this topic, bore 
a common theme: that headmen and chiefs be utilized and enmeshed in 
the white administrative and judicial structures, but that the 
magistrates retain firm overall control of the system. On this 
latter point they never wavered. Thus Elliot, 'No scheme would be 
desirable that lessened the authority or influence of Government, but 
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government might be devised that would satisfy the people and 
materially strengthen the hands of Government'. 79 Some adminis-
trators regarded such techniques negatively as providing a 'safety-
valve' for the regulated expression rather than profuse outpouring 
of otherwise suppressed political feelings, or merely as conferring 
'the semblance of power without the reality', as one magistrate 
blandly admitted.
80 
Others, however, far-sighted and more sympathetic 
to African interests, saw local self-government as an institutional 
stage in the development of African political maturity, a training 
for autonomy, a 'step in the right direction ••• which might be after-
wards extended as education and civilisation advances'. 81 
It is in Blyth's system of local self-government that we 
can trace the gP.nesis of the Glen Grey Act, for Rhodes's measures 
followed the lines of the Chief Magistrate's Fingoland District Fund 
more closely than either the recommendations of the Barry Commission 
relating to a 'Native Council' or the conciliar proposals included 
in the parliamentary bills of 188J and 1886. The relevant proclama-
tion (352 of 1894) which established district councils in the terri-
tories did not follow the Glen Grey Act exactly, for the councils in 
the Transkei were to be smaller in composition, and provision was 
also made for a General Council. Meetings of the district councils 
were to be held quarterly under the chairmanship of the resident 
magistrate and to comprise six members, four chosen by the district 
headmen and two by the Cape Governor, in practice the local adminis-
trator. From each council two representatives would be nominated to 
attend the General Council, of which the Chief Magistrate was chairman 
and on which the other magistrates sat, although they held no voting 
rights. By the end of 1894 the first four councils had met in the 
four Transkeian districts to which the proclamation applied, and 
early in 1895 the first General Council assembled under Elliot's 
79 fEE.t G.4- 183, Appendix c, p.57, q.12. 
80 Ibid., G.2-'85, pp.124-25 and 99. 
81 Ibid., G.33- 1 82, Report of Matt. Blyth, p.6. 
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chairmanship at Butterworth. 
From its inauguration in 1894-95 the conciliar system was 
to expand and develop until it covered all the territories. Like 
the early scheme pioneered by Blyth, the Gle.n Grey Councils suffered 
from the defects of a sharp limitation of focus on matters of purely 
local concern and a strict supervision exercised by the magistrates 
who dominated proceedings and ensured that criticism of government 
policy was kept within modest bounds. Nevertheless, in time, the 
Bunga at Umtata, the successor of the first General Council, would 
provide a central forum for the articulation of Transkeian African 
opinion and the councils a valuable training ground ~n the conduct 
and problems of local government. 
* * * 
Colonial rule throughout the period of annexation remained 
primarily an exercise in the<maintenance of control. The core of 
" the magistrate's role, the range of responsibilities beyond which it 
could not be narrowed, was the retention of a minimal political con-
trol and administrative authority, the maintenance of peace and 
public order, of that 'discipline and obedience' which officers con• 
t . ' 82 sidered essential to good Government • The state of nature once 
existent beyond the Kei had been terminated through the extension of 
the Pax Canensis by the institution of the rudiments of civil society, 
such as the Colony understood it. The 'disturbed .and unsettled 
state.' of the area gave way before the introduction of a 'firm and 
settled Government', which secured what Hobbes had called civil 
liberties, affording adequate protection to persons and property, and 
82 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 1/82: Elliot to U.S.N.A., 17 January 1884. 
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administering an impartial and equitable justice to all. 83 But 
beyond that control) which had been imposed from without as a re-
straint on anarchic political relations among the independent 
African chiefdoms, lay wider ambitions on the part of the Cape that 
embraced the more complex aspects of the transformation of traditional 
society along western lines. The extension of the colonial bureau-
cracy was testimony enough to the expanded scope of the Cape's will 
to control and to transform the territories. Political order became 
a precondition of progress and social development, of that civiliza-
tion which the Cape believed it was her mission to disseminate among 
the primitive and barbarous communities east of the Kei, living 
beyond the pale of civil society. 
83 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/2: ·Report of Matt •. Blyth for 1876. 
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C H A P T E R TWO 
SOCIAL EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND THE 
POLITICS OF PATERNALISM 
i Social Theory 
The experience of culture contact which the Transkeian 
magistrates shared in common with Victorian Englishmen in Africa, in 
India and elsewhere, can be most intelligibly defined within the 
framework of social evolutionary theory. In the nineteenth century 
this theory performed the function of providing a common language and 
conceptual structure that could unify the study and experience of 
man and his societies, familiar and alien, civilized and savage.
1 
As the cultural horizons of Europe expanded, the need arose for 
western man to make sense of disparate modes of organizing social 
life, which contact with alien societies had revealed, and to adjust 
his Europocentred vision that he might accommodate new social facts. 
At all times in the intellectual history of modern Europe, the figure 
of the savage has represented a disturbing problem for the cultural 
outlook, standards of value and philosophies of history of civilized 
men. Particularly as imperial commitments grew in the nineteenth 
century, it became increasingly necessary to discover social and 
ethical theories which took account of the fact that primitive forms 
of social existence did not merely belong to the past but constituted 
the everyday experience of colonial administrators. 
At the heart of the matter, beyond any immediate concern 
to construct a reasoned and scientific history of mankind, lay deeply-
felt needs of an age 'destitute of faith, but terrified at scep~icism', 
in the words of Carlyle, for reassurance amid the questionings of 
honest doubt and for guarantees that all was ultimately well with the 
1 For this introduction and, indeed, for the whole conceptual frame• 
work of the chapter, I am deeply indebted to J.W. Burr~w, 
Evolution and Society (Cambridge, 1966). 
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human situation. Evolutionary social theory arose in response to 
the breakdown of traditional systems of thought, in answer to the 
problem of how to reconcile a generally received body of descriptions 
and explanations with phenomena outside its range. What made social 
evolutionary theories attractive was that they presented a reformu-
lation of the essential unity of mankind - a classical premise of 
European political and social thought - while at the same time meet• 
ing current objections to older theories of a general human essence, 
a central human character that was static and unalterable or even un-
altered. 'Mankind was one, not because it was everywhere the same, 
but because the differences represented different stages in the same 
process'. 2 Accordingly, the various conditions in which human 
societies, both past and contemporary, are found, were treated as so 
many phases in a single scale of development. Societies were cap-
able of being graded as so many links in a cosmic, objectively know-
able progress, some stages of which were rendered automatically more 
valuable by their proximity to and mirroring of the final goal to-
wards which humanity is marching. Nineteenth century social thought 
conceived history, then, as a drama: each act could be understood 
and evaluated independently but taken together these episodes con-
stituted a single progressive ascent. Considered in these terms, 
humanity reveals itself as one everywhere, while at the same time 
assuming different and conflicting forms. As· J.W. Burrow has per-
ceptively written, theories of social evolution 
C:~rovided a way of being both relativist and not 
relativist; of admitting that many diverse modes of 
organizing and interpreting social life might have 
something to be said for them, and might play vital 
roles in the lives of human beings, while continuing 
to maintain the absolute validity of one such mode -
the positivist. The Victorian social evolutionists 
achieved this tour de force by admitting that other 
modes of thought and social behaviour might have 
been valid once, but asserting or assuming that these 
2 J.W. Burrow, Evolution and Society, p.98. 
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were only part of a larger process - social evolution -
which had to be understood in a positivist manner, 
and which led ultimately in a direction satisfying to 
those who cherished an ideal of absolutely rational 
social behaviour O. 3 
The dexterity with which Victorian social theory yoked 
together such heterogeneous ideas appears all the more remarkable 
when we consider the extent to which national chauvinism clouded any 
real understanding of alien cultures as authentic and valuable in 
themselves. Great Britain most often met with primitive societies 
on superordinate-subordinate terms, as conqueror, protector or power-
ful neighbour. The achievement of such political and military 
superiority lay in the same set of techniques which had raised the 
country to the status of a global industrial giant, inasmuch as they 
gave her mastery of the material world. Western civilization's high 
degree of control over the physical environment depended upon a com-
plex filiation of factors, among which can be enumerated a relatively 
non-magical religion and a logic of natural causality; scientific 
technology designed to secure rational ends; an ethic of work which 
released human forces of production; the growth of bureaucracy, in-
creasing specialization and structural differentiation. White 
superiority, then, was bottomed on brute mastery of the material 
world. But more significant for our study than this set of tech-
niques are the socio-psychological foundations of the confidence and 
assurance of superiority with which Britons in the nineteenth century 
surveyed mankind from China to Peru, grounded as they were on the 
steadily increasing prosperity and steadily improving security of 
Victorian England. An understanding of ethnocentrism as a social 
pheno~enon, deriving from the image men hold of their· own society, 
can help to explain how in his interaction with alien cultures, the 
Briton entered with a mind brimful with concepts and values dravm 
3. J.W. Burrow, Evolution and Society, pp.263-264. 
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from his own milieu. These ideas and attitudes acquired for him a 
normative character and provided the inflexible standards of measure-
ment by which other societies were ranked and evaluated. Elaborating 
upon social evolutionary theory, we can set up a conceptual model ex• 
hibiting the main features and contours of British ethnocentrism. 
The Briton. it may be argued, perceived his world in terms of a many 
phased progressional series, in which western civilization represented 
the penultimate, if not ultimate, stage of human endeavour. Whatever 
measure of recognition nineteenth century social theory might give 
the diversity of mankind and the variety of its social arrangements 
was severely qualified by the essentially positivist picture of 
society. Primacy and essential rightness were accorded to those 
major features of British society, economic, rel~gious and political, 
or, in specific terms, industrial capitalism, Protestant Christianity 
and parliamentary constitutional government. These formed the 
essential marks of a 'civilized' society. \'1.1hereas traditional 
societies, with their subsistence economies, heathen customs and 
chiefly despotism, were relegated to the lowest rungs of cultural 
achievement, the earliest stages of human development. Primitive 
cultures were looked upon as so many steps towards the superior life 
enjoyed by western civilization; towards which they aspired and tended 
in a process that passed through inevitable stages according to in-
flexible social laws. 
To turn to the Cape Colony, the evolutionary model has to 
be adiusted to suit local circumstances. As a consequence of almost 
a hundred years of interaction between black and white on. the Cape 
Eastern Frontier, cultural stratification of African and white 
societies was, it must be recalled, not as rigidly defined as in, 
say, Natal, and some degree of cultural continuity was provided by 
intermediaries. There was no 'one dead level of barbarism' among 
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the trans-Keian Africans, as one magistrate rightly commented. 4 
In the peri.od spapning the extension of white control beyond the 
Kei, the intermediary position was occupied by the progressive 
Mfengu, settled on the threshold of the Transkei, who had for various 
reasons shown themselves amenable to white rule and receptive to the 
ideas of civilized advance, preo.d1ecl by magistrate and missionary. 
By contrast, at the furthest quarter of the territories were the 
Mpondo, who were widely considered to occupy the lowest rungs of the 
cultural hierarchy and the lag-end of the cultural scale, ranking 
far behind other tribes in 'civilization'; so long had they escaped 
the extension of white control. Missionaries, led by the Bishop of 
St. John's, depicted them as children of darkness, while magistrates 
of the districts bordering on Pondola~d regarded the prospective 
task of raising these racial pariahs in the scale of civilization as. 
formidable. Close on their heels followed the Xesibes whom Brownlee 
pictured as 'about the wildest & most backward of all the tribes who 
have come under our influence'.
5 
As colonial rule over the indigenous people was more firmly 
consolidated, giving ampler play to the forces of social change, new 
social categories developed to mark the differentiation into defined 
socio-economic classes. By the end of the century a new term 'semi-
civilized' gained currency to denote a well-defined grouping of 
African people (the small peasants) who held a transitional position 
between the old broadly devised polarities of the 'Red masses' and 
the School people. As for the latter, magistrates looked upon the 
Mfengu and the School Africans as proteges of the white administration, 
amenable to civilized development and exemplars to the black popu-
.lation at large, constituting what one officer called 'the party of 
progress '. 6 A Ciskeian administrator spoke of this progressive class 
4 f.EE., G.33- 182, p.19. 
5 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/2: Report of c. Brownlee, 20 May 1879. 
6 f!:E., G.3- 184, p.101. 
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as 'most advanced and civilized, having adopted more civilized habits, 
and ••• generally speaking, in a more prosperous condition'. 7 How-
ever, in proportion to the total African population of the territories, 
the cla$S of evolues formed but a civilized minority, a leaven among 
the Red masses 9 as Walter Stanford was constantly intent to empha-
size. Particularly after the war of 1877-78 and the rebellion of 
1880-81, when the strength of African resistance to the advancing 
white tide and the virility of traditionalism were forcefully demon-
strated, the debate between magisterial radicals and conservatives 
about the nature and desirability of cultural conversion swung sharply 
in the latter's favour. As a result, given the observed extent of 
cultural cleavage between black and white, the recognition of the 
special interests of the indigenous people, flowing from their en-
capsulation within a particular phase of cultural development, was 
adopted into the official 'native policy' of the Cape Colony and em-
bodied in institutional form in the distinctively shaped 'native 
territorial system'. 
Notwithstanding the tactical concession, as it might seem, 
of the administration to the vitality of tribalism, rationalised as 
a belief in the efficacy of a gradualist 'native policy', the ethno-
centrism of the white society was in no way impaired. Recognition 
and tolerance did not as a matter of course imply approval. The 
imperial posture of conscious superiority and confidence in the ab-
solute validity of western civilization was not to be vitiated. 
Magistrates with unshakeable faith regarded white society as a cul-
tural paradigm exhibiting most vividly and supremely the standards 
of value which they sought to apply to social reality. Alien 
societies were consequently described in terms of the deviation that 
they displayed from the ideal model. Western civilization indeed 
7 fEE, G.4• 183, Minutes of Evidence, no. 2925 [R.J. Dick]. 
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was in many ways the measure of all things. 
As the final term in an evolutionary process, western 
society stood as the omega-point of creation towards which all human-
ity was tending, the universal and dominant model in whose image all 
other societies were to be moulded. Transposed into the terms of 
administrative policy towards the African people, such cultural 
arrogance of the Victorians caused them to conceive their govern-
mental responsibility as a civilizing mission. Writing iq~the mid-
seventies, when the successful extension of the Pax Capensis over the 
Transkeian Territories seemed in time assured, Charles Brownlee spoke 
of the '1flt>eral' African policy which his government was applying 
with regard to the subjected African chiefdoms. The Colony, he 
argued, was conducting a 'civilizing' policy which flowed from and 
justified colonial intervention in the interests of its eastern 
marches, raising military-political ends to the status of a moral 
obligation. 'we have ••• a higher mission to discharge towards the 
barbarous tribes on our borders than to govern them simply from inter-
ested motives. Our mission is to elevate and enlighten them, and to 
raise them in the scale of civilization and this we are endeavouring 
8 to do'. This policy Brownlee regarded as being in direct continu-
·ity with the 'system' inaugurated by Sir George Grey, a comment ex-
pressive of the importance of the Grey view which was to continue as 
a strong current in the mainstream of official thought all through 
Colonial times, right up to 1910. To secure the advance of the 
Africans in civilization, Grey had adopted several devices, amongst 
which were the introduction of colonial magisterial rule over the 
indigenous people; the gradual destruction of the traditional author-
ity structures, utilising them at the same time as instruments of 
white control; and attempts to create a progressive African peasantry. 
These techniques of Sir George Grey, Brownlee asserted, were being 
8 .£El!., G.21-'75, p.133. 
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elaborated and extended by the Molteno Government in the incorporated 
territories. 
policy'. 9 
'Thus, in 1856, was introduced our present native 
Implicit in Grey's understanding of the 'civilizing mission' 
was the principle of identity, the belief that· the extension of white 
control over the indigenous communities entailed their full incor-
poration within the Cape's political, legal and administrative struc-
tures, in a word, their assimilation. The civilizing mission was 
grounded on the conception and vision of a legally non-racial society. 
Indeed, in the multi-racial society at the Cape, the British Govern-
ment had maintained an identity of personal law and an equality of 
civic status for all subjects in the Colony, which were hallmarks of 
Cape liberalism. The system Qf identity was extended to British 
Kaffraria, which was annexed in 1865, where the African people had been 
conquered, broken, scattered and expelled from their patrimony over a 
period extending from the late eighteenth century and culminating in 
the desperate and disastrous cattle-killing delusion of 1857. Of 
the policy of integration, then, British Kaffraria in a legal sense 
stood as a model, but contrasted with it was the case of Basutoland, 
which the Cape treated after annexation as an autonomous territory. 
In fact, the two formed alternative paradigms of African adminis-
tration, embodying the very different principles of incorporation and 
differentiation; and the history of the progressive elaboration of 
the Transkeian system of government is in formal terms the movement 
away from the one precedent in the direction of the other. 
The benevolent paternalism of the Cape Government, implicit 
in the notion of the civilizing mission, remained the characteristic 
posture of the administration. Brownlee, for instance, considered 
the role of the magistrates paramount in advancing the civilization 
of the incorporated black population, for they were 'expected in 
9 Cape Archives, P.M.O. 259: Memo. by C. Brownlee, 7 July 1876, p.13. 
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every way to foster and encourage everything tending to the elevation 
of the coloured races'.
10 
But the temper07 informing the adminis-
trative stance, the character of the administrative style, was drama-
tically altered, as a consequence of the traumatic experience of the 
war of 1877-78 and the rebellion of 1880-81. Prior to this critical 
period, in the early and middle years of the 1870s, the reports of 
the Cape officials in the territories registered a sense of robusC) 
forward movement among the indigenous people, which was regarded as 
the very substance of 'civilization'. The process of social change, 
it was commonly argued, was necessarily slow, but the advance was 
nonetheless steady and assured. This steady confidence would not go 
' 
unchallenged. African resistance to the gradual encroachment of 
white rule, breaking out violently and actively in war and rebellion, 
revealed a surprising tenacity with which the traditional communities 
clung to their culture and it made explicit the vast extent of cultur-
al cleavage between black and white. A new note of sober realism 
was struck in the counsels of the administrators and policy-rfakers, 
(/' 
who were shocked into a realization of the magnitude and complexity 
of the task in which they were engaged. this sense of the intract-
ability of human material that was not merely passive in response to 
external pressures like the proverbial lump of potter's clay, the 
reciprocal nature of the process of social interaction, altered the 
evaluation by magistrate and politician alike of the tempo of change 
to be expected from the African societies. Even though administrators 
from the time of the 1865 Native Affairs Commission had put their trust 
in a slow grinding of the mills and had baulked at the magnificent im-
patience of Grey who would capture the assimilationist ideal by a 
frontal assault at all hazards and in one sweep, the cautious gradual-
ism which comes to the fore in the 1880s and 1890s is a new burden 
10 Cape Archives, P.M.O. 259: Memo. by c. Brownlee, 7 July 1876, p.34. 
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not heard before. There is a sense of the lowering of administrative 
sights, a concentration on the finite, the.here and now, while the 
goal towards which magisterial labours were directed has receded into 
the almost indefinite future. 
In view of the vitality of traditionalism, the Cape Govern-
ment had good reason to be wary about imposing the_Colony's adminis-
trative and legal systems on the subjected African societies. The 
war of 1877-78 and the rebellion of 1880-81 pointed the lesson of the 
dangers of excessive interference in the affairs of recently conquer~d 
communities, a lesson which the 1883 Native Laws and Customs Commission 
was to underline. Considered on the sheer grounds of political ex• 
pediency, the principle of identity, espoused by Grey and applied 
officially in the case of British Kaffraria, came to be modified in 
that of the Transkeian territories. The shaping of the distinctive 
'native territorial system', fashioned for the Transkei as a whole 
during the 1880s and 1890s, represented in fact an ever closer approxi-
mation to the Basutoland model. Indeed, from the ~ery beginning, 
with the annexation of Fingoland and East Griqualand in 1879, the 
Transkeian territories were accorded a separate status from the 
'colony proper' and governed in a distinctive manner. The Transkeian 
Annexation Act of 1877 rejected legal.assimilation because the in-
habitants 'are not sufficiently advanced in civilization and social 
progress to be admitted to the full responsibility imposed by the 
ordinary laws of the Colony'. 11 This Act gave the Governor-in-
Council, in practice the Secretary for Native Affairs, the power to 
legislate by proclamation for.the territories concerned; and, when in 
1879 such proclamations appeared, provision was made for the dis-
cretionary application of customary law in civil suits between 
Africans. With the establishment of magisterial rule in the terri-
11 A.N. Macfadyen (ed.), Statutes. Proclamations, and Government 
Notices: Act 38 of 1877, p.2. 
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tories, prior to formal annexation, the administration beyond the 
Kei was actually conducted on the same general principles as 
Basutoland, such being the pull of an apparently successful precedent 
exerted by this latter model; and so the various annexation acts can 
be said to have rationalised and sanctioned the existing administra-
tive procedures. In part, the separate status given the territories 
followed from the piecemeal, additive nature of the annexation pro-
cess. In addition, there was widespread agreement that these special 
measures provided only a temporary solution against the time when a 
permanent settlement for all the Transkeian Territories could be 
worked out, determining the precise way the territories were to be 
integrated with the rest of the Colony. However, as it happened, 
the Annexation Act of 1877 would remain, in some important respects, 
the charter of the 'native territorial system' elaborated in the 
eighties and nineties. 
Informing the distinctive administrative system shaped for 
the government of the African people in the Transkei, we can discern 
a whole political theory of conservatism, which although not systema• 
tically formulated was crystallized and substantiated by the traumatic 
cris§s of the late 1870s and early 1880s. This conservative ethos 
pervades the magisterial mind as it bore upon the desiderata, possi-
bilities, and ultimate aims of African administration. The initial 
premise of the magistrates' thinking, resting on the existence of 
cul1:ural cleavage between black and white, recognised the special 
interests of a large black population encapsulated within their 
traditional culture. The cultural evolutionary distance set be-
tween African and British societies could not be ignored in practice 
and dashed any hopes of sudden and miraculous changes in the social 
life of the indigenous people. Administration, like politics, was 
the art of the possible, and radical legislation directed at under-
mining the traditional political and social systems, without regard 
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to the history and circumstances of African society, was impolitic 
and to be avoided. Magistrates expressed an almost Burkean sense 
that society is an intricate and delicate structure imperfectly 
understood by insiders or outsiders, and that men can go only a little 
way towards adapting it to their principles and purposes. Social 
forms are slow growths of time, intimately connected with the tra-
ditions and sentiments of particular peoples, and altering almost im-
perceptibly. Thus it was argued that the governance and the permanent 
settlement of the Transkeian Territories had to take into account and 
accommodate the social circumstances and conditions of African society. 
Magistrates called for the granting of a separate status for the 
territories, which would be administered in a distinctive way. In ... 
stitutional form was to be given to the recognition of the Africans 
as 'a people apart'. 12 Consequently, the full incorporation of the 
dependencies in the Cape's political, legal and administrative struc-
tures receded from view and assumed the form of an ultimate goal to-
wards which current African policy was cautiously directed. 
In terms of social evolutionary theory, cultural differences 
between contemporary societies were to be ascribed to the achievement 
of different stages of essentially the same developmental process. 
From this some magistrates reached to an understanding that African 
modes of organizing social existence might have something to be said 
in their favour. African institutions could be seen as belori~g~_j;"t)~" 
uniquely to their own time and place, their own stage of social 
growth, and so of local and temporary, if not universal and permanent, 
validity, because the dynamism of the evolutionary process propelled 
them inexorably forward towards some other more perfect way of social 
life. Scattered hints abound of magisterial recognition that tribal 
cultures were possessed of an emotional value for their adherents and 
12 f!Z., G.4- '83, Appendix C, p.114, q.27 [ E.J. Barrett] • 
• 
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played significant r8les in their lives, that as a consequence the 
problem of social change was highly complex and deeply disruptive of 
an existing network of social relations. If this was the case, the 
administrative system must needs take cognizance of traditional in• 
.. 
stitutionst give formal recognition to those social forms evolved by 
and suitably adapted to the genius of the African people, as being 
functionally appropriate within the tot8:1 social system. The lmite 
adl!linistration, then, careful as it was not to impose a.lien structures 
proper to a civilized society, saw its task as one of preserving and 
adopting such traditional forms, not repugnant to the imperatives of 
Victorian morality, into a distinctive 'native territorial system', 
flexible enough to be both attentive to existing sociai conditions 
and responsive to the requirements of progress and change. 
Special provision in institutional form for the circum-
stances of African .society raised the question of the desirability 
and morality of differential treatment. The annexation of the chief-
darns and their incorporation within the Colony technically .conferred 
upon the black population the status of British subjects, owing with· 
the ~mite colonists common allegiance to the Crown. But the rights 
and privileges which whites as a matter of course enjoyed were not to 
be similarly extended to the Africans. A moral dilemma faced the 
' 
magistrates, which can be epitomised in the evidence of Charles 
Brownlee to the 1865 Native Affairs Commission. While he voiced his 
objection on principle to what was generically called 'class' (i.e. 
racially discriminatory) legislation,. Brownlee argued that he could 
not .see how 'any man •••• while he maintains his distinct nationality 
and adheres to his barbarous customs can, as a matter of rightt ex• 
pect to be a partaker of the privileges enjoyed by his civilised 
t 13 countryman • Less than twenty years later, when the felt .need to 
13 CPP, Annexures II, 1865, vol. 1: Proceedings .and Evidence of the 
Native Affairs Commission 1865, Appendix I, p.14. 
' 
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recognise the special interests of trans-Keian Africans had become 
widely accepted as an almost axiomatic premise of native policy, the 
acuteness of the dilemma appears blunted and magistrates, including 
Brownlee, were forcefully asserting without fear of contradiction 
that 'where classes are so dissimilar ••• class legislation [is J not 
only desirable but absolutely essential'. 14 So enshrined had the 
principle of 'special legislation for the natives suited to their 
present condition' 15 become in administrative orthodoxy, as exempli-
fied in the unique 'native territorial system', that Elliot could 
consider the whole debate closed. Writing in 1895, he claimed that 
'the fad against •tclass leg is lat ion n is now pretty well exhausted and 
that it is time legislation was enacted for the true benefit of the 
native population'. 16 Thus over a period of thirty years in the 
history of the Cape's administration of its African subjects, the 
principle of identity had retreated as an immediate desideratum of 
policy and had been replaced by one of differentiation. The details 
of this movement of ideas, as they gave shape to the Transkeian 
administrative system, now require attention. 
ii The 'Native Territorial System' 
As the territories were progressively annexed to the Colony, 
the necessity of formulating some general scheme for their governance 
came to press ever more urgently upon the Cape Government. Towards 
this end, the Native Laws and Customs Commission was appointed. But 
by the time the Commission presented its report to the Cape Parliament 




.£!:.!:., G.4- 1 83, Appendix C, pp.57-58, q.23 [H.G. Elliot] • 
Ibid., G.4- 183, Appendix C, p.69, q.23 rc~-BrownleeJ • 
Cape Archives, C.M.T. 3/275: Elliot to'l.1.S.N.A., 24 January 1895. 
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tracked the debate on the Transkeian Territories, throwing up the 
alternative solution of direct Imperial rule. After the Scanlen 
Ministry had been defeated at the polls on this very issue of abandon-
ment, the process of extending white control was resumed by its 
successor • Now,~wI~hlthe qreater part of the territories under 
...........,..-~ 
colonial rule, the time seemed opportune to define the status of the 
Transkei on the basis of a permanent settlement. 
At a Cabinet meeting held in April 1885, which Walter 
Stanford was summoned to attend, a series of proposals were drawn up 
for presentation to Parliament. Following the recommendations of 
the Barry Commission, which had declared itself in favour of what 
Stanford called a 1 separated Government for \&~he \J.3dependencies ', 17 
the measures of the Upington Ministry sought a middle path between 
incorporation and full differentiation. As the Cabinet meeting de-
bated the proposals before it, the Commission's Report, which was 
thought to move too far in the direction of legal and administrative 
differentiation, came to be pared down. The Recorder's Court, which 
the Commission had favoured in preference to the extension of the 
colonial judicial system of circuit courts, was 'thrown out'. The 
'Governor's Deputy', a permanent executive officer to be appointed to 
the territories in overall charge of the administration, was 'strongly 
objected to'. 18 Instead the Ministry decided to retain the system 
of chief magistrates; but this measure, which effectively recognised 
the special status of the Transkei, was to provoke opposition within 
Parliament and without long after the 1885 session. Stanford him-
self, a consistent advocate of the Barry Commission's recommendations, 
argued in favour of transferring judicial functions to a Recorder, in 
order to release the chief magistrates for administrative and diplo-
matic work. 19 But once the proposal of the Recorder had been scouted, 
17 Stanford Papers, 07~ 23 October 1882. 
18 Ibid., 010, 16 April 1885. 
19 Ibid., 010, 1 August 1885. 
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he remained a firm proponent of what he called 'my old scheme of 
.having all three territories under one Chief Magistrate'. 20 Such 
an arrangement would have the effect of co-ordinating the Transkeian 
Territories, hitherto divided in a tripartite structure, into a 
clearly defined administrative unit and of marking its separate status 
as a Jependency of the Colony proper. 
As late as 1889-1890, the Sprigg Government was intending 
to·proceed with the abolition of the chief magisterial system, in the 
belief that the time had arrived when it was no longer 'necessary to 
have a separate and distinct establishment throµgh which communications 
to and from the Government shall ••• be carried on', 21 the magistrates 
to correspond thereafter directly with the Secretariat in Cape Town. 
The way to this change in administrative structure, Sprigg held, had 
been laid open as a result, firstly, of the introduction of the. 
· colonial circuits conrts, i11hich had relieved the chief magistrates of 
certain judicial du.ties imposed upon them by the Penal Code. It 
followed as a cons2quence, too, of African enfranchisement, their 
direct representation in Parliament securing them in the exercise of 
all the rights and privileges of British subjects; and, lastly, of 
the many 'advances in civilization'. To this course both Stanford 
and Elliot were firmly opposed. They met the Premier in Cape Town 
and pressed for the retention of 'a superior officer for [theJ.:) Native 
Districts', 22 counte~inq at the same time Sprigg's proposal for the 
introduction of colonial civil commissioners as one 'unsuited to the 
conditions of the native people'. 23 
Walter Stanford, though recognising the desirability of the 
0radual assimilation of the administrative and leqal system in the 
territories to that of the Colony, cautioned aqainst any radical change 
20 Stanford Papers, Dll., 16 December 1886. 
21 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 1/147: U.S.N.A. to C.M. Thembuland, 
23 December 1889. 
22 Stanford Papers, Dl5 8 April 1890. 
23 J.w. Macquarrie (ed.}, The Reminiscences of Sir Walter Stanford, 
vol. 2, p.123. 
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and suggested modifications, rather, of the existing arrangement 
which would be less likely to provoke African disaffection. He 
argued that the 'Red' people who bore the weight of numbers were 
suspicious of such change as disrupted their traditional authority 
structures or altered the white administration to '!uhich they had be-
come accustomed. 'Personal government in so far as it approaches 
' 24 in form their own system is the most acceptable to them • It was 
essential, he continued, for the peace and well-being of the terri-
tories to station in some central position an administrative officer, 
in whom the Africans reposed confidence, and to whom 'Native Chiefs 
and people can personally apply for advice and relief in all their 
troubles and difficulties'. 25 Such an official would be empowered 
to 'inquire into and decide upon, or be the medium of communication 
generally with the Government in all questions affecting Native 
interests'. 26 In this recommendation we can catch an echo of the 
personalized view magistrates held of the white authority system, 
their understanding of its apparent relationship with the traditional 
role of the chief. In Stanford's own words, the African people re-
garded the magistrates ' ••• not merely as the judicial authority be-
fore whom their cases must be heard or the collectors 0£ revenue to 
whom taxes must be p~id; they are the representatives of that far 
away undefined power known to them as the Governor, and the Magistrates 
are their channel of communication and should be their friends and 
protectors'. 27 Stanford's emphasis on the strongly personal nature 
of the relations between magistrate and people registers the demand 
made on the colonial administrator to interpret his role in a more 
24 Stanford Papers, F(o)lO: Confidential Report by W.E. Stanford to 
U.S.N.A., 18 January 1890. 
25 Ibid., F(j)15: draft copy of Stanford to Sir Thomas Upington 
(c.1885). 
26 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/108: Stanford to U.S.N.A., 18 January 1890. 
27 Stanford Papers, .F(ll)7: copy of Report by .W.E. Stanford as 
Special Commissioner on Disturbances in Griqualand East. 
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human manner than ·was required by the impersonal norms of a bureau-
cracy. In traditional society, chiefs interacted with their subjects 
in a variety of roles, official as well as non-official, private as 
well as public; and the white magistrates, who had assumed so many of 
the functions of the chiefs, were expected to adopt similar roles by 
an African people still firmly attached to their tribal culture. 
The custodial aspect of the administration's function required that 
an attempt be made to establish substantial, if not formal, continuity 
of the white bureaucracy with indigenous authority structures; to 
accommodate traditional conceptions and expectations of governmental 
roles within the ne~\r system; to render a government which was an 
innovation, a superstructure deriving from white overrule, as familiar 
and as accessible to the people as possible. 
Walter Stanford's whole argument, then, rested on the felt 
need to make special provision for the administration of the terri-
tories in the interests of its African population. Such a need was 
underlined by Elliot's strenuous rebuttal of the reasons Sprigg had 
advanced in favour of abolishing the office of chief magistrate. 
As for the Premier '·s first point adduced in support of abolition, 
Elliot regarded it 'an error to suppose that the establishment of 
Circuit Courts will meet the requirements of the people in the matter 
of the Administration of Justice in these Territories'. In his view, 
the Chief Magisterial courts had provided a prompt and inexpensive 
form of justice in the settlement of civil disputes among Africans, 
the 'overwhelming majority' of whom were 'ei thcr rai:•i barbarians or at 
best in the earliest stages of civilization'. The extension of cir-
cuit courts would not fulfil the functions performed by the Chief 
Magisterial courts, and would be distrusted in particular by the 
Thembu[~J as the imposition of yet another colonial form, in con tr a-
vention of the terms of cession they had agreed to, and as a further 
whittling away of the ind~pendence which they had never voluntarily 
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surrendered. Thembuland presented difficulties in.another sense, as 
the integrity of the chiefdom cluster under one paramount, over-
lapping and stretching beyond the bounds of several m~sterial dis-
't? 
tricts, required the corresponding central authority of a chief 
magistrate. Regarding participation in the political life of the 
Colony, Elliot contended that Africans were largely ignorant of the 
value of parliamentary representation, as the number of registered 
voters in the territories was marginal in proportion to the whole 
population. Lastly, while the Territories had undoubtedly made 
great strides in civilization, the system of education operative in 
the Transkei, for one, was 'still in its infancy' and the number of 
school-going children confined to a tiny percentage of the total 
population. Elliot, too, like Stanford, sounded a note of caution, 
employing appropriately enough an organic metapho~ so dear to the 
heart of Burke and a standard weapon in the intellectual armoury of 
conservatives, as one appropriate to the conception of gradual evo-
lutionary growth: 'Forced political changes are usually as unhealthy 
as Hot House plants and do not thrive under the blast of public 
•t. I 28 oppos1 ion • Such conservatism, expressed as die-hard opposition 
to radical change, proved the mainstay of the administrators' case 
for the retention of the chief magisterial system. 
In the event, Sprigg's thorough-going reforms were allowed 
to fall by the way. Stanford's scheme, on the other hand, of uniting 
the territories under one Chief Magistrate, by which the administra-
tion of the territories would be centralized under 'a superior 
officer'• much like the Governor's Deputy recommended in the Barry 
Commission's Report, was finally realized in 1902 when Stanford him-
self took office as first Chief Magistrate of the United Transkeian 
Territories. 
28 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 1/147: Elliot to U.S.N.A., 31 December 1889 • 
• 
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Out of the measures submitted by the Upington Government 
to Parliament came the Native Territories Penal Code Act, no. 24 of 
1886, which in effect expounded the colonial criminal law with a few 
essential modifications. Magisterial comments were almost univers-
ally favourable to the Code, regarding it as 'admirably adapted to 
the present condition of the people'. 29 Some were so enamoured as 
to attribute exaggeratedly beneficial consequences to the promul-
gation of the Code, including 'the total absence of political unrest 
30 and intriguing amongst the people during the past year'. On the 
whole most readily concurred with Blyth's judgement that 'the effect 
upon the natives by the introduction of the Penal Code is most 
satisfactory, and they are fully satisfied with its administration by 
the Special Court •. 31 
However, even from the time of the publication of the Code, 
the Special Court was looked upon as an interim tribunal until pro-
vision was made by law and proclamation for the establishment of 'a 
superior court of record 1 • 32 In a memorandum to Upington, Walter 
Stanford, believing that events were tending towards the abolition of 
the Chief Magisterial courts, cautioned against any such change in 
. 
the judicial system and drew attention to the advantages of the exist-
ing arrangement which provided prompt and inexpensive settlement of 
cases without recourse to the colonial courts. Stanford's concern 
that the abolition of the superior territorial courts was in the 
offing received confirmation when Upington promised in 1887 that 
circuit courts would be extended across the Kei at the 'earliest 
opportunity', thereby interlocking the Transkeian judicial system in 
an important respect with that of the colony proper. When a Thembu 
-
deputation led by the paramount chief, Dalindyebo, protested to 
29 ~' G.6- 1 88: Report of H.G. Elliot, p.45. 
30 Ibid., G.6•'88: Report of H.G. Elliot, pp.4S-46. 
31 Ibid., G.3- 189: . Report of Matt. Blyth, p .• 29 •. 
32 A:N:' Macfadyen (ed.), Statutes, Proclamations: Act 24 of 1886, 
section 251, p.142. 
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Major Elliot against the advent of the circuit courts, in March 1889, 
Stanford remarked, 'It is most unfortunate that when radical changes 
are thought to be necessary in the administration of affairs such 
changes should be sprung suddenly upon officers and people in the 
Native territories'. 33 His fears of the disruptive effect of radi• 
cal legislation were amply justified when in the course of time 
colonial judges reversed several magisterial decisions in lobolo 
cases and when finally in December 1893 the Cape Supreme Court de-
clared that African customary marriages were illicit unions. 
Stanford, then Chief Magistrate of Griqualand East, informed the 
Government of what he called the 'revolution' implicit in the Supreme 
Court judgement, which threatened the stability of the territories. 
To remedy the dire state of affairs, the Native Territories Appeal 
Court was constituted in terms of legislation that provided for cases 
of appeal arising out of civil suits between Africans east of the Kei. 
For the very reason that the new Appeal Court followed the practice 
of the magistrates in recognising African customary law, Stanford 
looked upon the court as 'one of the most valuable institutions we 
have for the Natives•. 34 On the implicit assumption that law is an 
index of social relations, Walter Stanford felt assured that the 
social circumstances of the majority of the Transkeians, firmly en-
capsulated within their traditional culture, required a differential 
legal system. But nonetheless he foresaw the full incorporation of 
the Territories within the Cape's legal system as a goal attainable 
in the fu~ure, 'the goal of one law, one system of procedure for 
all'. 35 As he argued, 'that a time will come when the Colonial 
law and procedure will be fully extended to the Native territories 
is undoubted, but for any one to say that time has arrived would be 
33 Stanford Papers, 014, 14 March 1889. 
34 .!Ei£.., 033, p.43. 
35 £.EE, G.7- 192: Report of W.E. Stanford, p.43. 
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proof of his utter ignorance of the state of the various tribes to 
be dealt with'. 36 
Yet another item on the agenda for the Transkeian settle• 
ment was parliamentary representation. That, as it happened, the 
movement in the territories for representation was organised by a 
white minority, clamouring for participation in the political life of 
the Colony, made apparent once more the divergence of interests be-
tween black and white and confirmed the status of the African popu-
lation as 'a people apart'. As early as 1883, the Chief Magistrate 
of Griqualand East was reporting organised white pressure for politi-
cal representation and for local municipal self-government. The 
latter demand had caused unsettlement among the Griquas who, dis-
trustful of white intentions, saw the move as a hostile attempt by 
land-grabbing whites to deprive them of their vestigial rights, to 
burden their property with taxes levied so as to compel them to dis-
pose of it, in sum to extrude them from Kokstad. 37 A campaign for 
Natal was actively promoted by the Kokstad Political Association in 
188.5. A year later, when a Representation Bill failed to pass 
through Parliament, the Association moved for direct Imperial rule 
of Griqualand East. Needless to say. these political designs were 
heartily distrusted by the Griquas and Africans. 
For Walter Stanford, then Chief Magistrate of the territory, 
the campaign advanced by the white pressure-group gave particular 
point to the disharmony of interests existing between white and black 
in the Transkei, and between the Territories and the Colony proper. 
The idea of detachment he took up and incorporated within his wider 
concern of giving shape to a permanent Transkeian settlement on the 
36 CPP, G.3- 189: Report of W.E. Stanford, p.45. 
37 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/4: Report of C. Brownlee for 1883; 
General Report of 28 April 1884. 
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basis of a separate administration. He thought the ' ••• best course 
(/;ould b~j) to cut off Qj:heV European communities from iJE:heJ0 Natives 
J (t 1') _,J 
and ~hile incorporating ((theJ/ former fully with ~heJJ Colony, have 
{the)~ latter governed on t~h~) same lines as before • • • • Better for 
the present to regard unification {J..e. centralization under one 
Chief Magistrate]) as the first step in consolidating the Native 
t "t • I 38 erri ories •. The special status accorded the Transkei, in the 
interests of the black population, was however not to be construed 
as permanent racial segregation. 'I would not exclude Native areas 
from this privilege !~ncorporation within the Colony~ where the 
people are sufficiently ?-ivanced and ask for it'. 39 Stanford saw 
the remarkable depth and permanence of the change that had come over 
the indigenous people as a result of the impact of white society, 
particularly in the case of the growing class of evolues, which he 
regarded as a portent of the future. In passing, it can be noted 
that in 1927 he dismissed the current slogan of encouraging the 
Africans in their 'reserves' to 'develop a civilization on their own 
40 
lines' as a mere catch-phrase. That Stanford's scheme of detach-
ment was not solely determined by the articulation of white interests, 
but rather that the campaign had given particular form to his central 
concern of the 'native territorial system' was illustrated by the 
fact that he held to his scheme beyond the collapse of the white 
movement, once parliamentary representation was granted in 1887. 
Two years later he was to write about 'the formation of the three 
districts of Matatiele, Kokstad and Umzimkulu with a Civil commission-
ership to be cut off from the Native territorial system and fully 
incorporated with the Colony proper'; 41 and the same argument was to 
38 Stanford Papers, 012, 21 January 1887. 
39 Ibid., 012, 28 March 1887. 
40 Ibid., F(ww)5: Addr.ess by W .• E. Stanford to Conference called 
by Federal Council of Dutch Reformed Church, 2 February 1927. 
41 ..!.J2i9.., 014, 22 January 1889 •. 
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be repeated in the presence of Sprigg in 1890. 
In extending representation to the territories, the white 
society ensured that its monopoly of the political system would in 
no wise be endangered. The Transkeian Territories Representation 
Act, no. 30 of 1887; while it did not recognise a differential fran-
chise, nevertheless was so framed that the number of Africans en-
franchised beyond the Kei was marginal in proportion to the total 
population. The Chief Magistrates reported little interest shown 
by the African people in the parliamentary elections. Many of the 
officers expressed themselves cautiously on the question of 
parliamentary representation for the territories. Uppermost in 
their minds was the fear that representation would create a black 
political consciousness, fraught with danger for white colonial inter-
ests, privilege and power. A countervailing pull was given by the 
recognised need to provide some measure of representation in the 
sovereign parliament as a 'protection' for black interests, an in-
stitutional medium for the voicing of black demands• that would en-
able Africans to exercise some say in matters of policy touching 
their governance and 'a voice in the management of their own 
affairs'. 42 In addition, magistrates acknowledged an obligation 
to enfranchise the African evolues, 'as they advance in intelligence, 
education and prosperity', 43 in order to avoid the evil of class 
legislation. But mindful of the preponderance of the Red 'masses' 
and the minority status of the School people, the administrators 
continued to urge the need to accommodate the special interests of 
the black population and cautioned against radical change involved 
in thrusting white political structures, alien and incomprehensible, 
onto the African people east of the Kei. Walter Stanford agreed 
with the policy of excluding 'those living on the communal system' 
42 
43 
£EE, G.4- 183, Minutes of Evidence, no. 7417 (H.G. Elliot] • 
South African Native Affairs Commission, Apoendix c, vol. 3, 
Minutes of Evidence, no. 20503 (H.G. Elliot) • 
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from the franchise, as no demand for representation had come from 
that quarter; but he added the circumspect provision, 'W ~re they to 
do so and in sections sufficiently advanced such a request might be 
. ' 44 considered • His solution to this complex and thorny problem, 
without recourse to a racially discriminatory common franchise, how-
ever covert, as in the case of Sprigg's, was more fully elaborated 
when as a member of the Inter-Colonial Commission on Native Affairs 
(1903-05) he proposed the New Zealand system of separate representation, 
45 'as best for this country'. In the face of 'an evident tendency to 
restrict Native rights and privileges' on the part of the Lagden 
46 Commissioners as a whole, Stanford recommended and carried a reso• 
lution in favour of 'separate constituencies and voting by Natives 
for their representatives in Parliament', 47 and in this respect im-
printed his standpoint, shared by many Transkeian magistrates. on the 
Commission's Report. 
In the main, however, magisterial opinion settled on the 
view that parliamentary representation was simply irrelevant to the 
limited and divergent aspirations of the large majority of Africans, 
apart from a small class 0£ evolues whose agitation for the franchise 
was considered misdirected and mischievous. Black interests, it was 
felt, were adequately safeguarded by the Native Affairs Department. 
If the benevolent paternalism of this separate administrative depart-
ment were withdrawn, Africans would be abandoned to the hurly-burly 
of the free market of political and, more especiallYi, economic life, 
"' -~- ' 
where meeting with whites on unequal terms, and having no claim to 
protection from the Government, they would become vulnerable above 
all to the threat of land deprivation by whites wielding a superior 
economic power. The lack of interest shown by Africans in the 
44 Stanford Papers, Dl2, 1 April 1887. 
45 Ibid., 034, 3 October 1904. -46 Ibid., 034, 21 November 1904. -47 Ibid., 034, 21 December 1904. 1:.; 
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elections was attributed to their incomprehension of the white 
political sys·tem., and the complexity of white civilization, their 
residual attachment to traditional forms of ·government focused on 
the person of the chief. · Because of the incongruency of colonial 
structures, black interests could best be served by some limited 
form of local self•government. As one magistrate wrote, 'a system 
of personal local government would be much better understood by them 
than any representation we ·can give them in Parliament'. 48 
It was for this very principle of local self-government 
that the Glen Grey Act, the last major component of the Transkeian 
settlement, was in large measure designed to provide. In a tour of 
the territories, Cecil Rhodes, architect of the bill, had impressed 
upon the African people that ' ••• the Council system was the be-
ginning of local self-government for them on new lines adapted to 
their changing conditions of life'. 49 Walter Stanford regarded the 
Glen Grey Act as the centre-piece of the whole 'native territorial 
system', and he who had played some part in its genesis, undertook 
as Chief Magistrate of the United Transkeian Territories the task of 
promoting and extending the system of councils throughout the 
territories. 
Considered in one light, the District Council system was 
intended quite explicitly as a compensation for the curtailment of 
franchise rights imposed by the Glen Grey Act, which effectively 
disqualified Africans living under communal tenure from participation 
in the franchise. For many y~ars. both Elliot and Blyth had been 
plea§)i.ng for some 'well and carefully considered system of partial 
self-government 1 • 50 Both revealed an awareness of the importance 
48 CPP, G.6-'88, p.53. 
49 J.W. Macquarrie (ed.), Reminiscences, vol. 2, p:230. 
50 CPP, G.4-· 183, Appendix C, p.57, q.12 (H.G. Elliot] • 
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of thorough discussion in the traditional decision-making processes 
of government, and the genius of tribal government in the way it 
allowed for the. involvement of all the adult members of the relevant 
community. 
Under their own laws (which are being steadily and 
surely abolished), every man had virtually a voice 
in the laws framed for the government of the tribe 
to which he belonged. All important matters were 
discussed by the Chiefs and principal men of the 
tribe (usually at the Chief's kraal). These meet-
in0s were? public, every man belongino to the tribe 
could be present if he wished. Any one, no matter 
how poor his position, could express his views, and 
he would be attentively listened to. This privi-
lege acted as a safety ... valve, a very 11seful one. 
We have taken this form of franchise away, and given 
nothing in its stead. Natives are prone to say 
they are being treated like a flock of sheep. Any 
form of representation, no matter how limited, would 
be politic to sap thi~ grievance, and supply a de-
sirable safety valve.~l 
In this memorandum Elliot conveys a sense of the need to 
modify and aclapt western forms to suit traditional styles of govern-
ment and traditional processes of decision-making; to accommodate and 
utilize what Burke called the prejudices and sentiments of the poli-
tical culture of a society whose governmental structures had been 
broken up with the extention of white rule - in f?ct, as it turned 
out, to graft district councils onto a tribal system which still re-
tained considerable vigour. In the eyes of the colonial officialst 
parliamentary representative ciovernment-f:was
7
~~~Jinaccessible and un-.. ~-...--"~ 
viable system for an alien people still encc:i.psulated i·dthin their 
indigenous culture. The fact of cultural difference once again under-
lined the desideratum that 'a distinct system is required for the 
52 natives', let alone the political inexpediency of endangering white 
power by a rash and wholesale extension of the franchise. Alternative 
arrangements were thus called for. 'A tendency to centralize all 
government at Cape To~~, and leave these Territories without wholesome 
51 £.!:.!:, G.2- 185, pp.124-125. 
52 ..!2.is!•• G.6-'88, p.51. 
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political life and some voice in their future should ••• be carefully 
guarded against. Some measure of local self-government is not too 
·1d ·d f th N t· T · · ' 33 wi an 1 ea even or ese a ive err1tor1es • The district 
councils, then, would provide strictly controlled institutions for 
limited political self-expression, and would function as a forum for 
African opinion; in which Africans could articulate demands and voice 
grievances arising from the peculiar social conditions that formed 
the context of their lives, 
The conciliar system would fulfil other functions, too, 
one of which was an educative role. The white administration con-
ceived its task as one of educating the African people in the art of 
self-government and of watching over the process of self-education. 
Africans would learn by being brought closer to government and by 
taking a subordinate part in it, learning not only as spectators but 
also as participants. The Council system would 0ive valuable train-
ing in the problems and conduct of local 0overnment. As Blyth saw 
it, local self•government mc:rrked an institutional stage in the de-
velopment of African political maturity, 'a step in the right 
direction ••• which might be afterwards extended as education and 
civilisation advances'. 34 
The Glen Grey Act, as extended by various proclamations to 
the territories, rounded off the general shape of the Transkeian 
settlement. This articulated system of African administration was, 
as Walter Stanford remarked, 'specially adapted to the requirements 
of the natives under their present conditions of life, and proved by 
5 ,. 
experience to be effective and satisfactory to the people'. ) At 
the same time, while tolerant of traditionalism, it was responsive to 
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inducements to 'civilized' advance. 
Although not systematically expounded, a whole social and 
political philosophy of conservatism lurks behind and informs magis-
terial thought as it touched the 'native territorial system'. There 
is an almost Burkean conception of society as a well-integrated whole 
with long-established institutions supported by venerable prejudices 
which serve to hold the social body together. Society is many-sided 
and intricate, and its institutions are slow growths of time intim-
ately connected with and sustained by the traditions and sentiments 
of particular peoples. Men can do only a little to change it in the 
way they would have it change. Society is not clay passive to the 
potter, but a delicate and living whole, more easily damaged than im-
proved. Just as Burke was moved to scorn and anger by the 'arrogance' 
of the French revolutionaries, so the colonial administrators roundly 
condemned the rashness of radical social change engineered by the 
politicians and policy•makers in Cape Town. The motto that most 
aptly epitomised their work and thought was festina lente.
56 
As 
one magistrate declared, 'The guiding principle of our policy with 
the natives should be to go slowly ••• to interfere violently as 
little as possible'. 57 They brought to the task of administration 
the recognition of the gradual tempoof social change, an insistence 
that progress was an arduous and laboured process passing through 
inevitable stages, rather than a miraculous transformation of social 




Social progress is necessarily slow among a people 
such as we have in these territories with a system 
of their own which was eminently suited to their re• 
quirements so long as their surroundings were all 
of a more or less savage character. Individuals 
break away and adopt European habits. Education 
Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/11: Report of W.E. Stanford for 1896. 
South African Native Affairs Commission, vol. 2, Minutes of 
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is more highly prized. Churches and chapels are 
built in parts where not many years back Kafir 
chieftainship and its ways ruled supreme. But 
the fact remains that the great majority are still 
wedded to their customs, are still attached with 
unimpeachable loyalty to their Chiefs and view 
with corresponding distrust the onward march of 
forces which they see only too well are destined to 
destroy their national existence. . . . . . 
Civilization is an uphill drag for them. They 
must have breathing time between the pulls.58 
In line with this, frequent use is made, in magisterial 
writing on the subject of social change, of organic metaphors, which 
register their understanding of the process as one of evolutionary 
growth. Thus, Stanford: 'The forces, good and bad, of our civili-
zation a~e doing their work slowly but surely among these people, and 
it is better by far that the fruit should be left to ripen fully on 
its native tree before it is picked'. 39 In view of th~ tenacity 
with which the African people clung to their traditional culture, the 
administrators strove ~arnestly against the extension of colonial in-
stitutions and forms, for 'Which 'the conditions of Native life were 
not yet sufficiently advanced', 60 and warned against too rapid and 
premature an incorporation of the indigenous population within the 
white legal and administrative structures. h1it!1 conservative attach-
ment to the status guo, they expressed qeneral satisfaction with the 
adequacy of the existing Transkeian territorial system as one 'well 
adapted to natives in various stages of transition from their own 
tribal forms to our more civilized way'. 61 
Subsidiary tc -:::1ese cautionary noises against precipitate 
change came the wish to remove policy-making as it affected the ad-
ministration of the territories from the political aren1;), where the 
'J 
fall of qovernrnents could brin0 about a reversal of policy and a 
58 CPP, G.4- '90: Report of W.E. Stanford, pp.38ff. 
59 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/7: Stanford to U.S.N.A., 26 July 1890. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., C.M.Y.. 2/6: Report of W.R. Stanford for 1888. 
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change in law. 'Frequent alteration in laws, and manner of adrninis-
tering them, greatly perplex and irritate the people, which is un-
desirable'. 62 Moreover, from time to time the magistrates issued 
loud complaint that policy was formulated and legislation enacted 
without consultation with either administrator or people to whom both 
policy and law applied. In part, their effort to lift administration 
out of politics reflected resentment at their exclusion from the high-
est decision-~aking process. It also registered the value they 
attached to an ideal of service both to their African charges and to 
the Colony alike, a professional ethic that rose above the rough and 
tumble of parliamentary life - a viewpoint characteristic of the con-
flict of outlook between functionary and politian. But, more than 
this, magistrates feared that policy decisions would be dictated by 
the chance play of party political forces in a parliament elected by 
and responsible to a white electorate, and would mark like a weather-
vane the prevailing currents of political life in the Colony, without 
regard to the real interests of the black people in the Transkei. 
What the men on the rir.mmd highly prized in administrative policy was 
uniformity, consistency and continuity in both plannina and execution, 
which they believed that the vagaries of the parliamentary system 
rendered impossible of fulfilment. 'The changes of policy consequent 
upon the alteration of parties in the Government has the appearance 
to the natives of vacillation and inconsistency. A permanent and 
definite native policy in the territories beyond the Colony would be 
better understood by the natives, and would be more acceptable to 
them•. 63 Administrative activity must needs be ordered and regu-
lated, carefully planned and judiciously carried out. 
Given the extent of cultural cleavage between black and 
white, the need was universally acknowledged to provide for the 
62 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 1/83: RepQrt of H.G. Elliot for 1886. 
63 £!:..!:, G.4- 'r33, Appendix C, p.204, q.23 [o. Stracha.n J. 
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special interests of the indigenous people who were enfolded within 
their traditional social and political systems. This recognition 
of difference entailed an endorsement of separateness, of treating 
the Africans as 'a people apart'. The orthodoxy of Grey who had 
sought to promote 'civilization by mingling' became the heterodoxy 
of the Transkeian magistrates who set their face against what they 
called 'amalgamation'. It was thought that contact with whites 
would have a deleterious and corrupting effect upon the Africans, 
that they would succumb utterly to the .demon drink and that miscege-
nation would become rife. It was also felt desirable to set aside 
for the black people exclusive territorial areas for their own occu-
pation and cultivation, out of paternal concern to protect them 
against land deprivation and alienation by white farmers and land 
speculators. Magistrates believed it a 'good system [to] isolate 
large numbers of Natives living on large areas from v1h ich white 
settlement is excluded'. 64 Hence, the unwillingness on the part of 
the Cape Government to throw open the territories to white settlers, 
and the crisis that arose with the 'rushing' by white farmers of 
vacant lands in the Thembuland Chief Magistracy which had been cleared 
after the rebellion of 1880-1881. In part, the fear was one of 
potential conflict between land-hungry whites and dispossessed blacks, 
aggrieved and covetous; in pa~t, fear that those Africans driven off 
the land and extruded from the territories v.rould cross the Kei to 
squat on white farms or flock to the towns as a discontented landless 
proletariat. In all this we can find the root of the conception of 
the Transkei as a 'native reserve'. 
According to the categories of social evolutionary theory 
which pervaded the general mental outlook of the administrators, 
64 
0 
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African societies were necessarily fixed and ranked in a particular 
stage of the cosmic developmental process. To this phase accorded 
il1 
their institutions and social forms, beliefs and mo~s, as uniquely 
adapted to their own time and place, to their social circumstances. 
\ 
From this followed the presumption of t:Jmpering unduly with the 
. 0 
social order. There was need to take cognizance of traditional 
modes of organizing soci.al life, inasmuch as they played vital and 
valuable roles in the lives of the people, fulfilling various func-
tions {whether economic, religious or political) adequately and 
appropriately within the total social system. Thus the desire of 
the administrators to adapt and accommodate, to step up a rhythm of 
continuity within change, to balance the old and the new, tradition 
and progress, which as R. Heussler has observed was -~the classic con-
cern of Englishmen in Africa'. 65 From this flowed, inter alia, the 
recognition of African customary law by white ~agistxates as applic-
able in cases of civil disputes between black parties; the translation 
of traditional decision-making processes into the conciliar system of 
local self-governme~t; and the interpretation of the maoistrate's role 
in personalised terms aporopriate to African chieftainship. Examples 
of this process of con"sk liat ion can be multiplied. Indeed, the 
elaboration of the whole 'native territorial system' ~f]f:f~:::rthis 
cautious compromise between the modern and the traditional, traversing 
as it did a middle path between incorporation within the legal and 
administrative structures of the Colony and full differentiation. 
The principle of identity, overt in Grey's African policy, 
with its implication of the thoroughgoing integration of the indige• 
nous societies within the white polity, had long been set on one side. 
Particularly after the war of 1877-1878 and the rebellion of 1880-1881 1 
• 
there was a revaluation of the pace of cultural change; in the 
direction of assimilation, which could reasonably be expected _of the 
65 R. Heussler, The British in Tanganyika, p.66. 
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African, change now to be reckoned on the African's terms. The early 
sense of robust forward movement which the men on the ground had re-
ported in the 1870s gives place in the 1880s and 1890s to an emphasis 
on gradual evolutionary development, within the framework of the 
'native territorial system', towards goals that have almost infinitely 
receded. The full incorporation of the black people within the 
Cape's political, legal and administrative structures has been dis-
placed into the indefinite future. Elliot, for one, could speak com-
fortably of the possibility of legal identity as a matter of '200 or 
300 years' time perhaps' when Africans had attained the 'stage of 
civilisation' of whites, thus removing assimilation out of the realm 
of immediate practical policy. 66 There was now \"idespread agreement 
that the 'civilizin0 ~olicy' must be geared low, to keep in step with 
the administrative situation, side by side with the slowly advancing 
African. All the same, it must be remembered that th~ magistrates 
put a premium on civilized 8.<ivance. There ':·ras 110 sense in which they 
desired to shore up the t:::~v:Htional system, as in Natal, where, as 
J.X. Merriman invidionsly claimed, the Government had 'designedly 
kept [the Africans] in a state of barbarism'. 67 Rather they saw 
their task as one of promoting and encouraging activities that would 
help the people adapt to their changed conditions of life. 
iii Benevolent Paternalism and the Drink Question 
It is almost a commpnplace to state that the administrators 
conceived their rSle in the image of the benevolent paternalist. 
Answering to this, the frequent analogy they drew between Africans 
and children had a general basis in th0 hierarchical framework of con-
cepts through which as white men they viewed racial divisions. The 
66 South African Native[Affairs Commission, vol. 3, Minutes of 
Evidence, no. 20726 H.G. Elliot] • r 
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comparison fitted aptly with the categories of current social evolu-
tionary theories. These relegated traditional societies to a position 
of cultural immaturity and interpreted the process of acculturation 
as one of organic growth through various stages of maturation to the 
fully developed forms of western civilization. The child analogy, 
then, is more significant for what it tells of white attitudes and 
ideology, than of the innate qualities of blacks. Cultural misunder-
standing informs Elliot's comment, for instance, that Africans were 
'but children, by nature impulsive, changeable and easily led'. 68 
This statement is fairly representative in its ascription of immature 
character traits, of emotionalism, instability and docility, to the 
stereotyped savage. For the magistrates, the analogy proved useful 
as it sanctioned and gave force to white paternal control, to the 
self-assumed responsibility of the civilized society to determine the 
future of the traditional people, to map out their lines of 
development. 
At the same time, the child comparison bore defini t·e advan-
tages, containing as it did a certain trusteeship component which im-
plied the training, maturing and eventual achievement of.adulthood by 
the African. In t~is sense,' the administrator looked upon his work 
as educative, both as custodial (in loco parentis) and formative, en-
couraging the backward, disciplining the wayward and advancing African 
interests as he best saw them. Considered as a custodial function, 
the task of the white administration, having taken to its paternal 
bosom the indigenous people 'under our care and control ', 69 was to 
look after their interests, satisfy legitimate wants and secure their 
well-being, protecting them all the while against the blows and 
buffetings of the wider, outer world. For such reasons, the Govern-
ment had needs preserve traditional or adapt western institutions in 
68 £.E.E,, G.19-'97, p.80. 
69 ~., G.4-'83, Appendix C, p.69, q.23 [c. Brownl~e]. 
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meeting the requirements of the state of tutelage. At the same time, 
it was the avowed objective of the Cape Government to incorporate the 
subjected chiefdoms more closely within the white polity, to promote 
the civilized advance of the Africans and to foster the process of 
assimilation, as long term goals. The 'civilising mission' laid 
stress on the formative aspect of the educator's role. 'The people 
must be gradually educated up to the level of civ.ilized laws and cus-
toms, and their own laws and customs gradually modified and assimi• 
lated to colonial or British law, as time rolls on 1 • 70 Magistrates 
conceived of the 'Native territorial system' as an educational insti-
tution, an externally imposed structure in which Africans would become 
disciplined to accept and adopt new patterns of social and political 
behaviour, and acquainted with new styles and processes of social and 
political life. Cautioning against radical changes in the Transkeian 
system, Walter Stanford argued that 'the natives should be allowed to 
continue the training and education they are receiving under the ex-
' 71 isting system • 
In like manner, the district councils were seen as a school 
in the arts of self-government. The assumption was that Africans 
would learn by being brought closer to government and taking a sub-
ordinate part in it. The process of self-education would be closely 
watched over by the ruling authorities: the magistrates were insistent 
that they retain firm overall control and strict supervision of the 
conciliar system. This was formally achieved by making the resident 
magistrate chairman of the district meeting and the chief magistrate 
the Chief Executive Officer of the General Council. While councillors 
might make recommendations, actual decisions and effective executive 
control were firmly in the hands of the white civil servants. 
Yet another educative institution, in the administrator's 
70 CPP, G.4- 1 83~ Appendix C, p.193, q.31 [A.R. Welsh]. 
71 Cape Archives, C .M.K. 2/6: Report of W.E. Stanford for 1890. 
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eyes, was provided by the system of migrant labour. In the context 
of the 'civilising mission', work was considered desirable as it 
represented an agency for the progressive development from barbarism 
to civilization of the indigenous people. Magistrates contended that 
Africans would derive great benefit from an intimate contact as a 
labouring class with whites. Employment in the industrial centres 
and on the colonial public works would be a 'school' for civilization 
where Africans acquired civilized habits and notions, and, through the 
mechanism of social drill or social mimesis, as Toynbee has called it, 
would come to 'adopt a life having a closer resemblance to that of 
t 72 the European • The labourer, it was hoped, would learn the virtue 
of self-reliance, an eminently individualist idea appropriate to the 
aggressive individualism of the Protestant religion~ yet quite at 
variance with the solidarity of the traditional social organization, 
the collective sense of the kinship group and the tribal community. 
~cipline enforced on the mines and public works would teach the 
labourer to be 'punctual, obedient and civil' by sheer necessity, for 
the threat of dismissal hung over him if he did not respect these 
cardinal rules of the mechanically functioning economic system that 
. . . t f h C 1 1 11 d h A f M~ h. 73 was an intrinsic aspec o w at ar y e ca e t e ge o ac inery. 
Work would instruct him in the 'advantages of honest labour' and in 
industry, 'a proper recognition of the dignity which is invariably 
. 74 
the result of honest toil'. But mo-st important of all, the entry 
and absorption of African wage-labourers into the white-controlled 
economy at the lower levels of unskilled, poorly-paid, .low-status 
jobs would indoctrinate this proletariat as to 'their proper position 
. . t ' 75 in socie y . An economically intimate but socially segregated 
association with white civilization would instill a sense of the 
72 CPP, G.4- 193, p.95. 
73 Ibid., G.21-'75, p.41. 
74 Ibid., G.4- 1 93, p.95. 
75 ...!!2i£., G.27- 174: copy of Circular no. 5 of 1873, pp.153-154. 
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immeasurable distance separating black from white and the incredible 
superiority of white society, cultural, technological and moral. 
It would in sum vouchsafe 'a much clearer idea of the relative powers 
f th h . t d th t . t 76 o e w 1 e man an e na 1ve • · 
Because of his faith in wage-labour as a school for civili• 
zation, the magistrate regarded it his duty to induce Africans to 
undertake employment in the white economy. Blyth• that rigorous 
educator, believed that 'the great lesson, labor vincet omnia, cannot 
be too strongly inculcated•, 77 As official recruiting agents in the 
territories, it fell upon the administrators to assist workseekers 
and stimulate the flow of labour to the work-centres of Southern 
Africa • The firm guiding hand of the bureaucracy was perhaps nowhere 
... 
more apparent than in its efforts to encourage Africans to enter the 
labour market. Concern for measures and inducements, both fair and 
foul, to compel a readier stream of labourers received the constant 
attention of the magistrates. By such means, civilization would ad-
vance among the people. 
The whole con8eption of paternal rule rested upon the argu-
ment that Africans were unable to help themselves and needed the firm 
guidance of the white administration. It was held that the people 
were involved in a process of disruptive change generated by the fact 
~, of cultural interaction, they were caught up in something they could 
not understand and therefore could not control. Moreover, as 
Africans were beginning to acquire western /iieeds and standards, 
·~;-J 
material, moral and political, they ought in their own .interests to 
consent to learn from those who first set these standards how they 
·were to be realised. 
~bile as a general rule benevolent paternalism worked to 
";:, the advantage of the African people, at times :it sounds oppressively 
76 
77 
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through the exhortations of the white officers, jarring upon modern 
ears in its self-elevated moral tone. Thus Charles Brownlee,. in a 
homiletic circular to 'the Native Chiefs, Headmen, and common people 
under British Rule': 
The Govt. has long striven to teach you to adopt better 
customs, it desires you to see for yourselves, & to 
accept its teaching because you yourselves see that it 
is good. Since, however, you close your eyes to the 
good & choose the evil, disregarding the teaching which 
has come to you, it becomes the duty of Govt. to stand 
up & say what shall & what shall not be done lest you 
should believe that the Govt. is satisfied with what 
you are doingL & lest its silence should confirm you in 
what is evil. ·1a 
The illiberal character of paternalism here verges on an overbearing 
authoritarianism, earnest in its moral self-assurance, didactic in 
its chaste admonitions. Freedom and reform, liberty and civilization, 
seem to be incompatible. In.line with this, magisterial political 
thinking represented power not as a delegation of natural rights from 
the people, but rather a trust imposed on the Colony by an inscrutable 
Providence, to be exercised in a context of moral purpose on behalf 
of its subjects. This power would be used for the benefit of the 
people, without their prior concurrence in the wisdom of its direction 
or not. Government was seen as the repository of their best inter-
ests, and like the legislator in Rousseau's Social Contract could com-
pel the people to "will'' their common good, as the administration con• 
ceived it. 
Obviously, the magistrates preferred to justify their 
activity by reference to the people's acquiescence in and even approval 
of their beneficent rule. 'As a mass, (the natives] certainly prefer 
that we should hold the reins, and are perfectly willing to be guided 
by us, so long as l"le treat them justly and straightforwardly. 
• • • As a whole they would readily embrace any opportunity of guidance 
and assistance, were they fully convinced that it was plainly and 
78 Cape Archives, N.A. 841: Circular of c. Brownlee, 15 August 1875. 
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sincerely for their benefit'. 79 But in the face of African recalci-
trance and opposition, the administrators would resort to the dog-
ma tic assertion of the duty and right devolving upon whites to assume 
control over the African population, a duty thought to stem from and 
be validated by the establishment of white sovereignty over the terri-
tories, whether as a result of conquest or cession. Cape imperialism 
was not simply conducted, much less was it understood, in the terms of 
political power and military strength. As Charles Brownlee, the 
first Secretary for Native Affairs, argued, the Cape had been divinely 
entrusted with a civilizing mission, 'to elevate and enlighten ('the 
barbarous tribes on our frontier'), and to raise them in the scale of 
. · 1 · t. 1 80 c1v1 1za ion • This it was her obligation to discharge. The in• 
fusion of white imperial control with the respectable content of 
moral responsibility served, then, to legitimise the extension of 
white rule over the independent African chiefdoms. Colonial control 
could also be justified by reference to the ore-annexation state of 
affairs in the territories, which, flying in the face of the natural 
order of things, merited the saving intervention of white authority. 
Political relations, for one, among the chiefdoms in the trans-Keian 
lands prior to annexation were viewed as anarchic, and white inter-
vention substantiated as a necessary step to secure the pacification 
of the frontier zone. Then, secondly, the institution of chieftain-
ship was looked upon as despotic and oppressive, and magistrates 
pictured themselves heroically as liberators of the common people. 
Elliot, for instance, quite assuredly believed that the restoration 
of the chiefs to their former positions of authority was 'not the wish 
of the mass of the people'; 81 and he saw in the numerous appeals to 
the magistrates from the tribal courts and the frequent bypassing of 
Z9 ·,£.EE, G.4- 183\ Appendix c, p.132, q.8 [T. Liefeldt]. 
80 Ibid., G.21- 75, p.133. 
81 Ibid., G.3- 1 84~ p.118. 
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the latter as evidence of gross injustice in the administration of 
law by the chiefs. Lastly, African customary practices were roundly 
condemned, for every Englishman knew, as Lord Acton was to pontificate, 
'Opinions alter, manners change, creeds rise and fall, but the moral 
law is written on the tablets of eternity'. 82 The image of Africans 
sunk in heathenish customs cried out for the redemptive ministry of 
western cultural missionaries and their conversion to what were known 
as the 'usages of civilised society'. In sum, endemic inter-tribal 
warfare, chiefly despotism and primitive customs morally justified 
white intervention, providing the raison d'etre of the civilizing 
mission. The task was immense, although self'-imposed, but the call 
of duty and the satisfaction of cultural arrogance could not go un-
answered. The prospective transformation of the untutored savage 
merely ennobled the civilizing mission. The Bishop of St. John's 
gave his blessing to the Government's apostolate: 
We have the right to assume that supervision which is 
implied in constituting ourselves the central power of 
government over the whole country. It is our duty to 
take upon ourselves that position, and not to perform 
it would be to leave the Kafir races ••• to their 
savagedom and interminable intertribal warfare. 
Hitherto they have manifested no power of self-origi-
nated civilisation; all change for the better ••• has 
been due to the presence of Europeans, and as the dis-
tinct result of that presence.83 
Paternal concern for the moral r~elfare and civilization of 
'-J 
its African charges shaped the administration's thinking on the drink 
question. Once again, in yet another area of social behaviour, 
magistrates distinguished the African people as a separate social 
category for whom special legislative provision was to be afforded 
in recognition of their status of pupilage. As the liquor problem 
demonstrated, unregulated contact with white society was liable to 
produce a corrupting effect upon the Africans. Caliban, that 
82 Lord Acton, 'The Study of History' in l.ect11res on Modern Hj story, 
2.40. [ J 83 9:E,., G.4-'83, Appendix C, p.85, q.8 Bp. of St. John's • 
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literary archetype of primitive man, had succumbed to the worship of 
the demon drink when exposed to his cult by the dissolute servants of 
Suropean civilization. Magistrates in the Transkei were alarmed by 
evidence of similar failing among their subjects, who were contracting 
'civilized vices' acquired by promiscuous intercourse with the 
colonial society. As it unhappily turned out, the blessings of 
civilization seemed neither wholly self-evident nor unmixed. Some 
tried to exonerate civilization and argued that heathenism made the 
Africans more susceptible to evil, less resistant to temptation, 
exercising, so it was claimed, less self-control than whites; yet tne 
evidence for corruption was alarmingly apparent. The administrative 
response was to enfold the people in a protective legislative mantle, 
to remove the object of temptat·ion ·and prevent contamination from 
evil by shunning all contact with it. The tasi~ of the guardian was 
to render the charqes immune from the corruptions of white society 
through a process of education, by deliberately creating an arti-
ficial environment conducive to the moral growth and ~ventual achieve• 
ment of responsible ;:·_dul thood by the Africans. Liquor regulations 
affecting the territories reflect, then, the custodial component of 
the administration's role and at the same time give substance to the 
ruling ideology of the civilizing mission. As one magistrate ex• 
pansively wrote: 
Unless that care l\Jhich a parent exercises over his 
ignorant children is realised and assumed by a paternal 
government over the natives, and they are thus by law 
prevented from drinking, they will lapse from a state 
of semi•barbarism into a condition infinitely .t.vorse, 
and be for ever a menace to, and a millstone round the 
neck of the country. In such a case G·eat Britain 
will not, so far as this country is concerned) have ful• 
filled what has been since the Crusades, and I believe 
still is, her gr~at trust and her destiny - to civilise 
and Christianise the dark places of th~ earth.84 
The drin'!( question was complicated in the minds of the 
84 ~t G.42- 198, p.100. 
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administrators by the fact that whereas white society had introduced 
the local people to liquor - indulgence in Cape brandy being what was 
called •an acquired taste ta beer-drinking among the Africans de-
pended much, on the other hand, on cultural tradition, and so called 
for a different approach in its regulation. Among the Cape Ngun i, 
beer-drinking usages were woven into the very fabric of their life, 
having both social and ritual functions •. Beer was the most important 
beverage, and particularly between the harvest and ploughing seasons 
beer-drinking feasts were frequent. The generalized objection of -
magistrates to beer-drinking, as with all drinking (which they in-
variably equated with drunkenness), was its antipathy to civilization. 
Their specific objections are adequately represented in this account: 
At present beer is working sad havoc amona the Fingos. 
Men and women, and sometimes even boys and girls, flock 
to the nearest beer drinks at early davm, and remain 
there, or at the nearest beer-drinking kraal, for 
several days and nights, the men and women to the neglect 
of their homes and duties, and the boys and girls to the 
complete prostitution of principle, to say nothing of the 
frequent breaches of the peace which occur at these ~ 
gatherings, and which often result in loss of life. 8 J 
These 'beer orgies• 86 were denounced as a great moral and social 
ev§1. Magistrates supposed that beer-drinking lay at the root of 
all other sins: stock thefts 'seditious talk, breaches of the peace, 
and many immoral and disgusting practices'. 87 As the feasts, like 
the drinking bouts of Irish navvies in England, were common occasions 
for fights, 'broken heads' frequently bestrew the annual reports and 
the number of deaths as a result of beer fights was only equalled in 
the magistrates' estimation by that of murders owing to witchcraft. 
The drink problem was regarded as pressing and measures 
were advocated and adopted to remedy it. Blyth, as usual, took the 
lead in Fingoland when in January 1872 he convened a meeting of head-
men and people, which duly passed a series of regulations to limit 
85 £!!E,, G.3-'89, p.33. · 
86 Ibid., G.5- 1 96, p.87. 
87 Ibid., G.4- 1 93, p.58. 
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the beer-gatherings~ These defined the accountability of location 
headmen or homestead heads in the event of disturbance, prohibited 
the attendance of women or children; and disallowed beer.-gather ings 
. . 88 
to accompany the initiation rites of boys or girls. · But, as the 
. 
Chief Magistrate was to discover to his chagrin, such regulations 
' 
lacked· legal standing .• Before the Liquor Laws Commission of 1889-
·1890, magistrates variously suggested that legislative checks be im• 
posed to prevent the wholesale brewing of beer, particularly in large 
quantities, to stop its :free sale and control the beer-gatherings. 
While caution was expressed in the matter of restricting manufacture, 
because beer formed a valuable food staple and because Africans would 
resent white interference with their customary practices, as for its 
sale, however; magistrates agreed that it should be ·totally prohibited 
except under licence. This was strictly speaking given effect.by. 
Proclamation 343 of 1894, section xii, which declared the beverage an 
intoxicating liquor. Beer-ga~herings re6eived greater attention 
from the Commission, as the administrators regularly attributed_ a 
large percentage o:f the district crime to-brawls arising out of them. 
From a leg~l point of view, beer-fights were dealt with in the terri-
torial courts under sections 94-97 of the Penal Code as - 'offences 
against the public tranquility' rather than as cases of common assault. 
All who attended a gathering where an affray.had occurred made them-
selves liable to conviction and the gathering was then reckoned for 
legal purposes an 'unlawful assembly'. Nevertheless, beer-gatherings 
themselves were not affected and continued to plague the administration, 
Walter Stanford's suggestion, which he argued was 'founded. upon Native 
law', that the kraalhead 'should be held responsible for the.good be• 
haviour of his guests'• was taken up. recommended by the Transkeian 
General Council in 1895, 89 and enacted as Proclamation 185 of 1895 
88 Cape Archives, N.A •. 151: Blyth to S.N .A., 5 February 1873. 
89 £E.E., G.4- 191, p.44; .G.5- 1 96, p.87. 
(for the Transkei) and Proclamation 291 of 1902 (for Thembuland and 
Griqualand East). 
With greater urgency, the men on the ground expressed alarm 
and moral concern at African addiction to Cape brandy, the notorious 
'Cape smoke '. As one wrote, 'The evils arising from the worst cus• 
toms of the natives are not ·to be compared to. those arising from the 
90 sale of brandy'. Magistrates were prohibitionists to a man and 
anxious to keep the Transkei 'dry'. Their case rested on the earn-
est belief that the sale· and consumption of brandy presented a formid-
able obstacle to the advancement of 'civilization'. They erected 
brandy-drinking into an all-embracing evil, radix malorum, and argued 
that prohibition formed the essential pre-condition of progress in 
any other sphere of social reform. The Barry Commission gave an al-
most definitive resume of magisterial opinion. The Commissioners 
regarded: 
drinking. 
the use of spirituous liquors (chiefly ardent spirits, 
the product of distilleries), as an unmitigated evil 
to the Native rtaces, and that no other cause or influ• 
ence so directly increases Idleness and Crime, and is 
so completely destructive, not only of' all progress and 
improvement, but even of the reasonable hope of any 
progress or improvement. Those members of the commission 
who ••• had occasion to visit the Border districts, were 
eye-witnesses of the mischief, wretchedness, and misery 
which the multiplied facilities for the sale of spirits, 
by licern~ecJ ·'canteens'' in the neighbourhood of native 
locations, are producing; if unchecked, it can have only 
one result, and that is the entire destruction of that 
portion of the natives who acquire the taste for brandy. 
All the better class of natives, and even the heathen 
and uneducated portion ••• have implored the Commission 
to suppress the evil which is bringing ruin on them• 
selves and their country.91 
Extreme remedies were a natural response to excessive 
Both teetotalism and prohibitionism were advanced. Pin-
ning their faith on the moral education of the individual, missionaries 
organized temperance societies in the towns anti rm the: f!'lission stations, 
on the model of sinilar movements in England. The nmqistrntes 
90 £Ef.,, G.13- 180, p.131. 
91 Ibid., G.4- 1 3~, Report, para. 129r p.43. 
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supported the cause and often patronised the lccal organizations. 
Kokstad boasted no less than four of these societies, directed chiefly 
at the Griqu;:1s. HP.r2, one missionary body had introduced the Good 
Templar movement, a pseudo-masonic temperance body of zealous tee-
totallers pledged to total a.bstinen~e; the Band of Hope, a juvenile 
society devoted tc reariP0 children in sobriety; and a branch of the 
Blue Ribbon Army; which had originally sprung up in 0-.2':ford. This 
close alignment of evangelical religion with the temperance movement 
is significant, for magistrate and missionary alike brought over into 
their reforming activity many of the attitudes and assumptions they 
acquired in their religious life. As devout or even nominal 
Christians they sa11,• t;1e world as deeply taint2d and ::!orrupted by sin: 
it could be purified only through the reclamation of the individual 
soul. They believed that social ills could oe explained in terms of 
individual moral failure, and hence ascribed the African's drinking 
habits primarily to a £ailure of moral responsibility rather than to 
social and environmental factors causing drun:i.~enness. Likewise 
social reform was conceived entirely in terms of sudden 'conversion', 
whether of the individual or of society as a whole, as a miraculous 
character trans:formation produced merely by the sinner's act of faith, 
his exertion of ~·.rill•po;·.rer. The temperance movement \'las conducted 
as a ministry of salvation to the lost children of the House of Israel, 
a moral crusade aaainst the snares of sin and the forces of darkness. 
A missionary among the Mfen9u declared, 'If all missionaries and 
magistrates in the TraJ1skei and beyond would unite in promoting 
11total abstinence •, by example and precept, a raighty power would be 
. ld d . l .b . d . f f Cl . t . . ' 1 . t ' ' 92 wie e against )ar arism, an . in ·avour o iris ian c1v1 iza ion • 
The campaign for abstinence thus fitted into the larger evangelical 
cosmology of a Manichean conflict between gooJ and evil, in which 
mankind was engaged. 
92 ff,E, G.33-'82, p.25. 
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The same inattention to social factors affecting the in-
cidence of drunkenness, the same explanation of social experience in 
moral categories, marked the magistrates' inflexible demand for total 
prohibition throughout the territories. Their observations reveal a 
failure to grasp the precise nature of social problems attending a 
process of rapid change, problems which the Good Samaritan model, of 
individual compassion and reclamation, could never hope to resolve. 
It was common knov1ledge, for example, that a number of chiefs were 
notorious drunkards. 'Most Kaf fir chiefs were and are under the 
curse of brandy, thus breaking down themselves, their strength, and 
' 93 their power • However, it would seem that this assertion has mis• 
taken cause for consequence and ignores the socio-psychological 
foundations of drunkenness among chiefs. Indeed, one can say that 
the encroachment of white society brought to bear intolerable pressures 
on African chiefs and that the erosion of their powers as a result of 
the extension of white rule and the deliberate policy of destroying 
their legitimacy led to severe personal tensions which they relieved 
by drinking. Not only individuals but almost entire communities, 
like the Ngqika, suffered the disrupting effects of subjection to 
white sovereignty and the pressure 0£ social change. In 1873 the 
Civil Commissioner of King i·Jilliamstown estimated that the Ngqika in 
94 his charge consumed 23 to 30 thousand gallons of brandy annually. 
The resettlement of the Ngqika community in liquor-free Gcalekaland 
in the late 1870s was thus regarded as· an exodus from the bondage of 
drink to a promised land. 'I attribute much of their happiness and 
, prosperity to their inability to procure brandy, the use of which at 
one time before their ••exodus" from the Colony threatened their en-
' 95 tire destruction as a people • 
93 £.EE, G.3•'84, p.138. 
94 Ibid., G.27-'74, p.13. 
95 Ibid., G.8- 183, p,150. 
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State intervention in the form of liquor prohibition en-
tailed a drastic iniringement of personal liberty, but for magistrates 
the question 'whether we have a right to interfere with a man's in-
dividual freedom' was seldom presented. 96 In the traditional and 
transitional states the Africans occupied, it was argued, the mass of 
the people were incapable of enjoying real and responsible freedom, 
and if most were not yet ready for autonomy, they must be made ready 
for it through a process of education. The promotion of moral pro-
qress and civilization would demand, then, not less interference with 
individual liberty, negatively conceived as an absence of restraint, 
but more. 
The issues involved in the argument become more apparent 
when we examine th<! conflict i•Ji thin mid-Victorian Liberalism between 
the claims of individual freedom and of moral progress, as exposed by 
the drink question. Tl1e raJical liberal, John Stuart Mill, averred 
that the individual would progress morally only if the state left him 
entirely unshackled in his moral choices. Other liberal thinkers, 
by contrast, were £ar 12ss patient with prevailing evils and advocated 
consequently a far more positive role for the state than Mill, for 
whom liberty increased with every curtailment of state control. His 
prohibitionist critics within the liberal camp argued just the reverse: 
that civilization depends upon restraining_ and regulating individual 
liberty. Mill's foremost contemporary antagonist, James Fitzjames 
Stephen, the author·of Li~erty, Equality, Fraternity (1373))held that 
compulsion was 'a condition of human life', that coercion of the in• 
dividual ty society constituted the main safeguard of social cohesion 
and discipline. The anarchic nature of man made necessary his sub-
mission to the restraint of authority. Coercion, Stephen believed, 
was essential to maintain and reinforce the ·;;;enerally accepted order 
of beliefs and values whi~h held society together; and to carry 
96 £f.E., G.4- 'GJ, .L-Iinutes of Evidence, no. 3412 [E.A. Judge]. 
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through from above those vital changes in social and political life 
which made for progress and advancement in civilization. It was 
justified by the nature of the end and by the effectiveness and econ-
omy of the means employed to gain it. Such was the message of the 
conservative brand of liberalism espoused by men like Stephen. 
The magisterial apologia for legislative intervention in 
the matter of liquor rested primarily on an appeal to the self-assumed 
civilizing duty that sanctioned interference in the real or best inter-
ests of the subject people. Support for the cause was also drawn 
from the appreciative assent of the Africans themselves to the measures 
adopted on their behalf, though this line remained purely incidental 
and subsidiary to the claim that the white administration understood 
the true interests of blacks better than they did. Prohibition was 
vindicated too by the advantages derived from so drastic a step. 
Indeed, self-interest happily united with duty for the benefits con• 
ferred upon the Africans • of moral well-being and sobriety - would 
redound equally to the self-regarding advantage of the whites, now 
presented with a redeemed people who were more amenable to control 
and more desirous of work. As one magistrate wrote, legislative 
compulsion was justified by 
that higher law which requires us as civilized people 
and professing Christians to take such steps in our 
dealings with the natives, and in our governing them, 
as will raise them in the scale of civilization and 
Christianity, and not drive them to self-destruction 
by forcing a curse upon them •••• The natives them-
selves do not in the least object to the restrictions 
put upon the liquor traffic; on the contrary, they 
appreciate these restrictions very much indeed, as 
they see that they are for their own good, happiness, 
and prosperity; and the Chiefs, Headmen, and people 
have e"Pressed to me a hope that these restrictions 
will not in the slightest degree be relaxed •••• And 
as we have to do with such a vast native population 
in the whole country, and as such restrictions have 
in every ·way proved such a success here, it is to be 
hoped that the Legislature will see the advantages 
to be derived, in every respect, by protectinq our ,., . 
natives throughout the country from the b:c\)neful ,in-
fluences of intoxicating liquors; and thevnecessity 
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of adopting such steps as will put a stop to the 
wholesale traffic which is carried on in other parts, 
and which is proving such a curse to the whole 
country and people. Such measures would tend not 
only to the benefit of the natives themselves, but 
also to our own advantage, and to the peace and 
prosperity of the whole country.97 
The history of liquor regulations as they were extended to 
the territories can be briefly reviewed. The annexation proclamations 
nos. 110 and 112 of 1879, sedtion 39, prohibited the sale of spirit-
uous liquors, without a licence, in the Transkei and Griqualand East. 
As for Thembuland, because the conditions of cession did not make 
actual legal provision for the territory, Major Elliot was forced to 
resort to issuing a circular prohibiting the sale of liquor to 
Africans, until the general regulations of 1885 finally brought the 
area into line with the two other Chief Magistracies. 
Yet such legal barriers, however firmly erected and vigilantly 
guarded, were not impregnable, and magistrates fulminated at betrayal 
both from within the Transkeian territories and from without. Ex-
ception to the blanket prohibition was made in the case of whites, and 
licences were issued under strict control of the Chief Magistrate, 
usually to white traders, who received permission to keep accommo-
dation houses and to sell liquor to white residents and travellers. 
For magistrates, licensed houses represented a necessary evil, being 
a potential source of brandy within the territories, since apart from 
illegal retailing; Africans could use whites as go-betweens. More-
over, the traders who were for the most part the owners of accommo-
dation houses attracted and bribed customers by obviously~rieans. 
~~ h~ 
Deficiencies and loopholes in the law pointed to the need for more 
stringent regulations, duly provided for by Proclamation 154 of 1885. 
Blyth had previously alerted the attention of the Government to the 
fact that because of the loose wording of section 59 of the Transkeian 
regulations, restrictions on the sale of liquor to Africans need not 
97 ~.f., G.2- 185, p.165. 
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legally be written into the licences, so that dealers were not con-
ditionally bound to sell only to whites. 98 Section 5 of Proclamation 
154 was meant to cover the opening but in fact merely complicated the 
problem, insofar as it laid down that no liquor was to be sold under 
licence 'to any native not being a Chief, Petty Chief, or Councillor' 
without his first obtaining a permit from the magistrate. Blyth 
vehemently objected to this exception as he feared that it would pro-
vide an opportunity for dealers to evade the law and sell almost in-
discriminately. He argued that chiefs and headmen were more addicted 
to drink than other classes of natives; and that the 'common people' 
would resent the class legislation implicit in the clause. 99 The 
Chief Magistrate called in, as well, the support of his charges and 
could report several meetings of the headmen and people of various 
districts, which had resolved to memorialize the Government on the 
subject of repealing the offending clause.
100 
When the Secretary 
for Native Affairs expressed his opinion that it would be inexpedient 
to alter the Proclamation, Blyth took the dramatic step of travelling 
to Cape Town where he m·ade personal representations to the Government. 
Proclamation 210 of the same year duly amended no. 154 by excising 
the notorious phrase. 
If accommodation houses and trading stores represented the 
Trojan horse secreting the enemy within, then the canteens strategic-
ally established on the borders of the territories stood for the enemy 
without. It was from the Colony that a brisk trade in liquor was 
conducted. Magisterial opinion was decidedly unfavourable. One 
Ciskeian administrator wrote graphically of 'vile dens called 
canteens placed wherever a sufficient number of natives in the 
vicinity can be entrapped to swallow the abominable and maddening 
98 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 2/66: Blyth to U.S.N.~., 8 September 1885. 
99 Ibid., C.M.T. 2/66: Blyth to U.S.N.A., 13 October 188j. 
100 Ibid., C.M.T. 2/66: Blyth to U.S.N.A., 13, 16 and 23 November 
1885. 
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poison, a cheap and most vile compound, rendering such remarkable 
profits to the vendors!.
101 
Enterprising African carriers in 
Fingoland added the profitable trade of brandy to their business and 
made their purchases in Queenstown and Kina Williamstown. The ad-
ministration retaliated in the form of section 8 of Proclamation 154 
of 1885, which required the Chief Maqistrate or Resident Magistrate 
of the district to issue written permits for importing liquor into the 
territories. This clause was also designed to meet the difficulty 
experienced by the courts in securing conviction for liquor offences 
under 'the annexation proclamations, which provided a penalty only for 
the actual sale of liquor and did nothing to halt the flow of liquor 
across the Kei. Africans responded by smuggling brandy, packed in 
dry goods cases, red ochre barrels and paraffin tins, into the terri-
tories and frequently escaped under cover of darkness the police 
patrols set up along the border. Penalties for illegal importation 
were stiffened by Proclamation 343 of 1894, so as to offer a deterrent 
for infringement of the law; and Proclamation 454 of the same year 
authorized the administration to search transport wagons 'on proof of 
reasonable suspicion' that liquor was being smuggled into the Transkei. 
So intricate and knotty did the liquor question prove that 
by 1893 Walter Stanford was already complaining of the utter inadequacy 
of Proclamation 154 of 1885 and pressed the need for framing new regu-
1 t . t t 1 th 1. t ff. . th t . t . l02 H a ions o con ro e iquor ra ic in e err1 ories. e 
claimed that according to existing rules dealers could sell wine and 
beer freely and in unlimited quantities to Africans, rendering the 
detection of brandy selling difficult. Again, the authority to 
issue permits for the purchase of liquor was not confined to the 
magistrates but was indiscriminately extended to field-cornets and 
ordinary justices of the peace. 
101 
102 
~' G.27- 174, p.63. 
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Magistrates in drawing up the conditions on which licences were 
.J'""h''!"-""-_-- [~""~"-;----.==--"':"::----., - ·--~--,. -~r=~~~---·- -:--:...., --·- _,.::--.~~-_:;---:....~,_-\ 
issued had not been laid down and~el]~P.ri~~~ 
such conditions, if challenged, would most likely not be upheld in a 
court of law. Stanford also recommended that provision be made for 
the punishment of the African who bought liquor illicitly as well as 
the seller. 'With a Proclamation upon these lines I feel sure that 
illicit dealing would to a great extent be prevented'. To remedy 
this state of affairs, Proclamations 343 and 454 of 1894 were ex-
tended to the territories; and Stanford noted with paternal concern 
· that the African people were well protected by the terms of these 
1 . 103 regu ations. 
iv Progress and Social Change 
Imbued with a faith in the absolute validity of western 
civilization, the magistrates posed as cultural missionaries who 
sought to foster the civilized advance of the African people by a 
process of education that would discipline and direct them in new 
ways of social life and so fit them for entry into the new society. 
The administrators were conscious agents of social change, the revo-
lutionary nature of which went far beyond their powers to understan:'jJ 
or control. 
At a theoretical level this characteristically Victorian 
concern with progress, advancement, change, was registered in the 
predominant position which the idea of social development held as 
the central concept of nineteenth11Century social theory. Victorian 
social thinkers assumed the creation of a social science to be 
virtually identical with the creation of a science of history, a pre-
supposition founded partially on an increased respect for history and 
103 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/10: Stanford to U.S,N.A., 23 October 
1895. 
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a perception of the fundamental character of historical change. The 
result was an emphasis, as social science developed, on the discovery 
of laws of social change at the expense of the study of social systems. 
This theoretical leaning can best be exemplified in Herbert Spencer's 
sociology. His work paradoxically combines a rigidly deterministic 
brand of evolutionism with a surprisingly modern use of the structural-
functional approach to social theory. Intellectual reconciliation 
was achieved by means of social evolutionary theory: for Spencer uses 
the ideas of structure and function, which he derived from evolution-
ary biology, always subordinately to the governing conception of evo-
lution. Like other nineteenth century social thinkers, his positivist 
faith in the universal operation of natural laws, his almost religious 
determination to prove human life part of an ordered totality, led to 
. t. . h 1 . 1 1 t. f . l 1 t . 104 an 1mpa 1ence wit mere y partia exp ana ions o socia re a ions. 
This relative neglect of Social Statics in favour of Social 
Dynamics is mirrored in the thinking of the Transkeian magistrates. 
Despite the frequent use of that nineteenth century sociological 
vogue-word 'system 1 , popularized by Spencer, their reports reveal 
little sense of the wholeness and otherness of the tribal social sys-
tem. African culture was viewed through a framework of accepted 
concepts and valuations which made for a selective interpretation of 
tribalism. They appraised it in terms of a single overarching 
standard of values, derived from and appropriate to western society, 
which represented for them the measure of all things. In this 
manner were parried the blows that historicism threatened to deliver 
against the classical tradition of western thought, to which the 
• 
notion of perfection is essential. For if there is no common stan• 
dard in terms of which to grade societies, there can be no final 
solution to the central problem of what mankind should aim at. 
Instead, holding fast to the myth of the 'Dominant Model', the 
104 J.W. Burrow, Evolution and Society, chapters 3.3, 4.1, 6 passim. 
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administrators viewed primitive societies as so many steps towards 
the more perfect way of life embodied in western civilization. 
The inability to understand African society from within, in 
terms of its own purposes and outlook, manifests itself in the magis-
trates' partial insight as to the ways traditional institutions ful-
filled the social needs and suited the social circumstances of the 
people. Walter Stanford, for one, could observe that the Africans 
possessed 'in their own polity many laws and customs well suited to 
their needs and conditions•. 105 Such cross-cultural sympathy gave 
impetus to the formal recognition of African customary law as applic-
able to civil disputes between African parties. But at the same 
time, in magisterial reports and discussions, while component parts 
of African culture stand out in isolation, the sense of how the parts 
interrelate functionally with each other and how the whole system is 
organically integrated is dimly and intermittently grasped. The 
administrators showed little understanding of the coherence of the 
African way of life, and displayed an inability to understand and 
value traditional society in terms of its own scale of values, its 
own rules of thought and action, and not those of some other culture. 
Given what Lord Annan has called 'the curious strength of positivism 
in English thought' in the last century, they could never attain to 
a consistent standpoint of cultural pluralism, the belief not merely 
in the multiplicity., but in the incommensurability, of the values of 
different cultures and societies. To avoid the unpleasantly re-
lativist implications of a world in which many of the old certainties 
were disappearing and startlingly new and alien social phenomena were 
demanding accommodation within Europocentred systems of thought and 
value, nineteenth century social thinkers and colonial administrators 
as well turned to and leant heavily upon social evolutionary theories. 
These fulfilled the need for a satisfactory conceptual structure in 
105 J.W. Macquarrie (ed.), Reminiscences, vol. 1, p.99. 
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which to order their world and stabilize their experience. Within 
such a framework they could concede that primitive modes of social 
behaviour might be appropriate and valid for a particular cultural 
stage, the tribal system being 'eminently suited to [the natives'] 
requirements so long as their surroundings were all of a more or less 
savage character•.
106 
At the same time they asserted that contempor-
ary primitive peoples represented the earlier stages of human develop-
ment, that such phases formed but part of a larger process of social 
evolution which happily led in a direction marked out by western 
society. Of this hypothetical sequence, white civilization represent-
ed the culminating point, the Benjamin, the peak of the creative 
process. 
Magisterial concern, then, was not to preserve African cul-
tures intact, but to change them, however modestly, in a desirable 
way. The fact of social change was something of which no thoughtful 
administrator could remain unaware, forming as it did a basic datum 
in the experience of the indigenous communities and of the magistrates 
in their administrative roles - which they sought to stimulate, to 
control and direct, and applaud. Looking back over a period of a 
hundred years, we can observe that the impact of white advance had 
generated a process of change that was progressively to transform the 
traditional systems. As the interaction between black and white on 
the Cape Eastern Frontier grew ever more intense, from their first 
meetings to the political incorporation of the chiefdoms within the 
white polity and beyond that time, the impulse of change, quickly 
gathering pace, propelled the African sosieties out of their existing 
course and forced them upwards on to a new plane. This rapid 
acceleration in the tempo of change was revolutionary in nature and 
marked a decisive climacteric in the history of the Cape Nguni. 
It was one of the great watersheds in their socio-historical experience. 
106 £E!:, G.4- 190, p.38. 
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Borrowing a term from W.W. Rostow's analysis of the industrial revo• 
lution, we can say that the period spanning the political incorporation 
of the Transkeian Territories, with which we are largely concerned, 
was one of 'take-off'. The change-over from 'primitive' to· 
'civilized' society gradually got underway, as traditional society 
was more closely interlocked with the large-scale white society. 
The African chiefdoms entered a wider world, which was to remodel 
them profoundly in its own image. 
Modern social anthropologists, in their desire to construct 
a value•free study of comparative societies, have conceived the pro-
cess of social change in terms of an increase of scale, over a broad 
range of features, economic, political, religious, et alia.
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In 
its economic aspect, change overtook the locally self-sufficient 
traditional economies and brought about the growth of peasant communi-
ties. The course of political incorporation in turn drew the hither-
to independent chiefdoms into a wider political structure. As the 
magisterial system was extended to the annexed territories, so the 
African chiefdoms lost their sovereignty and became local unit.s of 
government within a white-controlled administrative system. 
Paralleling the process of political incorporation, on the one hand, 
and the growing economic interdependence of white and black, on the 
other, was the process of religious inclusion, as missionary evange-
lism spread the Christian religion among African converts and drew 
them within a new and wider form of organization, the Church. Where-
as present-day anthropological study would understand the fundamental 
difference between traditional and modern societies as a difference 
of scale, the nineteenth century administrator conceived the difference 
as one of kind and value. The ethnocentric assumption, that western 
culture represented the pinnacle of human endeavour and embodied 
107 Cf. G. Wilson and M. Wilson, The Analysis of Social Chanqe 
(C. U .P. , 1945). 
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standards of universal validity in terms of which other cultures 
were to be evaluated, caused African societies to be relegated to an 
inferior status. 'Civilization', as it found supreme expression in 
white society, was opposed to the 'primitive' or 'barbarous' African 
race. This separation of the cultural sheep from the goats provided 
the point of entry and moral justification for white intervention and 
control, exercised as a 'civilizing mission'. For the magistrate 
the process of social change was construed as a healthy forward move-
ment, the progressive development from barbarism to civilization, an 
ever closer approximation to a single universal pattern exemplified 
by British society - in a word, 'progress'. 
The idea of progress is one of the characteristic and rul• 
ing notions of the administrative mind and indeed of the whole age. 
The classic historian of this idea, J.B. Bury, has remarked that in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century the doctrine of progress 
became a generally received article of faith, an idolum saeculi, and 
was absorbed into 'the general mental outlook of educated people'. 108 
The socio•psychological foundations of this notion can be discovered 
in the mid-Victorian confidence born of the steadily increasing pros-
perity and steadily improving security of a rapidly industrializing 
world power. In extending what the prophet of Victorian progress, 
Lord Macaulay, called 'the empire of man over the material world', 109 
England had outstripped other nations and seemed poised for a bound• 
less destiny. Faith in material progress found its evidences in the 
expanding productivity and increasing wealth of industrial capitalism, 
in which Britain glorified. Contrasted with this, the unspecialized, 
poor and non-accum~lating economies of Africa were scorned as unpro-
gressive. Moreover, the confident expectation that the expansion of 
trade would displace the parochialism of nations by international 
108 J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress, p.346. 
109 Lo·rd Macaulay, Critical and Historical Essays, p.395. 
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co-operation and advance world peace influenced white attitudes in 
Africa to the supposed endemic anarchy in the tribal interior. 
Progress implied, too, a release from the fetters of tradition and 
the old order in the case of political institutions and religious 
doctrine. In the African context, the destruction of chieftainship 
and the adoption of Christianity in the place of heathen superstitions 
were seen as so many signs that the burdens and errors of the African 
past were yielding before the advance of civilization. To foster 
this continuous forward movement lay, in the view of the colonial 
magistrates, at the very heart of their civilizing mission. 
If we are to unpack the meaning ascribed by the adminis-
trators to the notion of progress, it must be understood that the 
identification of social evolution with progress, categories which 
they considered interchangeable, served to convert the social theory 
into a moral one. Looked at in a wider cultural perspective, it is 
apparent that as traditional certainties and beliefs began to crumble, 
the human need for assurance that man was moving in· a definite and 
desirable direction found secular expression in the doctrine of pro-
gress. Colonial magistrates were as certain that social change was 
propelling the African societies along a new course, as the Victorians 
in general were that their society was travelling. What they wanted 
to know was the route and the destination. They required guarantees 
that mankind was advancing in a desirable and satisfying direction• 
which the dogma of progress provided. For the magistrates, who 
represented European civilization as the universal model, the highway 
of progress entailed an ever closer approximation by the traditional 
people to the modes of social life supremely embodied in their own 
society. Fortified and sanctioned by the doctrine of progress, they 
looked upon the movement of change working among the Africans and saw 
that it was good. 
But in attempting to comprehend a process of radical social 
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change such as the African chiefdoms underwent, the very concentration 
on development and continuity proved itself inadequate in describinq 
the complex historical process. It is in the discussion of the 
Transkeian administrators on the impact of change disrupting tradition-
al patterns of social life that we can confirm what Karl Popper has 
called the 'poverty of historicism'. In their inability to under-
stand revolutionary change from the viewpoint of the African ex-
perience of it, the magistrates tended to focus their attention on 
the pleasing and satisfying surface, which reflected a story of 
'progress', passing over at the same time those deeper undercurrents 
which were stirring African society .. That social change was seen as 
a progressive development towards a higher form of civilization, 
rather than radical discontinuity with traditionalism, can be illus-
trated by a report of Walter Stanford. 
My faith in the colonising genius (of the British) ••• 
is too robust for me to join in the general pessimistic 
wail that no progress towards better things is seen 
amongst our natives •••• Twenty years are but as a 
moment in the life of a people, and yet what changes 
have occurred in these territories since 1876. The 
power of the chiefs, supported by that of the witch 
doctors, was unbroken throughout numerous tribes this 
side of the Kei. Raids, reprisals, and stock lifting 
were rampant. It took over two years of fighting, 
from the end of 1378 to the beginning of 1881, to 
firmly establish the authority of Government. Since 
· then trade has developed enormously, and the quality of 
merchandise sold the natives rises steadily higher. 
The area under cultivation has been widely extended, 
and the use of ploughs and wagons has become general. 
Substantial schools and cottages built by natives are 
to be seen in every district. In 1876, I do not 
suppose a hundred men went out annually to labour from 
such tribes as the Gcaleka, Tembu, Pondomisi and others. 
Now they go out by thousands to Johannesburg, Kimberley, 
and other parts. In the more advanced districts we 
see natives carrying out a large measure of local self-
government with conspicuous success.110 
If this report resembles a parochial imitation of Macaulay's paean 
to mid-Victorian England, the similarity lies precisely in their 
subordination of the socio-historical process to the ruling n'.§~ion· 
110 ~' G.19•'97, p.129. 
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of progress. Insofar as progress culminated in their own civili-
zation, British society of the nineteenth century provided the 
measure and standard with which, in Macaulay's case, the past and• 
in Stanford's, African culture, were judged. For the magistrate; 
the highroad of progress as traversed by the traditional people tended 
towards the superior life of civilization: peaceful and beneficent 
government stripped of despotic chieftainship; security of life and 
property; the interchange of commerce and trade; increasing agricul• 
tural production; education; and the dignity of labour. The great 
argument of the colonial administrators seeks, in sum, to justify the 
ways of white society to black. 
This supreme confidence of the 'dominant race' in its cul• 
tural superiority led to an oversimplification of the complex problems 
involved in social change. Magistrates saw themselves as emissaries 
of a higher, more advanced culture, bearing the fruits of civilization 
to a 'backward' and 'inferior' race. It was assumed with extra-
ordinary complacency that the blessings of civilization were self-
evident, and that the Af'rican people, acknowledging their inferior 
cultural status, would voluntarily release themselves from the tram-
mels of tradition, throw off their 'Hebrew old clothes', in Carlyle's 
words, and submit to white rule. Moreover, by defining the process 
of white-directed change as one of moral progress; administrative 
activity embodied its own justification. Magistrates convinced 
themselves that they knew by some intuitive means, available to their 
superior position, the 'real' or 'best' or 'substantial' interests of 
Africans better than they did and could proceed to impose policies-
against their will, in the belief that African ignorance would eventu-
ally be enlightened on discovering the tangible benefits conferred. 
A fine example of begging the quest ion can be quoted here: 'all 
thoughtful Natives must be aware that the provisions of the Q 
(Glen Grey Act] are calculated to confer large and lasting benefits 
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upon the people if they can be induced to see what is really best 
for their own advancement and elevation. Many, it is to be feared, 
do not wish to be advanced. • •• they may submit to being improved 
1th h . t th . • 1· t;,: ' 111 a oug agains eir inc ina ~on • 
The magistrates' analysis of the mechanisms of social 
change was confined to an enumeration of the various 'civilizing 
agencies' and, subsidiary to this, an identification of the 'hindrances 
t Ch . t . . t d . . 1' t . ' 112 A f h f h o ris 1an1 y an c1v1 iza ion • s or t e ormer, t ese 
agencies were most commonly denoted as the colonial administration, 
the Christian religion, and commerce. Magistrates universally 
assumed that change, although desirable, was not self-generating and 
would therefore have to be externally induced. Frequent reference 
was made to the essential conservatism of the African people and 
their innate aversion to change. This conservative belief in the 
intractability of human material seems to form a common(~~in 
nineteenth century colonial administrative thinking. It was incor• 
porated as a general statement by the Indian administrator, Sir Henry 
Maine, in his indictment of democracy, Popular Government (1885), 
where he argued that the natural condition of mankind was to be un-
progressive and to scorn all change. But, he continued, human pro-
gress though limited had been real, and its instrument had always been 
a minority which had brought about innovations that the multitude 
would have rejected. Such an elitist conception of political 
leadership in Maine's writing harmonised well with the magistrate's 
image of himself as the apostle of a higher civilization to the be-
nighted Africans. His appointed duty was to command and to lead; 
the reciprocal obligation of the Africans was to obey and to follow. 
As a representative of the colonial government, his taskiwas to en-
trench and extend white rule over the black population, to combine 
111 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 3/275: Report of H.G. Elliot for 1894. 
112 ~' G.17- 178, p.105. 
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the roles of law-giver' j·Jdge, father and chief of his people; as a 
cultural missionary, he was charged with disseminating western civili• 
zation and evangelising the primitive societies. 
In this civilizing mission, the magistrate was assisted by 
the fellow agency of the missionary and the trader. Administrative 
reports reveal a frequent collocation of Christianity and civili-
zation. So inseparably were western culture and Christianity fused 
in the magistrate's mind that the magistrate and missionary appear as 
complementary figures. They looked upon each other's work as 
mutually supportive and let no opportunity slip by to exchange warm 
tribute. For the administrator, evangelism and conversion prepared 
the way for his coming, rendered the Africans more receptive to 
civilization and more amenable to white control. The progressive 
Africans, the School people, were invariably Christians and patron-
isingly looked upon as models of law-abiding and obedient subjects. 
The Church, then, was a useful pillar of the Government. 
That the administrators frequently collocated Christianity 
and civilization and used them as interchangeable concepts points 
once again to the characteristic transference, already observed in 
the drink question, into their reforming activity of attitudes derived 
from their religious life. Social reform was conceived wholly in 
terms of 'conversion' at the level of the individual, who by an 
exertion of will-power, the conscious exercise of free choice, re• 
leased himself from the snares of sin and made himself anew. Because 
of the voluntary nature of the redeeming act, determined by a free 
moral agent, magistrates set themselves against the use of force.and 
legislative interference to 'make men moral', and not only on the 
c:irounds of political expediency. The function of legislation, rather, 
was to create an environment conducive to social change and moral re-
form. The .conversionist analogy, reflected in the very terminology 
used to express a missionary view of change, as one of 'advancing' 
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and 'enlightening' the Africans, occurs as well in the magistrates' 
fear of 'relapse' on the part of their subjects into barbarism, a 
retrograde movement like that of the Christian sinner who has fallen 
from the light. Thus, the administrator regarded it as his duty to 
113 keep his charges up to the mark, to a civilized pitch, as the 
missionary would his flock, exhorting, encouraging, disciplining. On 
the removal of one respected magistrate from Tsomo, the Chief Magis-
trate expressed his concern that the people of the district 'would 
go back and get lost 1 • 114 It was the cultural regression of the 
Mfengu under the laissez faire administration of Captain Cobbe who 
was content to leave them much to themselves, acting merely as a dip-
lomatic adviser, thnt prompted the Government to appoint Matthew 
Blyth in his place. Blyth believed that to arrest the evident cul-
tural decline, he would have to institute a thoroughooinq civilizing 
programme, that involved the erection of churches and schools, and by 
a process of reinforcement confirm the Mfengu in the civilized ways 
previously adopted and since almost lost. However successful this 
administrator's work was in the long run, there was a constant need 
like that of the God of Israel to recall an erring people who were 
ever 'going back to barbarism and destruction', 115 becoming 'careless 
and indifferent ••• discouraged and [losing] heart'. 116 Blyth's 
task was to keep them on the right path and to prevent their returning 
to the fleshpots of traditional life. 
This emphasis on the personal factor, implicit in the anal-
ogy of conversion, comes throuqh likewise in the individualism 
colouring the administration's ideal of the advanced civilization to-
wards which the African people were progressinq. In fostering the 
113 .Q:E., G.4-'91, p.32. 
114 Cape Archives, C.MMT. 2/63: Blyth to U.S.N.A., 14 July 1882. 
115 Q!E, G.4- 191, p.31. 
116 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 2/68: Blyth to u.s.N.A., 25 January 1888. 
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progress of their subjects, the magistrates sought to liberate the 
I 
individual from the slavery of custom and from the tyranny of priest 
and king - the witchdoctor and the chief. The individualism which 
they espoused was opposed to and subversive of the firm inclusion of 
the African within communal forms of organization, his close identi-
fication with the kinship group and the tribal community. They re-
garded with hostility the traditional social organizations as inimical 
to the advance of civilization and believed it both desirable and 
necessary to destroy these social forms. Only by breaking up the 
traditional structures could those progressive energies be unleashed 
and the individual allowed to emerge, to attain an independence that 
was the necessary condition of any healthy forward movement. 
In the magistrates' eyes, traditionalism became a 'hindrance' 
barring the way to the establishment of the individualist, competitive 
society which they looked upon as the acme of an advanced civilization. 
It presented obstacles retarding that forward advance which they 
thought it their duty to promote. As a minor theme in their analysis 
of the mechanisms of social change, they identified 'the main obstacles 
to the further advance or civilization' as 'the customs, and super-
stitions, and traditions' of the indigenous people. 117 The whole 
traditional system was embodied in and symbolized by the chief. The 
institution of chieftainship was looked upon as inimical to white 
supremacy and white civilization (which were facilely equated), 
essentially antithetical to them. The administration saw the chiefs 
as focusing the conservative and primitive energies of tribalism 
against beneficent white rule, acting as a brake on the desirable 
progressive development from,barbarism to civilization; and it looked 
I 
to the ultimate destruction of chieftainship as necessary and inevit-
able. Particularly after the war of 1877-78 and the rebellion of 
1880-81, when the African societies displayed great tenacity in 
117 £f,E, G.33- 179, p.90. 
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clinging to their traditional social system, the white tendency to 
reduce the complexities of interaction to the crude polarity of a 
k d I fl 
0 t b t 0 0 l 0 ti d b b • I 0 f d llS na e con 1c e ween c1v1 1za on an ar ar1sm was rein orce • 
This vulgar simplification of the issues at hand in terms of polar 
abstractions rendered it less possible to treat the problems attending 
social change and social upheaval in a pragmatic manner. The tradi-
tional system was an ill to be eradicated, an· obstacle to be over-
thrown, an immature and inferior social form whose future it was to 
be replaced by the superior life of western society. 
The antithesis of traditional and modern, of 'primitive 
communism' on the one hand and liberal individualism on the other, 
was best exemplified for the magistrates in the economic area. They 
deroqated the system of communal tenure as unprogressive, precisely 
because it stifled individual effort and enterprise. Its apparent 
egalitarian socialism seemed at odds with th8 spirit of competitive-
ness, the institution of private property and the individuallaccumu-
lation of capital, -i:•rhich formed the components of the capitalist sys-
tern, whose productive efficiency when contrasted with the relative 
inefficiency and poverty of the tribal economy provided its own 
justification. The magistrates argued that only individual owner-
ship of land, free of the threat of confiscation by conservative 
chiefs, would act as an inducement to progress and improvement. As 
one officer wrote, 'The communistic practices of Kafir society are 
fatal to individual enterprise. Should a man by superior industry 
and skill obtain a larqe crop, he must share it with his less fortunate 
1\9 
(because more lazy) friends, of whom there are sure to be numbers •••• 
These considerations 0ave impetus to the magisterial promotion of in· 
dividual titles to land. Individual ownership was at variance with 
indigenous systems of land tenure whereby the tribal land was held in 
118 £EE., G.20-'81, p.43. 
119 Ibid., G.17-'78, p.115. 
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trust by the chief, and so the white innovations in granting in-
dividual titl~s and 'certificates of occupation' risked and incurred 
the opposition of the traditional authorities. The chiefs resented 
the loss of power entailed in the prerogative of distributing land, 
and were alarmed at the dispossession of the tribal patrimony by a 
progressive black minority allied to the white administration. In 
their turn, magistrates saw the granting of individual ownership as 
a lever for subverting the power of the chiefs, whose resistance to 
the advance·of civilization was strengthened by the claim that the 
tribal reserve was vested in their own person. Walter Stanford be-
lieved that land would be the final solvent of the old order; and 
with its demise the power of the chiefs would go. 'With individual 
title the individual owner steps to the front rank at once and away 
r\ •go chieftainship and all that combined to sink the man's individuality 
(l) 
in the tribal bond'. 120 
Set at liberty in this way from the despotism of chiefs and 
communal ownership, African society would be stirred out of its in-
veterate backwardness and stagnation, and set moving along the path 
of improvement. In true liberal tradition magistrates regarded the 
institution of private property as the tap-root of individual liberty 
and progress. 
Turning to the third civilizing agency, that of commerce, 
we can say that the close alliance of civilization and trade, found 
in the administrators' reports, is descriptive of the strong commercial 
component forming their notion of civilization. There was widespread 
agreement that the expansion of trade tended to promote friendship and 
co-operation among nations and advance universal peace; that the 
acquisition and accumulation of material goods, distributed by 
commerce and trade, was a sure index of prosperity and progress. In 
this sense, the civilization disseminated by the magistrates was often 
120 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/7: Report of W.E. Stanford for 1890. 
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frankly and grossly materialist. They viewed the increasing turn-
over of the trading stores and the sale of such products as European 
clothing and agricultural implements to a growing African clientele 
as visible signs of progress. Like the Utilitarians, the adminis-
trators welcomed the multiplication of African wants and took it for 
a mark of progress. The more men's wants multiply, they argued, the 
greater the need for peaceful and industrious collaboration between 
white and black and the.greater the cohesion of the new society which 
had been forged by the incorporation of the chiefdoms within the Cape 
Colony. The function of commerce was to penetrate the isolation of 
the parochial African societies and 'bring them into contact with 
. . 1. t. t 121 c1v1 1za ion • The interchange of commerce would create civilized 
wants and satisfy awakened needs, advance the material prosperity of 
the Transkei, and, not least, expand the Colony's markets. The whole 
strength of the civilizing mission rested, then, on the happy union 
of duty and self-interest. 
Considered in more general terms, magisterial discussion 
reveals a tendency to concentrate on agency in the social process, to 
the exclusion of those profounder structural :forces, involved in the 
very circumstances of interaction between black and white, working in• 
exorably to transform African society. However much, for example, 
the administration might ascribe migrant labour to the rational 
acceptance by Africans of a. new ethic of work, it is incontrovertible 
that pressures on land and population increase set up a chain reaction, 
impelling Africans willy nilly to seek work in the industrial centres 
of Southern Africa. In their desire to make sense of and thus con• 
trol the forces of transformation, ·the magistrates were concerned to .. 
discover agency in the process of change, the agencies of the magis-
trate, the missionary, and the trader. White agents and institutions, 
121 Q:f., G.5- 196, p.126. 
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by being brought directly to bear on the daily life of the people, 
would promote their continuous upward advance. 
In conclusion, we must recognise the tension existing between 
the conservative and the modestly reformist tempers of administrative 
style, which the Tra.nskeian magistrates apparently contained, however 
uneasily, at an intellectual level in social evolutionary theory. 
On the one hand there exists a significant conservative component of 
thought which accepted the importance of socio-historical understand-
ing, the intractability of human material and the folly of wantonly 
uprooting a traditional system of society on radical a priori 
principles. On the other hand, magisterial appetite for progress 
and improvement left them unsatisfied with the conservative criterion 
of judgement, the prescriptive force of tradition, as being too inert 
and unprogressive. For the Victorians were certain that mankind was 
advancing, that western civilization formed the vanguard, being 
necessarily closer to or a prefiguring of some ultimate human goal, 
and therefore superior to the more traditional societies which took 
up the rear. 'nle history of man and society was represented as the 
progressive assimilation to a single universal pattern which formed 
the ultimate standard of value and to which western civilization most 
nearly approximated. For the colonial administration the task became 
one of fostering the acculturation of the African people to the domi-
nant European model, of watching over a process of education throuqh 
various fixed stages of social growth until they attained the fully 
developed forms of western society. To this end, administrative 
policy was qeared to th~ slow tempo of evolutionary change; and was 
valued for its responsiveness to transformations in the social re-
lations among the trans-Keian Africans. Following the contours of 
social development, it represented, in the words of one magistrate 
in the territories, 'a unique progressive policy, adapting itself 
to the varied stages of advancing civilisation'. 122 
122 £.EE., G.33-'82, p.19. 
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CHAPTER T H R E E 
LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
i The Recognition and Codification 
of African Customary Law 
The sphere in which the colonial magistrate operated was 
wide; but it was in the role of judicial officer that he achieved his 
most sustained and immediate form of contact with the African people, 
with the court as the locale or context of interact ion, a.nd law the 
style of discourse between them. This essay is concerned largely 
with one party to the dialogue, the white administration, and to de-
code, as it were, the particular medium of communication, it would be 
useful at the outset to examine the magistrates' notions of law, 
their understanding of the nature and function of the language -
legal in kind - that flowed between the colonial and African societies. 
Two concepts of law, embedded in magisterial thinking, can 
perhaps be defined. There is, first of all, an Austinian-like notion 
of law as the command of the sovereign or 'determinate human superior' 
in receipt of habitual obedience from the bulk of his subjects. 
This implies a prior characterization of the body politic as one sus-
ceptible of a simple top and bottom analysis, divided into rulers and 
ruled. The governmental system operative in tQe Transkeian terri-
tories, being essentially one of direct rule, approximated most nearly 
to such an ideal political type. It comprised a bureaucratic hier• 
archy, reaching its apex in the office of the Secretary for Native 
Affairs, with power devolved downwards to assignable persons through 
a disciplined chain of command. The authority of the local magis• 
trate, the right to command obedience and exact respect; was 
'positional', deriving from his ranking in the administrative hier-
archy, and in this sense differed from that of the traditional chief 
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whose authority was consensually legitimated. Backed by the Adminis-
tration, the magistrate enjoyed full control of his district, and in 
theory his sovereign fiat was law, although in practice he did not 
usually enforce his authority against popu.lar opposition or with out 
popula~ support. In line with this, the conception of administrative 
action which was generally held by the white officers revolved around 
the confident issuing and ready receipt of lawful orders. The de-
cisions, whether judicial or administrative, which he reached and en-
forced, the magistrate regarded in the nature of laws, entitled to the 
prompt and unquestioning obedience of the subjects he ruled. The 
concept of law as command, then, is appropriate to a government im• 
posed upon an alien people from without, a superstructure deliberately 
fashioned as an instrument to serve conscious ends, those of civili-
zation and control. 
The other notion of law implanted in magisterial thought 
represented law as a socio-historical institution, a conception which 
suggests supremely the work of F.C. von Savigny and of Sir H.S. Maine, 
the foremost legal proponent of the historical method in the English-
speaking world. The principal doctrines of the historical school, 
as expounded by Savigny, are two in number. Law springs from, is 
organically connected with and justified by, the ideals and character 
of a given people in its historical surroundings {what Montesquieu 
l-·"1~, .-r~ 
had called ~p.?sprit de la nation'). Each culture develops its own 
"'•"'\ 
legal habits and institutions, as it has its peculiar language, mo~!:.f' 
and government. If this is so, it follows that laws are not of 
universal validity or application. Secondly, law, being determined 
by the whole past of the people, cannot be changed arbitrarily by 
legislative decree: for law is found, not made. As Savigny himself 
expressed the idea: 'Law is the organ of folk-right: it moves and 
grows like every other expression of the life of the people: it is 
formed by custom and popular feeling, through the operation of silent 
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forces, and not by the arbitrary will of a legislator'. 1 An irn-
plicit criticism is contain~d in the last phrase of the Austinian 
view, shared by writers like Hobbes and Bentham, which treats civil 
law, if not always as ccr.imands, then at least as effects of power, 
and which by extension seeks to explain social institutions as in-
struments to serve human purposes. The historical school, by con-
trast, displayed a superior understanding of the social determinants 
and functions of lai;\T. As conceived by its outstanding theorists, 
law is only one among many aspects of social development, conditioned 
by the same sort of factors as social life in gen~ral. They were 
impressed by the social fact that laws are the slow products of time 
and experience, by the manner in which they form the context of men's 
lives and purposes, the social environment we are born into. Men 
are creatures of law more even than creators of law. 
Just as the notion of law as command issued from the bureau-
cratic system of magisterial control, described in chapter one above, 
so the concept of law as a socio-historical institution ties i.n with 
the social evolutionary theory, outlined in chapter two. Indeed, as 
Sir Frederick Pollock has said, the historical method of which Henry 
Maine was the leading Victorian proponent in the field of legal 
studies, was nothing else than the doctrine of evolution applied to 
h . t"t . 2 uman ins 1 utions. In bis magnum opus, Ancient Law (1861), Maine 
sought to demonstrate that a greater appreciation of the social basis 
of all legal forms would be achieved when jurists used the techniques 
of the historian to trace the implications for all present systems of 
law, of the full course of legal development in the ancient world. 
In common with other contemporary social thinkers, his work advances 
arguments and carries assumptions which need only be stated to be 
recognised as familiar. For Maine admits the relative validity of 
1 E. Barker, Political Thought in England 1848 to 1914, p.164. 
2 Ibid., p.163. 
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primitive legal modes as the expression of a particular stage in the 
continuous development of a particular society, while maintaining the 
absolute validity of modern western institutions, and he assumes that 
ancient legal forms were only part of a larger process of legal evo-
1 ut ion, which he formulated in his famous 'status to contract' theory. 
As he argued, 'Starting, as if from one terminus of history, from a 
condition of society in which all the relations of Persons are summed 
up in the relations of Family, we seem to have steadily moved towards 
a phase of social order in which all these relations arise from the 
free agreement of individuals'. And again, 'the movement of the 
progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to 
Contract'. 3 Legal, as ·well as other social, institutions were thus 
capable of being arranged on a single scale of progress. Viewed in-
dependently, they were seen to belong uniquely to a particular stage 
of social growth, but taken together they constituted a single pro-
gressive ascente In effect, Maine's research was shaped by an 
ideological intent. To his contemporaries, the work represented a 
scientifically tested exposition and vindication of liberal individ-
ualism, manifesting itself in history, in which progressive western 
man was tending towards the apex of legal refinement: the freedom of 
individuals to enter into contracts on their own behalf and so de-
termine their own status. 
Corresponding to the two notions of law, best known in the 
formulations of the analytical and the historical schools of juris• 
prudence (which are incidentally the leading and conventionally con-
trasted legal doctrines of the nineteenth century), are two differing 
conceptions of the sovereign, which stand side by side in magisterial 
thinking. On the one hand, there is th~ Austinian idea of the 
sovereign as the source of law, issuing commands and demanding 
3 G. Feaver, From Status to Contract, p.53. 
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obedience. On the other, the sovereign is regarded as the custodian 
and repository of customary law. The understanding of the white ad• 
ministration that African tribal law, like everything else in tradi-
tional society, was the expression of the changing habits, beliefs, 
general attitudes of African society, at a particular stage of its 
cultural development, shaped its recognition as a legal system to be 
administered in a modified form by Cape magistrates beyond the Kei. 
Such was the conservative form of evolutionary jurisprudence which saw 
tribal law as the expression of the deepest traditions and instincts 
that had formed the charactar of the indigenous society, not to be 
superseded by advanced colonial structures out of harmony with its 
cultural ethos. At the same time it was complemented by a reformist 
strain which demanded that the law should respond attentively to 
changing social needs, generated as a consequence of the interaction 
between black and white societies. In the Transkeian territories, 
the flexibility of the legal system, its relevance and responsiveness 
to changing social relationships among the African people, were 
guaranteed by the discretionary capacity conferred upon magistrates 
to apply customary lalv in civil suits where both parties were black. 
As one administrator observed, 'Th:97s [in regard to] native people 
attaining a civilized status (and] entering into contracts based upon 
civilized or Christian procedure or rites, colonial law applies, but 
contracts based upon native custom obviously call for application in 
cases of dispute of such custom, restricted however by [the] dictates 
of humanity •••• 14 Moreover, as primitive modes of social life 
represented, according to the categories of social evolutionary 
theory, inferior stages of human development, the colonial adminis-
tration conceived its task not merely to wait upon f9!iange, but, in 
the exercise of its civilizing mission, deliberately to foster such 
4 J.W. Macquarrie (ed.), The Reminiscences of Sir Walter Stanford, 
vol. 1, p.100. 
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change and promote the civilized advance of the tribal communities. 
The sovereign therefore assumed, in addition, the guise of the edu-
cator, whose function it was to create a legal environment conducive 
to social progress, holding out inducements to the adoption of a 
western life-style. This was achieved, for example, by a system of 
_exemption from the operation of customary law. By Act 39 of 1887 1 
in the territories, any duly registered parliamentary voter was com• 
pletely exempted from African customa_ry law and from all laws differ-
entially affecting Africans. Cape tribal law policy held out the 
promise and se~ up the objective of full incorporation within the 
colonial legal system of the African people east of the Kei, towards 
which goal they would be levelled up progressively as time and cir-
cumstances changed. In the transitional stage, however, recognition 
would be extended to traditional law as a necessary accommodation to 
social reality. As Walter Stanford argued, 'that a time will come 
when the colonial law and procedure will be fully extended to the 
Native territories is undoubted, but for any one to say that time has 
arrived would be proof of his utter ignorance of the state of the 
J~ I .:) 
various tribes to be dealtLJwith • 
The issues involved in the recognition of African tribal law 
can best be illuminated by reference to the 1883 Cape Native Laws and 
Customs Commission, which was appointed to investigate the complex 
question of what system of law and government should be applied in 
the territories. 
That social evolutionary theory formed the general conceptual 
framework within which the Commission regarded customary law is evi-
dent from the significant description which the Report provided of 
the nature of law in traditional society. The law, according to the 
5 £EE, G.3- 189, Report of W.E. Stanford, p.45. 
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commissioners, was unwritten, it embodied and was transmitted by oral 
tradition, being rooted in established custom and tracing back to the 
habits and usages of the people. Tribal law reflected the social 
circumstances of African society, it was 'created by and adapted to 
the conditions of a primitive, barbaric life'. At .the same time, 
leaning upon the work of Maine, the Report located the traditional 
system of law fairly low in the scale of legal evolution, and acknow-
ledged that 'in some respects it was not unlike that which prevailed 
among our Saxon ancestors in the early days of civilization'. 6 Thus, 
once again, the familiar dialectic, characteristic of nineteenth 
century social theory, between absolute values which reside in modern 
western civilization, and those which depend upon time and place in a 
concrete situation, reappears in colonial thinking on African admin-
istrative policy, 
The argument in favour of recognising the customary legal 
system received greatest force from the traumatic impact of the 
African resistance movements. Sitting in the aftermath of the war 
and rebellion of the late 1870s and early 1880s, which had incon-
testably demonstrated the vitality of traditionalism, the Barry 
Commission concluded that the supersession of African customary law 
by the colonial legal system was inexpedient, for 'many of the exist-
ing Kafir laws and customs are so interwoven with the social con-
ditions and ordinary institutions of the native population ••• that 
any premature or violent attempt to break them down or sweep them 
away would be mischievous and dangerous in the highest degree • • • • 
A spirit of conservatism informs the Commission's judgements, not 
least in its refusal to cont~late the wanton uprooting of the 
traditional social system, the transformation of tribal institutions 
by means of positive acts of legislation, and in its reluctance to 
6 ~' G.4-'83, Report, para~ 8. 
7 Ibid., G.4- 183, Report, para. 28. 
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ignore, to quote words redolent of Burke, 'the important sanction 
which long prescription and national feeling give to all laws'. 8 
Law in this sense was regarded as the expression of the deepest tra-
ditions which have shaped the character of a people - bound up with 
the 'organic' development of a community, not to be deflected by the 
arbitrary fiats of reforms that disregard its historical 'spirit' and 
social circumstances. Like Burke, the commissioners were impressed 
by the intricacy and variety of tribal laws and customs, by their be-
ing the slow products of time and experience, by their power to affect 
the mind and take hold of the feelings. The capacity of radical re• 
formers to change and alter laws, it was held, is limited by their 
nature and function, as the social context of men's lives and purposes, 
informing and shaping as laws do their habits and prejudices, the 
assumptions men make without even being aware that they make them. 
On these grounds the Commission declined to propose radical reforms in 
the direction of legal assimilation, and its conclusions carried be-
hind them a large weight of magisterial opinion. Elliot, for one, 
stressed the danger and futility involved in challenging the tradition-
al legal system to which the Africans were tenaciously attached and 
underlined the threat of African resistance which such reckless inter-
ference might provoke. As he wrote: 
The natives in this territory are totally unprepared to 
accept colonial law, and would resist any attempt to 
force it on them ••••any attempt to rudely break down 
existing laws and customs (to which the people are much 
attached) would meet with determined and obstinate 
opposition.9 
It seems clear that given the temper of the time, with the 
prevailing loss of self-confiience in the Cape's ability to rule the 
subject African people, pragmatic considerations of administrative 
expediency allied to a cautious and sceptical conservatism largely 
8 £El!,, G.4-'83, Report, para. 32. 
9 Ibid., G.4-'83, Ap~-:::endix D, p.280, q.29 [H.G. Elliot]. 
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determined the formal recognition of customary law in the Transkeian 
Territories. However, for some m~gistrates, the desire to give 
greater effect to tribal law in the territorial courts was shaped by 
a superior understanding of the close and necessary relation of the 
African legal system to the traditional social structure. Blyth, in 
evidence before the Barry Commission, drew from hi.s administrative 
experience in commending the social utility of customary law and the 
adequacy of the Transkeian regulations. which had given the magis-
trates discretionary powers to apply such law suitably modified, in 
encompassing the needs of the Mfengu community.
10 
Walter Stanford, 
to provide another outstanding example, implicitly recognised that 
the criterion for assessing the viability of a legal system is its 
relevance and responsiveness to social realities. As he was contin-
ually to maintain, the African people possessed 'in their own polity 
many laws and customs well suited to their needs and condition'.
11 
African laws bore the merits of clarity and simplicity of definition; 
they embodied concepts of right and justice discoverable in more de-
veloped legal systems; their procedures were neither cumbrous nor pro-
hibitively expensive on account of costs. He was convinced there-
fore of the desirability of extending recognition to African custom-
ary law as a system of law. More specifically, he held that tradi-
tional laws of inheritance, founded on male primogeniture, were con-
sistent with the stru~tui~ and social functions of the extended 
family system. To abolish the institution of polygyny, as mission-
·aries demanded, although a pattern of marriage 'in conflict with the 
principles of Christianity and of western civilization', would result 
in the disruption of family· life and of the whole joint family organi-
zation. As for the tribal custom of lobolo, it legalised the 
marriage and made the children legitimate. The practice of the 
10 CPP, G.4- 183, Appendix D, p.266, q.29 [Matt. Blyth]. 
11 J.W. Macquarrie (ed.); Reminiscences, vol. 1, p.99. 
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courts in the Colony proper of regarding traditional marriages estab~ 
lished by lobolo invalid before the law was intolerant and harsh in 
i . l - 12 ts socia consequences. Stanford's insight into the social struc-
ture underlying the legal arrangements of the African community in-
formed his advocacy of formal recognition of customary law in the 
territories. 
At the_same time, he understood the need for the adjustment 
of law to meet changing situations, and held that the function of law 
must be to encompass new social relations among Africans, brought 
abo~t by their absorption and participation within a wider white-
dominated society. African customary law. or that version of it ad• 
ministered by the colonial magistrates, was geared to the needs of a 
small-scale society of herders and cultivators. But as many Africans 
emerged from the bounds of tribalism and; entering upon a process of 
cultural transition, (Same to form new relationships, customary law 
would have to be modified to accommodate their changing needs; or 
exemption granted from its operation to those evolues who had broken 
entirely from their· culture. Stanford himself was aware of 'many 
cases of ••• hardship resulting from a code no longer applicable to 
t 13 the conditions of the native people, even the heathen • As in-
stances of Africans entering into newly contract.ed relations, he cited 
the examples of a female African teacher and the many women in domes-
tic service in the white towns and on the white farms. He realized 
the need for suppleness in the legal system and regarded the pro-
visions in the various Transkeian proclamations £or the discretionary 
application of customary law in civil cases an admirable expression 
of s.uch need. As an advocate of flexibility, Stanford opposed the 
codification of customary family law, holding that 'as conditions 
changed in the life of the native people, a written code which would 
be sure to crystallize and be difficult to amend would constantly 
12 J.w. Macquarrie {ed.), Reminiscences, vol. 1, p.}87. 
13 .ll?.i.Q.. t p. 101. 
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check the people's advance•. 14 There was a danger of imparting 
rigidity to the law. In fine, as Stanford wrote in the early twen-
tieth century, the legal system prevailing in the Transkei while 
'allowing for the circumstances then p;evailing •••(has] undoubtedly 
largely led to the good government of the Territories and the steady 
d . f "t 1 . . ·1· t' ' 15 a vance o 1 s peop e in c1v1 iza ion • 
Yet· another cluster of arguments advanced before the Barry 
Commission in favour of recognition centred upon the custodial function 
of the white administration. It was argued that on the assumption of 
political sovereignty, the magistrates had stepped into traditional 
authority roles and adopted chiefly personae. For this reason they 
were bound to sanction customary law so as to maintain a necessary 
continuity between the old and the new regimes, without which the 
traditional social system would be seriously dislocated. Consequent tp-
on the displacement of the tribal ruling elite from their positions 
of authority, the need arose for the white magistrates to step into 
the breach, to uphold and continue the administration of justice after 
the traditional manner of the chiefs. Fearful of the disintegration 
of the indigenous social structures, the rending of the social fabric, 
the administration sought to reinforce some of the traditional rules 
making for the stability of the social system under the impact of new 
forces of change. The Cape was thus impelled to acknowledge the 
effectiveness of customary law as an instrument of social control, 
well tempered to suit the social circumstances of the African people, 
if the 'cake of custom' were not to crumble. Moreover, the tran-
sitional cultural state the Africans occupied between barbarism and 
civilization, to which colonial laws were clearly inapplicable, de-
fl 
manded the recognition of a modified corpus of tribal law, so that 
14 J.W. Macquarrie (ed.), Reminiscences, vol. 1, p.99. 
15 Ibid. 
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the social life of the African communities could be brought under 
some. form of legal control. In this condition of tutelage, it was 
argued, the administration must needs take account of the special 
needs of the black population beyond the I<ei as 'a people apart ', 
until by a process of education they were weaned from traditional 
modes of social behaviour and introduced to a western life-style, at 
which point of time the extension of the colonial legal system would 
become a matter of practical policy. The whole cf e:.._nc;;_y of Sir T •. 
Shepstone's case in favour of recognition, which carried great weight 
with the Barry commissioners, was that African customs ought to be 
recognised for the sake of placing them under some contro1. 16 'The 
main object of keeping natives under their own law is to ensure con• 
trol of them. You cannot control savages by civilized law'. 17 
Again• magistrates contended soundly enough that non-
recognition of African tribal law would entail a denial or deprivation 
of justice to those seeking to enforce rights previously obtained 
a~cording to local_ custom. In addition, refusal to hear claims 
arising out of customary arrangements and to entertain previously 
contracted family ties and obligations would effectively lessen 
magisterial control, as Africans were sure to take their cases to the 
traditional courts where such claims were regarded as cognisable. 
Unless the realities of the situation were to be completely ignored, 
then. strong practical considerations compelled the administration to 
accord some measure of recognition. Magistrates were plainly aware 
of the sheer impracticability of applying socially incongruous laws. 
'If we make laws unfit for a people, they will become a dead letter, 
••• and the people will follow custom rather than obey law'. 18 
• The opposing standpoint, spearheaded by the missionaries, 
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law. Disapproval was grounded in the main on moral grounds. In-
deed, magisterial attitudes towards tribal customs and law were 
characteristically suffused with a high seriousness, ever mindful of 
the moral law 'written on the tablets of eternity'. 19 To several 
features of traditional African culture, particularly to the complex 
of witch beliefs and the initiation rites, magistrates reacted with a 
deeply felt sense of moral repugnancy. To many administrators, as-
pects of the kinship system, more particularly polygynous marriage 
and lobolo, seemed genuinely shocking, as they violated a conception 
of Christian marriage on which it was believed that the whole fabric 
of civilized life rested. Missionary opinion, and the weight of re-
ligious orthodoxy, :.'.:orti:fied this view. At numerous vital points, 
touching established social mo~es and norms, then, the practices and 
v' 
values of tribal life conflicted with western society. It was argued 
consequently that traditionalism presented a formidable obstacle to 
the advance of civilization, and that it should be destroyed, for., as 
one magistrate wrote, 'heathenism means antagonism to everything of a 
progressive and developing nature•.
20 
Just as the Africans were en-
titled to the benefits of civilization, conferred on them under white 
rule, they should in turn, so the argument continued, be subject to 
its restraints. More impelling than this, the magisterial radicals 
opposed the establishment of a system of legal dualism, as a con-
sequence of 'class legislation', in the belief that 'the European 
and the native should be ,g_gua~ in the presence of the law', 21 but ig ... 
'-..:-~-
nored at the same time.a the cultural cleavage betneen black and white, 
which for the magisterial conservatives was a prir.iary consider at ion. 
Whereas the latter considered that cultural difference made special 
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social category, the former argued that any formal recognition of 
cultural pluralism in legal matters would merely highlight that di-
vergence of interests between white and black societies which it 
should be the Colony's vital concern to bridge and reconcile. 'So 
long as the natives adhere to these customs ••• so long will they re-
main a separate and distinct people, and will never become one with 
us in habits and feeling; ••• so long may we expect Kafir wars'. 22 
From the critical experience of African resistance to white encroach-
ment could be drawn two contrasting lessons about the desirability 
and nature of acculturation. 
Among the administrators as a whole the conviction held 
sway that the social circumstances of the Transkeian people, firmly 
encapsulated within their traditional structures, required a differ-
ential legal system. 'It would be well to consider that native law, 
so-called, is an outcome of their social life, and that European law 
is the outcome of a vastly different social life; and the same legal 
system is not likely to suit such different social conditions'. 23 
In a spirit of legal realism magistrates perceived the incongruity of 
colonial laws and, 'by contrast, the utility of African customs and 
law which 
having grown out 0£ the requirements of the people, 
are more suited to the genius of the race. Experience 
proves too that laws which work well, as regards a 
civilised community, have an opposite effect when 
brought to 'Jear upon an alien people, whose institutions, 
associations, habits, modes of thought have been cast in 
a different mould. While these remain unchanged, all 
legislation on other lines is likely to fail to produce 
satisfactory results. The introduction of English law 
would throw out of gear the whole machinery by which the 
national life of the people is carried on.24 
However much they considered tribal law of questionable morality, 
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on the ground advocated the principle of recognition as a matter of 
practical administrative necessity. All the same, for some who 
looked beyond immediate requirements of policy, the full incorporation 
of the territories within the Cape's legal system beckoned as a goal 
attainable in the future, 'the goal of one law, one system of proced-
ure for all'. 26 
With regard to the Transkeian Territories, the desire to 
give greater effect to African customary law received permanent and 
formal recognition. Indeed, from the first, with the annexation of 
the Transkei and Griqualand East in 1879, the general regulations pro-
claimed had given the magistrates discretionary power to apply tribal 
law in civil cases where Africans were parties to the suit. Even 
before the promulgation of the annexation acts, in the period of in~ 
formal rule, the Cape agents who exercised a type of pseudo-magisterial 
authority in the area had orders- from Cape Town to observe the rudi-
ments of tribal personal law. In Fingoland, for example, the Agent 
was guided in the administration of justice by a code of rules drawn 
· up by Sir w. Currie on the exodus of the Mfengu and endorsed by the 
Government although bearing no statutory authority: these regulations 
declared that 1Kaffir law' was to prevail. The case in favour of 
sanctioning the tribal legal system found its fullest and most defini-
tive expression in the Report of the Barry Commission which, while 
recognising African civil law, refused to codify it. At the same 
time, appended to the Report were a series of regulations relating to 
customary marriages and traditional laws of inheritance, but these 
were never enforced or enacted, thus leaving civil cases to be dealt 
with under the discretionary provisions of the governing proclamations. 
The marriage regulations framed by the Barry Commission 
represented a cautious attempt to reform the traditional system of 
26 CPP, G.7- 192, Report of h1.E. Stanford, p.43. 
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family law, but as the Colony proved reluctant to antagonize 
traditionalism, customary marriage would continue to secure official 
toleration in the territories. Two features of the indigenous 
marriage system, polygyny and lobolo, were the principal objects of 
the Commission's reforming zeal, as they had long been regarded as 
directly antithetical to the western ideal of Christian marriage. 
The Commissioners declared that 'the Christian law of marriage sets 
forth the truest and purest idea of such a union'. 27 As Victorian 
gentlemen they set store by a monogamous union, chaste and sexually 
restrained, entered into by freely consenting partners, bound to-
gether in life-long constancy and fidelity, and animated by an exalted 
love which was both platonic and romantic. This culturally determined 
pattern of marriage conflicted with the practices and values of the 
customary marriage system, rooted as it was in the social structure 
of African communities, and provided an important source of cultural 
misunderstanding. 
Magistrates in their evidence and the Commission in its 
Report advanced strong objections to polygyny on moral and other 
grounds. There was a widespread conviction of its incompatibility 
with 'civilization'. Charles Brownlee thought 'polygamiJ;is antago-
nistic to civilization and therefore an obstacle to its advance 
th t . t 28 among e na ives • Magistrates objected in particular that it 
degraded women and reduced them to a servile status, enabling men to 
live in idleness by battening on the labour of their exploited wives. 
Women were said to take revenge on elderly polygamists by having 
extramarital liaisons with young lovers. The polygynous family was 
supposed to be rent by the jealousy and ill-feeling of the co~wives. 
Not least, polygyny was harmful to the material interests of the 
Colony as it locked up the potential labour resources in the terri-
27 £EE, G.4• 183, Report, para. 84. 
28 Ibid., G.4- 183 1 Appendix c, p.64, q.41. 
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tories. But despite strong criticism of the institution on moral 
grounds, as an institution for the enslavement of women and the un-
bridled sexual licence of men, the colonial administrators by and 
large were willing to tolerate the practice as one to which the in-
digenous people were firmly attached, to make allowances for the 
weaknesses of the flesh and the social circumstances of the black 
population. Major Elliot made the distinction in these terms, 'I 
do not disapprove of the native custom of polyga@yJupon social 
grounds (although I do upon moral), because I consider in the present 
condition of the people it is impossible to abolish it without intro-
ducing a more questionable evil'. 29 This evil was the disruption of 
family life, which magistrates feared would follow in the wake of 
abolition, as wives would be relegated to the status of concubines 
and children rendered illegitimate. Indeed, one administrator went 
so far as to urge missionaries to admit polygynists as converts to 
Christianity, appealing to the practice of the biblical patriarchs 
who seemed to have secured divine toleration in marrying a plurality 
f 
. 30 o wives. The enlightened insight of Sir T. Shepstone was, how-
ever, exceptional when he held, 'The kind of existence [the African 
people) lead and their peculiar beliefs and views render polyga1IDtd 
almost a necessity as far as their social condition is concerned'. 31 
In a more restrained manner, the Commission argued, true 
to the tenets of social evolutionary theory, that while a monogamous 
Christian union represented the ideal type of marriage, primitive 
marriage forms insofar as they incorporated the essential of a con-
tract between a man and a woman could not be regarded as invalid 
merely because the Christian rite of celebration was absent. 
'Marriage is as fully recognised an institution among them as among 
us, and to ignore their marriages would destroy the very foundation 
29 ~' G.4-'83 1 Appendix C, p.54, q.48. 
30 Ibid., G.12-'87, p.75. 
31 Ibid., G.4-'83, Minutes of Evidence, no. 742. 
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of their social life'. 32 Furthermore, refusal to recognise the 
practice would place the people outside the operation of the law, 
without the opportunity of civil remedy. Just as in order to gain 
control of judicial functions in the African communities, magistrates 
found themselves obliged to uphold customary law, so if they were to 
regulate polygyny in the direction of its ultimate demise it would be 
necessary to recognise the custom. In sum, the Barry Commission 
adopted a cautious viewpoint, generally representative of magisterial 
opinion. tolerant of polygyny, but looking nevertheless to the gradual 
spread of the civilising agencies of Christianity and education to 
bring about the suppression of the practice, 'l.'lithout resorting to 
direct legislative bans. The Report concluded: 
We must express our convict ion that it t1rould be for the 
welfare of the native people of this country if this 
practice could be speedily abolished, and that its dis-
appearance would materially aid the labours of Missionaries, 
and conduce to the prosperity of the country. On the 
other hand we recognise that institutions which have be-
come rooted in the social and national life of any people 
are not easily overthrown by direct enactment. They are 
never so overthrown unless there is a preparation of 
opinion and a certain willingness on the part of the 
people to accept such changest or unless the Government 
promulgating such enactments is in possession of sufficient 
force to give effect to these laws, and is also satisfied 
both as to the justice and necessity of using such force. 
None of these conditions exist at the present moment.33 
At the same time, the Commission did attempt in the appended 
marriage regulations to offer certain recommendations, radical in the 
case of the Colony though more conservative in that of the Transkei, 
for the gradual reform of customary marriage by indirect legislative 
devices. The commissioners surveyed the various statutory techniques 
for the suppression of polygyny and gave particular emphasis to the 
provisions of the Natal Marriage Code for registration; which was one 
of that Colony's major contributions to marriage reform. Registration 
32 
33 
South African Native Affairs Commission, Appendix C, vol. 5, 
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was valued as a device for achieving certainty in marriage as to the 
respective rights of husbands, wives and children, and so dissipating 
the confusion that surrounded the claims and rights of each particular 
house in a polygamist's homestead. It was also regarded as an instru-
ment of control by which, as the author of the Natal Marriage Code ex-
plained, the administration could induce Africans 'to look to the law 
for direction. You would thus create a habit of obedience, which 
you could use as a step to introduce changes at favourable opportuni-
t . ' 34 ies • But the Commission feared that obligatory registration 
would be met by mass evasion of a law which could not be strictly en-
forced, and the creation of illegal marriages and illegitimate off-
spring. Consequently, the provision of permissive rather than com-
pulsory registration of marriages was recommended. In fact this was 
an endorsement of the existing system of optional registration of a 
man's first marriage only, which the various annexation proclamations 
had introduced with a view to the gradual discouragement of polygyny. 
by reducing all wives subsequent to the first to the position of con-
cubines. In terms of the regulations customary law marriages could 
be .brought under the Colonial law as regards property rights, divorce, 
guardianship and inheritance by registering them with the magistrate. 
Although registration did not prevent a man from marrying other wives 
by tribal law, the status of the second and subsequent marriages was 
rendered obscure. While the Supreme Court declared that they were 
illicit unions, the Native Territories Appeal Court at Umtata ruled 
that these subsequent marriages were valid when contracted according 
35 to customary law. As it happened, however, registration was al• 
most wholly ignored by the Transkeians and also by the magistrates, 
the system fell into desuetude and was repealed in 1910. 
The other feature of traditional marriage to which the 
34 ~' G.4- 1 83, Minutes of Evidence, no. 764. 
35 H.J. Simons, African Women, p. 85. 
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Barry Commission devoted its attention, the customQ1' of lobolo, like-
wise stimulated a principled debate between magisterial radicals and 
conservatives about its nature and social function. Modern-day an-
thropologists regard lobolo as an essential component of customary 
marriage which is established by the transfer of cattle or ikhazi. 
The marriage consideration, then, is a significant element that dis-
tinguishes marriage from illicit cohabitation. 
Magistrates' objections to lobolo rested on the sale and 
purchase interpretation which reflected the values of the commercially-
minded society to which they belonged. Their criticisms were levelled 
• wh d 'b d I f b • d 11 • • 1 t 3 ( against at one escri e as the system o uying an se 1ng gir s 
and another a 'traffic in human flesh and blood'. 37 As cases arising 
out of inherited debts and recurring obligations attached to the 
lobolo institution occurred frequently in the territorial courts, some 
urged that the custom should not be recognised by the Government in 
order to reduce litigation and asked to be relieved 'from the most 
unpleasant duty of superintending almost daily the sale into slavery 
of the women of the tribe'. 38 Others recognised that a husband's 
rights and powers in relation to his wife were not those acquired by 
a commercial contract. Brovmlee wrote, 'The woman does not regard 
herself as sold, the husband does not consider he has bought her 
and the transaction is called ''ukulobola '' and not "ukutenga" (to 
• • • 
purchase) '. 39 The husband was customarily obliged to maintain her; 
and was liable to lose her and forfeit his claim to the lobolo if he 
ill-treated or neglected her. But while most magistrates expressed 
a degree of tolerance for the practice, claiming that it had im-
portant advantages and functions in the traditional social system, 
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whole-hearted. Thus, for Brownlee, while he looked upon lobolo as 
a transaction serving to bind the customary union, the ikhazi were a 
basely material consideration when compared with those binding quali-
ties of 'affection, faithfulness, high principle', which suffused the 
ideal conception of western marriage.
40 
At the same time, he advised 
against the disallowance of customary arrangements, fearful that such 
tampering would loosen the bonds of social control and cause deep 
reverberations in the [~jhole social structure. Lobolo was held the 
author of other evils, encouraging younq men to steal cattle for pay-
ment, whence the incidence of stock-lifting. Champions of the in-
stitution countered with the claims that lobolo was regarded as secur-
ity given by the husband for his own good conduct towards his wife, 
for if she left him because of ill-treatment, he lost his claim for 
the return of the cattle. Not only did it ensure good treatment and 
care of women, but also gave the wife legal claim on her father to 
protection and maintenance should her husband maltreat her. Finally, 
it guaranteed the good behaviour of the wife to some extent, for if 
she left her husband without just cause he could claim back the 
marriage payment. Mindful of the social utility of the institution, 
one magistrate regarded lobolo as 'a very right and proper thing for 
41 Kafir society in its natural state'. However, as Simons has tell-
ingly remarked, such claims ignore the 'difficulty of isolating the 
effects of lobolo from other factors that influence marriage and 
family relations 1 • 42 
On the whole, there was general agreement among the colonial 
administrators that the custom should be legally sanctioned and the 
Transkeian courts be allowed to settle cases arising from the practice 
in accordance with traditional law. Magistrates cautioned against 
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of customary marriage. Because of the vast network of kinship 
claims and the recurring obligations attached to lobolo, manifest in 
frequent litigation in the courts, and because of the tenacious hold 
of traditionalism upon the African mind in general - lobolo being 
'th hl d t d d b 1. d . b . t 43 d d oroug y un ers oo an e ieve in y natives , they regar e 
suppression as out of the question. Magistrates, then, presented 
the viewpoint of 'moral suasionists' who saw in the spread of civili-
zation the occasion of the gradual disappearance of the institution. 
The Barry Commission considered: 
the custom of ukulobola could not from its peculiar 
nature and history be repressed and rendered illegal 
by direct enactment, without overt or concealed 
opposition, or constant evasion of the law, as such 
legislation would necessarily affect masses of people 
unwilling at present to accept such change, and, be-
cause unenlightened by previous teaching, preferring 
to be let alone. But the Commission in all its en-
quiries and in the Regulations it has framed, has 
steadily kept in view the emancipation of the Kafir 
woman from the degraded position in which, according 
to English views, she is placed by the practice of 
ukulobola and certain forms of native marriage, 
especially when those marriages are polygamous.44 
As in the case of polygyny. the :.Bkrriage regulations framed 
by the Commission with regard to lobolo sought to curb the practice, 
'to turn the custom to some use, while the way is being paved for its 
abolition by more enlightened views on the sanctity of marriage and 
4-
the rightful place of woman'. ~ They provided for the free consent 
of the woman about to be married, thus meeting the objection that the 
contractual element occurring in the agreement·between the girl's 
guardian and the prospective husband necessarily implied the compul-
sory marriage of the woman, who was bartered away on an open market 
to the hiqhest bidder • The regulations stipulated that the gift of 
ikhazi would constitute an obligation on the part of the father or 
kinsman to maintain a woman in case of need, so as to exaggerate the 
43 ~, G.4- 183, .\ppendix C, p.54, q.52 [H.l§l. Elliot]. 
44 Ibid., G.4-'83, Report, para. 73. 
45 112.i.9.., G.4-'83, Report, para. 79 • 
• 
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least objectionable, morally respectable function of the custom. 
The dowry could also be reclaimed by the husband in the case of un-
just desertion by his wife, so as to prevent the institution being 
abused by the father as a system of barter for gain.f{}J The giving 
of lobolo was no longer to be an essential for the validity of the 
marriage, and would only be claimable by the woman's family if the 
husband had originally agreed to give it. The Commission also 
recommended that only in some cases would claims for the return of 
dowry be heritable or transferable from the husband, thereby pre-
venting a widow from being forced by her family to return to that of 
her husband against her will, so that they could retain the ikhazi. 
All these attempts to regulate lobolo in the hope of inducing Africans 
to abandon the practice were never enacted, and the marriage regu-
lations, considered too radical by Government and magistrates alike, 
fell by the way. The institution, as it became apparent, has 
suffered most from the decline of the extended family system and the 
emergence of the nuclear family unit, rather than through legislative 
reform. 
The whole thrust of the Commission's recommendations re-
garding African customary marriage were impelled by its 'desire to 
46 secure the sanctity of marriage and the rightful place of woman'. 
Indeed, with the institutions of polygyny and lobolo, the whole 
status of the African woman in traditional society was inseparably 
bound. Magistrates universally believed that women held an inferior 
position in African society, from which it was the duty of the white 
government to emancipate them. For Blyth, 'Amongst the heathen 
natives the woman is regarded as the chattel of her husband, and 
therefore her condition is servile'. 47 To the magistrates, in whose 
own society (3omen were exalted as 'the teacher, the natural and 
46 ~, G.4-'83, Report, para. 72. 
47 Ibid., G.4-'83, Appendix C, p.45, q.10. 
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1\c~) f 48 
therefore divine guide,pu]rifier, inspirer of the man , and wor-
... .,,v.1 
shipped as 'the angel in the house', African women held a degraded 
status. Women, it was argued, had no legal capacity in traditional 
cu 1 ture, they w<?rP. perpetual minors, neither able to inherit nor to 
own property in their,ovm right. Traditional marriage had the result 
of transferring the guardianship of the woman from her father to her 
husband, which seemed to place her in the position of a slave; but in 
practice the property on which she depended for food and clothing was 
well protected, as v:as her person. Furthermore, as Simons has justly 
remarked, such concepts of ownership and status appropriate to western 
common law are informed by an individualism alien to tribal culture 
and they misrepresent the social relations underlying the African sys-
tern of law. It was the extended family, which was the cornerstone 
of the social system, rather than the individual, that had full legal 
capacity. People regarded themselves as members of domestic and 
kinship groups, each occupying a clearly defined position with recog-
nised claims and obligations inseparable from their group affiliations. 
The man was the senior partner of the patrilineally jomnt family; and 
the woman held a subordinate position in domestic affa~.rs, sharing at 
the same time her ht>.sband ts or her father's rank. Acting on a mis-
conception of the wonan's place in traditional society, the Cape 
Government conferred najority status on women as well as men at the 
age of twenty one years under the provisions of the various territorial 
regulations. 49 Walter Stanford believed that this clause 'emancipated 
[}he African~ womanJj from the thraldom of native law and custom. Under 
that she remains a minor all the days of her life aisd may not so much 
as own property in her own right even if earned by her own efforts'. 
48 Charles Kingsley, Letters and Memories of His Life, quoted in 
W.E. Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind, p.351 
49 A.N. Macfadyen (ed.), Statutes, Proclamations: Proclamations 110 
and 112 of 1879 (sections 39, pp.14 and 32) and 140 of 1883 
(section 38, p.73). 
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He held that this measure emancipating women from the tribal rule 
of perpetual tutelage 'has led to the advance in Christianity, know-
ledge, and civilization o:f the native people in the Transkeian Terri-
jQ 
tories'. Despite Stanford's assertion, the ric1hts conferred by 
the Cape were seldore enforced by Transkeian women, the innovative 
i@7?9 
regulations proved inoperative and were repealed in 1910:~sociolo• 
gists of law maintain that legal reforms made in advance of related 
social changes are likely to be ineffective. 
With considerations in mind, similar to thtj,~ informing the 
recognition of African customary marriage, the Barry Commission also 
drafted a succession act for all the African territories, defining 
existing tribal customs and usages relating to inheritance. There 
was universal commendation among the administrators of the social 
relevance of traditional laws governing succession, as being 'perfect 
of their kind and ••• admirably adapted to the condition of the 
51 people'!) 
;~) 
\~)lich in essP.nce provided that only men could inherit 
and that. the eldest son of c>. house inherited all the property as well 
as d~bts of that house. The-Commission pointed to the satisfactory 
legal situation within the Colony proper where Act 18 of 1864 had 
legalised the tribal law system of succession (though it had left un-
defined what this was) and where as a consequence little difficulty 
had been experienced in the administration of deceased estates of 
Africans. The draft act appended to the Report laid down rules for 
the testamentary disposition of property by Africans, for guardian• 
ship of incapable persons, and for the care and custody of their 
property. As with the marria·ge regulations, the Commission again 
introduced certain modifications of the tribal law, such as giving 
women the right to acquire property and dispose of it by will, and a 
procedure was laid down whereby Africans could choose to have their 
30 J.w. Macquarrie (ed.), Reminiscences, vol. 1, p.99. 
51 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/6: Stanford to U.S.N.A., 11 April 1889. 
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property distributed after their death, according to the colonial 
law of succession. Governing its work• the explicit intention of 
the Commission was 'while adopting the Native law in the main ••• to 
introduce such changes as shall tend to the elevation Jf women, and 
promote the advancement of all Natives desirous of rising above the 
52 
level of their own laws and customs'. As in the case of the 
marriage regulations, the draft succession act was never promulgated, 
and the administration of estates continued to be dealt with in the 
Transkei under African tribal law. The general regulations pro-
claimed after the annexation of the territories had provided that 
actions arising out of estates of Africans married before a Christian 
minister or marriage officer were to be decided according to Colonial 
law, and the practice developed of referring to the Chief Magistrate, 
in his capacity as deputy of the Master of the Supreme Court, the ad-
ministration of estates of testate Africans and intestate Africans 
married by Colonial law. 
There is an obvious disparity of attitude between the kind 
of evolutionary jurisprudence which regards laws as a function of 
social development and which shaped the formal recognition of custom-
ary law in the territories, and the Roman tradition of codified law, 
dedicated to the rigorous application of fixed standards of justice, 
independent of time and place and circumstance, which lay behind the 
criminal code drafted by the Barry Commission. That a penal code 
was necessary was agreed upon by all the important witnesses who 
appeared before the Commission, in addition to the three Chief Magis-
trates although they differed as to whether colonial law suitably 
modified or customary law subject to a repugnancy clause should form 
the basis of it. Indeed, there was a long-standing plea on the part 
of the Transkeian magist0rates for a definitive manual or code of law 
52 £E,E, G.4- 183, Report, para. 102. 
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to guidethem in administering customary law, both in its civil and 
criminal branches, among Africans and to ensure a uniformity of 
judicial practice. Uncertainty as to the true provisions of this 
law, complicated by the fact of differences in the detail of tribal 
legal systems, was leading to irreqularities and inconsistencies. 
The Barry Commission in its investigations discovered a wide diversity 
of laws and procedure administered in the territories, as well as 
varying divisions of jurisdiction between the magistrates' and the 
chiefs' courts. Legal confusion, almost baroque in kind, resulted 
when, for example, in cases which the colonial law defined as crimi-
nal, the magistrate was quite likely to deal with acts which in tribal 
law were not offences as crimes to be penalised according to their 
gravity in the sight of the colonial, not the African, law. In 
punishments, too, colonial law was imposed. 'Magistrates, completely 
untrained even to recognize the legal problems involved, yet caught 
in the middle of this culture collision, would have needed the wisdom 
of Solomon to have done justice in many cases'. 53 A heavy responsi-
bility wa~ placed by such legal uncertainty upon the magistrates to 
administer an equitable and impartial justice, and given the unique 
conditions of the territories it was inevitable that some discretion 
had to be left in their hands. From this it was but a short step to 
the frequent criticisms of the territorial judicial system that the 
administrator was virtually a law unto himself and that the judicial 
process was 'not the carrying out of the definite law, but the caprice 
of a magistrate'. 54 The ancient issue between the rule of men and 
the rule of law assumed particular relevance in the Transkeian context. 
As for African civil law, the Barry Commission drew up 
marriage regulations and a draft succession act recognising tribal 
53 S.B. Burman, 'Cape Policies Towards African Law in Cape Tribal 
Territories 1872-1883 1 (Oxon. D.Phil., 1973) p.135. 
54 £EE,, G.4- 183, Minutes of Evidence, no. 5887 tc.H. Driver J. 
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law with certain modifications, but as both Stanford and Upington 
agreed with Shepstone that a substantive civil code might rigidify 
customary law, no full civil code was drafted. 'All tribes are not 
equally advanced, and hence the impossibility of laying down one 
special code for all. One tribe should not be kept back for the 
sake of others'.
55 
This objection they agreed was of little weight 
with regard to a criminal code. The Transkeian Penal Code in its 
draft form was almost entirely the work of Sir J.D. Barry, chairman 
of the Commission. It was essentially a statement of the criminal 
law of the Colonyt though with certain modifications. The Commission 
gave as its reasons for taking Colonial law as a basis, the vagueness 
of the distinction between civil and criminal law in the African legal 
system, such criminal law as there was being based upon the assumption 
that all members of the tribe belong to the chief and that injury to 
them is injury to him. On the other hand Colonial law alone was in-
sufficient because it did not concern itself with the imputation of 
witchcraft with which so much African crime was bound up and it did 
not recognise the principle of communal responsibility; moreover, its 
law of procedure offended the African sense of justice by failing to 
exhaust every source of information, including the accused and other 
persons able to throw light on the matter under investigation. 
On these grounds, the Commission resolved to draw up a 
Penal Code, which 'while it adopts the general principles of existing 
Colonial law endeavours to remedy its defects, and retains some laws 
and principles of procedure dear to natives, and which commend them-
1 t f th T 't . t 56 se ves o us as proper or ose err1 or1es • This statement of 
intention, it can be seen, is framed in the familiar terms of social 
evolutionary theory, with its assertion of the normative character of 
western forms coupled with the admission that primitive social insti-
tutions might be functionally useful and, on that account, valuable 
55 .£,EE, G.4-'~3, Appendix D, p.272, q.29 [w. GirdwoodJ. 
56 Ibid., G4- 83, Report, para. 38. 
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for the particular stage of cultural development which the community 
had achieved. Or, to use the categories of jurisprudencet there was 
combined the notion of justice both as a transcendental eternal stan-
dard and as a natural function or relationship between changing 
social factors. The main additions incorporated in the code (which 
can thus be regarded as conceding those values dependent upon time 
·and place in a concrete situation) were the adoption of the provisions 
that prohibited the enforcement of circumcision or intonjane by force 
or threats, or without the consent of parents or guardians; made 
punishable both imputation of witchraft and habitual practice as a 
witch-doctor; and recognised communal responsibility in respect of 
stock theft. In punishments, emphasis was placed upon the imposition 
of fines, as being familiar to Africans, and the use of flogging was 
correspondingly curtailed. The main procedural difference from 
colonial law was that the accused and his wives would be allowed to 
testify in court. In this way the Commission sought to give effect 
to the African view that only by thorough examination of every possible 
source of information could substantial justice be achieved. Another 
important alteration made provision for African assessors to sit with 
the court, and so sanctioned a practice which had been followed by 
some magistrates for many years. 
The administration of the Code was, in the case of more 
serious criminal offences, to be entrusted to a special court, pre-
sided over by a recorder, the court to have jurisdiction concurrent 
with that of the Supreme Court within the territories. This recom-
mendation the Commission felt justified in making on the grounds of 
'the special character of the laws to be applied', the need for 
immediate revision of magisterial decisions in criminal cases and 
other advantages derived from the close supervision exercised by a 
'high judicial officer' over the inferior courts. 57 
57 £EE,, G.4- 183, Report, 'P@-ra. 120. 
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The Penal Code was a territorial not a personal one, every 
resident in the territories, African and European alike, being sub-
ject to it. The existence of a white minority within the Transkei 
as well as a category of cultural evolues, who claimed the protection 
of colonial law, had raised the question of the scope of operation of 
a special code. In the ~agisterial courts the practice gradually 
developed of administrators applying at their discretion colonial law 
'in the case of Europeans and other civilized people'; 58 but a diffi-
culty arose in suits and proceedings involving a conflict of laws, 
where both white and black were concerned: this the annexation regu-
lations sought to resolve by providing that such cases were to be 
dealt with according to the laws applicable to the defendant. More-
over, to complicate the matter, as Africans were plunged into the pro-
cess of cultural transition, they came to form new relationships of 
which customary law did not take cognizance and experienced changing 
needs which it did not encompass. Thus, in the period of informal 
rule, since the general order to officials was to enforce tribal and 
not colonial law when they tried cases, Christian converts who had 
broken entirely with their culture apparently suffered on occasion. 59 
With regard to a criminal code, magistrates in their evidence before 
the Commission considered it undesirable to exclude whites resident 
within the Transkei from its operation, as a system of legal dualism 
would lead to confusion, the· administrators having to face an increas-
ing number of intricate legal problems arising from a conflict of laws, 
and also to dissatisfaction among the African people who would regard 
special legislation as discriminatory in intent. At the same time, 
the Government was concerned to secure to the whites all the rights 
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Code, as drafted, was basically a statement of advanced colonial 
criminal law, shortened• simplified, made intelligible and precise, 
with certain essential modifications, as in the provisions for the 
punishment of Witdl'lcraft and the principle of communal responsibility 
l.( .... ,ri.....r' 
from which whites were explicitly exempted, the European community 
suffered no major legal disability. The Commission sought, in 
effect, to reach a plausible compromise between white and black usages. 
It recognised that the colonial criminal law in many respects over-
lapped with the indigenous system of criminal justice, apart from the 
difference that some common offences defined as crimes in the colonial 
legal system were regarded in tribal law as offences against the in-
dividual only, that is, as civil wrongs; and so it effectively assimi-
lated African criminal law to the colonial system. 
The Native Territories Penal Code, in an amended form, was 
enacted as Act 24 of 1336 and came into force on 1 January 1897. 
ii The Transkeian Judicial System and Magisterial 
Doctrines of Jurisprudence 
The distinctive feature of the judicial system operative 
in the Transkei was the structure of magisterial courts, administering 
a modified form of customary law in all civil disputes between African 
parties, with an appeal lying to the Government's senior officer, the 
Chief Magistrate, in the territory. In effect, the whole system was 
a replica of the Basutoland model, the convenience and success of 
which had prompted the Cape to extend and apply it to the Transkeian 
Territories, despite the illegality this involved. For several years 
constitutional problems surrounding formal annexation delayed the 
legal administration of a Basutoland-type system of law and government 
in the territories, and the Transkei was consequently ruled by a 
'l 
'system of bluff'. 0 
61 S.B. Burman, 'Cape Policies Towards African Law', p.314. 
The first part of section ii (i.e. pp.150-159) draws largely upon 
Burrilan's thesis. 
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Prior to the promulgation of the annexing acts, the only 
legal powers possessed by Cape officials beyond the Kei were those 
conferred by the Imperial Act 26 and 27 Viet. Cap. 35. This ex-
tended the operation of Colonial laws to all British s·1bjects in the 
extra-colonial territories and empowered the Governor to appoint 
special magistrates in these areas, with authority to arrest offenders 
and transmit them to the Colony for trial. As a general rule the 
Cape's agents held commissions under this act, but such a definition 
of their legal powers provides no indication of the actual powers they 
exercised, which far exceeded them. 
Britain had not formally annexed the territory, but the dis• 
position and resettlement of the tribes in the Kei-Mbashe area, each 
with an agent, as effected in the 1860s, presented an opportunity of 
introducing a form of pseudo-magisterial authority into the territory. 
J .c. Warner was(~ointed British Resident in the Transkeian Terri-
--..1'-' 
tories, with general supervisory authority over the other Transkeian 
agents, and was stationed at the Idutywa. When he wrote to the 
Colonial Secretary for a clarification of his and the agents' po~~rs, 
he received in reply a remarkably candid statement of how the authori-
ties proposed that the British officials should exercise the judicial 
powers of magistrates, although not legally competent to do so. 
His Excellency believes it to be essential to the 
successful working of the Trans-Keian Settlement, that 
the British officers employed there should be perfectly 
aware. that they possess no authority in the legal · 
sense of the word, derived from the British Government, 
inasmuch as Her Majesty's Government have deliberately 
determined to relinquish the possession they obtained 
of that Country. 
The authority of the British officers must there-
fore strictly speaking be derived altogether from the 
Chiefs, and people with whom they dwell, and by whom 
any directions, or advice they may give must be carried 
into effect. 
But although it is right that these officers should 
themselves correctly appreciate their position: it by 
no means follows that they should bring this circumstance 
prominently into notice, and thus lower their own influ• 
ence in dealing with the Natives. 
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Each of the Tribes settled in the Transkei looks 
with more or less jealousy on the others. Each de-
sires to retain the good-will of the Government. 
The leading men set a value on the allowance they re-
ceive. The individuals composing each tribe have 
become alive to the benefit of an impartial adminis-
tration and have probably little desire to come under 
the •mccntrolled power of their chiefs. 
All these influences will operate to sustain the 
authority of the British Resident and to enable him 
to procure the execution of orders given with dis-
cretion, and with a due regard for the habits and 
prejudices of the Native Races.62 
Acting on these instructions, the Fingo Agent rapidly 
assumed the virtual authority of a magistrate, since the acephalous 
Mfengu had been accustomed in the colony, prior to their exodus, to 
supervision from a white official and with the hostile Gcaleka for 
neighbours had an added reason to co-opera~e with their agent. This 
enlargement of his status followed directly.from the strong position 
in which Sir w. Currie's code of rules had placed him. According to 
these regulations, endorsed by the Government but lacking statutory 
force, the agent was declared the 'paramount chief' of the country; 
all serious cases and inter-location disputes were to be brought be-
fore him, while 'trifling cases' were left to be adjudicated by the 
chiefs and headmen; and the traditional authorities were no longer 
entitled to receive criminal fines, which were henceforth to belong 
I • t 63 to the Fingo Government • In like manner, the influence of the 
Tambookie Agent residing with the Emigrant Thembu gained from the 
fear of the four chiefs of outside interference, in this instance 
from the Thembu paramount, under whom they had no desire to fall. 
On their departure from the Queenstown district the Thembu had been 
guaranteed independence from colonial rule and told that 'they would 
be permitted to manage their own internal affairs, in accordance with 
62 Stanford Papers, F(a)9: copy of R. Southey, Col. Sec., to 
British Resident, Transkei, 8 November 1 l866. 
63 Cape Archives, c.o. 3193: Blyth to Col. Sec., 9 September 1871. 
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their own customs and usages, when not opposed to the laws of human-
•t t 64 l. y But as it happened this assurance was soon broken and to 
their dismay the Emigrant Thembu witnessed the steady aggrandizement 
of white authority. After the area they occupied was divided into 
two districts in 1878, both magistrates exercised similar .powers to 
the other officers in Thembuland. As for the Resident with Kreli, 
Sarili resented using him as a channel of communication with Cape 
Town, and neither this official, nor the superintendent in the 
Idutywa Reserve, nor the Tambookie Agent, had an influence comparable 
with that of the Fingo Agent. 
On the assumption of responsible government, the Cape Colony 
from the first deliberately adopted as a model the Basutoland policy 
of gradually weaning the African people from the traditional courts 
and slowly modifying African customary law. Accordingly the Cape 
extended the system of law and government as developed in Basutoland 
to those chiefdoms newly brought under colonial rule, even though it 
could not legally be imposed prior to annexation. When J.M. Orpen 
received the appointment of resident at the Gatberg, with the addition-
al duties of government representative for the whole area beyond the 
Mthatha, he was directed to act on the Fingoland precedent, which 
recognised customary law so long as it was not cruel or unjust. 
Arch-expansionist that he was, Orpen sought to thrust the whole of 
Nomansland into the colonial embrace, and he succeeded in persuading 
the Cape ministry to accept the warring Mpondomise chiefs, Mhlontlo 
and Mditshwa, as British subjects. On their reception, the agent in• 
formed the tribe that witchcraft trials were forbidden and killing 
for any reason prohibited, and in future a right,of appeal was to be 
allowed to him in all cases. These rules were subsequently elaborated 
when Charles Brownlee met the Mpondomise the following year, adding 
64 Cape Archives, N.A. 401: E.J. Warner to w. Ayliff, 17 April 1879, 
quoted in S.B. Burman, 'Cape Policiest, ·p.316. 
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Considered in legal terms, general regulations could not 
be proclaimed for a territory until it was formally annexed. In 
1875 steps were finally taken to place some of the Transkeian terri• 
tories, namely r,§ingoland, the Idutywa and Nomansland, :nore firmly 
under Cape control and on the same legal footing as Basutoland. The 
intervention of African resistance movements and the demands of the 
Imperial Government, ho~~ver, deflected and delayed the course of 
annexation, and the Transkeian Annexation Act of 1877 was only ex-
tended to the territories by proclamation in 1879 1 whereby magisterial 
rule for the first time became legal beyond the Kei. 
After the war of 1877, colonial control over the whole area 
was strengthened by the establishment of three chief magistracies. 
In Griqualand East, to which Brownlee was posted, the Chief Magis-
trate followed closely the Basutoland code of rules 'with some slight 
d . f. t. ' 67 mo 1 ica ions • Blyth was transferred back to Fingoland on pro-
motion as the new Chief Magistrate of the Transkei. About this time 
he introduced a number of changes in the regulations for the govern-
ment of the territory which included the provision that 'no headman 
or chief will be permitted to hear or decide any case, but all cases 
shall be brought before the Magistrate of the District, whose de-
cision shall be final in all cases under the value of i2', allowing 
for an appeal to the Chief Magistrate in all other cases. The 
judicial authority of the headmen was thus abolished, a system which 
the new Secretary for Native Affairs, w. Ayliff, apparently did not 
favour. 68 All serious criminal cases were to be heard by the Chief 
Magistrate and the Resident Magistrate in whose district the offence 
had occurred, after the latter had conducted a preliminary examination. 
The African court system of messengers who received a portion of the 
fine was to be replaced by the colonial system of police messengers 
67 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/2: Brownlee to S.N.A., 30 December 1878. 
68 £EE, G.43-'79, pp.11•12. 
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receiving no reward beyond their salaries for court duties, for the 
old practice it was alleged had led the messengers to encourage liti-
gation. Fines were to be the property of the government in assault 
cases; even in adultery cases part of the fine was to 1 JO to the 
d 11 f . t b "d . . h .bl 
69 
government, an a ines were o e pai in coin w ere poss1 e. 
These changes in the system of law and government brought the Tran• 
skei almost exactly into line with the Basutoland code. However, 
as the territory was not yet annexed; the regulations could not be 
legally enforced, but the African people could not know this. 
The anomalous legal standing of the white administration 
in the area became uncomfortably apparent in the case of Thembuland, 
to which Elliot was appointed as Chief Magistrate in August 1877. 
The Thembu had been received as British subjects in 1875 under con-
ditions of cession which included a clause to the effect that the 
chiefs were 'to exercise authority and settle law suits (except cases 
of murder, crimes arising out of the charge of witchcraft, serious 
assault, and theft from other tribes and from the Colony), within 
t . . b. . h f 1 h M · ' 7o heir own section, su Ject to rig t o appea to t e agistrate • 
The conditions also provided that the paramount Ngangelizwe and his 
sub-chiefs would be recognised and paid salar1es, although for a 
time Ngangelizwe was deposed by the Cape Government. On the recom• 
mendation of a special commissioner charged with settling the new 
form of government, a chief magistrate and three assistant magistrates 
were appointed to act as government representatives in their area and 
to recognise customary law. Al though legally they held office 'under 
· the Hj.gh Commissioner, in fact the Native Affairs Department exercised 
full control on his behalf. The Cape regarded annexation as an 
impending formality, but it was not until 1885 that Thembuland was 
69 CPP, G.33-'79, pp.94•95, 104-105. 
70 Cape Archives, N.A. 307: Conditions accepted by the Thembu and 
Dalasile, encl. in Elliot to U.S.N.A., 2 August 1883, quoted in 
S.B. Burman, 'Cape Policies', p.344. 
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annexed to the Colony. 
In the meanwhile the question whether the Cape magistrates 
had any authority to exercise judicial powers in the territory 
claimed the anxious attention of the Government. A test case raised 
the moot point of Elliot's competence to impose· the death penalty on 
African prisoners. On referring the matter to Cape Town for con• 
firmation, the Chief Magistrate was instructed that in terms of his 
commission he had no authority to try or sentence any criminal offen-
der who was not a British subject and could exercise judicial author-
ity in civil disputes among Africans only with the consent of both 
t
. 71 par 1es. Elliot, in reply, adopted the standpoint that all author-
ity in Thembuland had been voluntarily ceded to the Colonial Government 
in 1875, a transference which marked the establishment of de facto if 
not de jure white rule. Were he to comply with the ministerial 
directives, the territorial judicial system would be rendered in• 
operative, and there would ensue 'the non-recognition of all consti• 
tu\~d authority' and, what was more, 'the complete restoration and 
assumption of all power by the chiefs'. 72 When the question was re-
ferred to the Attorney-General, he found that the extension of 
British protection in 1875 was an informal act and that Thembuland 
was not part of the Colony, nor even British territory, 'although it 
practically belongs to the Crown'. Until such time as the country 
was formally annexed to the Cape, the magistrates held no authority 
to decide civil disputes between non-British subjec·ts except with the 
consent of the parties at issue, nor to try or sentence any criminal 
offender. Nor had the Cape Government any right to confer juris-
diet ion upon him over persons resident beyond the limits of the 
71 £EE, G.4-'83, Minutes of Evidence, p.428 1 copy of u.s.N.A. to 
Elliot, 21 March 1881. 
72 Ibid., G.4- 183, Minutes, p.429, copy of Elliot to u.s.N.A., 
4 April 1881. 
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73 Colony. The whole matter received the careful consideration of 
the Ministry which endorsed the opinion of the Attorney-General. 
This left the Under Secretary for Native Affairs no alternative but 
to inform Elliot to assume that his actions were tacitly approved by 
the tribal chiefs and to forbid him to submit cases to Cape Town for 
74 review as in the past. It also meant that the Government lacked 
the legal means of enforcing the authority of its magistrates and of 
the laws they administered, which if challenged would not be upheld 
in court. 
\ The device the Cape resorted to in order to put· its admin-
istration on a legal footing was to commission Sir H. Robinson as 
governor of Thembuland, Bomvanaland and Gcalekaland in November 1881, 
empowered to issue proclamations for their 'peace, order, and good 
government i • In January 1882 a proclamation extended Cape laws to 
these territories except as modified by the regulations it contained, 
which were the same as the existing Transkeian and Griqualand East 
regulations. As a consequence uniform administration was established 
throughout the Cape-ruled territories east of the Kei, with the ex-
ception of Xesibe country. 
The general regulations by which the territories were to be 
ruled were partly based on ones drafted by Blyth, which were in turn 
modelled on the earlier regulations· he had introduced in Fingoland, 
and in the final form in which they were eventually passed resembled 
75 closely tbose of Basutoland. Section 23, dealing with jurisdiction 
and procedure in civil suits, provided for the discretionary applica-
tion of African law 'where all the parties to the suit or proceedings 
are what are commonly called Natives'. An appeal lay from the de-
cision of the magistrate to the Chief Magistrate's court in civil 




Cape Archives, c.o. 1156: Memoranda by A.G. Leonard, 23 and 
23 April 1881, filed with U.S.N.A. to Under Col. Sec., 16 April 1881 • 
.Q:E, G.4- 1 83, Minutes of Evidence, pp.429-430, copy of U.S.N.A. 
to Elliot, 25 June 1881. 
A.N. Macfadyen (ed.), Statutes, Proclamations: Proc. 110 of 1879, 
pp .4ff. • 
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month's imprisonment or fine of ls or 12 lashes might be carried out 
until it had been transmitted for the consideration of the Chief 
Magistrate, who might confirm, alter or reverse the judgement but 
might not increase the.sentence (section 26). Fines in criminal cases 
were to belong to the Government, but part could be given to informants 
or the injured party, thus enabling magistrates to follow the African 
law of restitution in cases of theft (section 22). There were a 
number of minor differences from the Basutoland regulations, but the 
only important change in the personal law was in relation to marriage: 
in the new regulations customary marriages could be brought under the 
colonial law by registering them with the magistrate. The far-
reaching implications of this system of registration have already been 
discussed. 
On the whole the general regulations evoked a favourable re-
sponse from the magistrates. Blyth's criticism centred on the en-
· larged judicial powers of the magistrates, for the punishments now 
open to them included long terms of imprisonment, deportation and even 
the death penalty. Neither colonial nor Transkeian magistrates had 
any experience of exercising such wide powers of punishment as they 
now possessed. He recommended that i~ serious cases proceedings be 
forwarded to the Government, so as to gain the satisfaction that his 
decisions were supported by professional legal opinion. 76 In the 
main, Blyth considered that the regulations \'Jere 'a great step in the 
right direction and ••• quite sufficient for the present wants of the 
people •••• As civilization and education advance it may be necessary 
to make changes from time to time, but they should be gradual '. 77 
It was these regulations of 1879 that would form the ground-plan of 
the system of law and government operative in the territories through-
out the eighties and nineties, and beyond that time. 
76 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 2/62: Blyth to U.S.N.A., 2 October 1879. 
77 Ibid., C.M.T. 2/62: Blyth to U.S.N.A., 19 April 1880. 
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The central tenets of the magistrates' doctrines of juris-
prudence can best be determined by taking the measure of their critical 
response to the remodelling and reorganization of the judicial struct• 
ures in the territories. All through the 1880s and b(:yond, as the 
distinctive 'native territorial system' was progressively elaborated, 
a debate raged among policy-makers and administrators as to the de-
sirability of interlocking the Transkeian judicial structure, particu-
larly at the level of the higher courts, more closely with that of 
the Colony proper. For the men on the ground, this touched mo~)f) 
directly the chief magisterial system, whose fate consequently hanged 
in the balance throughout .this period. 
There was widespread agreement that the special circumstances 
of the territories required some higher tribunal, be it the appoint-
ment of a recorder or the extension of the colonial circuit courts. 
While Act 40 of 1882 had provided for appeals to go to the colonial 
high courts, the prohibitive costs attending the legal process, par-
ticularly when the case at issue revolved about a point of law, had 
the effect of deterring parties from availing themselves of the right 
of appeal. Furthermore, under the terms of Proc. 81 of 1881 cases of 
murder were transmitted to the Colony for trial, but the expenses in-
curred and delays involved in removing prisoners and securing witnesses 
78 hardly justified the arrangement. The Barry Commission recommended 
the establishment of a 'superior court of record', presided over by 
'a high judicial officer', to whom was to be entrusted the adminis-
tra~ion rf the Penal Code, in the case of more serious offences. 79 
The magi trates had favoured a recorder in preference to the intro• 
duction of circuit courts as he 'would always be accessible for advice 
in chambers, and thus prevent cases hanging over many months'; further-
more, 'where the duty of a judge or person is confined to administer-
78 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/4: Report of Acting C.M. for 1882; 
Report of c. Brown.lee for 1883. 
79 .Q!.E., G.4- 1 83, Report, para. 120. 
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ing native laws, there would be less chance of confusion and conflict 
with Colonial law 1 • 30 The transference of judicial functions to the 
Recorder was also welcomed as it would release the Chief Magistrates 
for administrative and diplomatic work. 
However, objections to the Recorder's Court were voiced by 
the Upington Ministry, largely on the grounds of expense. In its 
place, as an interim measure pending the restructuring of the judicial 
system, the Penal Code made provision for a Special Court, consisting 
of the Chief Magistrate and two Resident Magistrates, to try more 
serious offences, thereby revamping the combined court of the 1879 
General Regulations. While the administrators came to value the 
system of Special Courts highly, championing them resolutely when re-
placed by the colonial circuit courts, nonetheless, at the outset, in 
their conservative suspicion of innovative cha~ge, they fretted about 
the African reaction and bemoaned the disruption of administrative 
routine caused by the practical demands of the system, which in 
Griqualand East at least required the Chief Magistrate to travel from 
one magistracy to another to attend sittings and entailed the constant 
absence of at least one official from his post. 81 Such peregrination 
soon had the Under Secretary barking about travellin~ expenses. A 
more serious criticism advanced was that the Chief Magistrate to whom 
all preliminary examinations were forwarded in the first instance had 
no authority to remit cases to the local magistrate for trial, as 
when the accused admitted his guilt. This procedure incurred un-
necessary delay and expense, and it was suggested that the criminal 
jurisdiction of the magistrates be enlargea. 82 The Penal Code also 
allowed for African assessors to sit with the court, which was the 
feature that presented itself most favourably to the magisterial mind. 
80 ~' G.4-'83, Minutes of Evidence, no. 7385 [H.G. Elliot]. 
81 Ca~e Archives, C.M.T. 1/83: Elliot to U.S.N.A., 13 January 1887; 
C •• K. 2/6: Stanford to U.S.N.A., 21November·1888. 
82 Ibid., C.M.T. 1/83: Elliot to u.s.N.A., 17 June and 22 August 1887. 
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Walter Stanford commented, 'The attendance of Chiefs and Headmen at 
each sitting has been full and regular and as assessors they have 
proved of great value•. And again, 'Their cross examination of wit-
nesses was acute and enlightening and their opinions 01. the issues 
involved were given clearly and impartially 1 • 83 A political advan-
tage was gained, in addition, in securing the co-operation of the 
traditional ruling elite who were in this way enmeshed and utilized 
in the judicial process. 
The system of Special Courts was explicitly constituted as 
a provisional arrangement. Magisterial concern that the abolition 
of the chief magisterial courts was therefore imm~ent received con-
firmation as proposals came repeatedly before Parliament relating to 
the structural alteration of the higher courts in the territories. 
In a memorandum written to Upington in 1885, Stanford, believing that 
events were tending towards the supersession of the chief magisterial 
courts, cautioned against any such radical change in the judicial 
organization and underlined the utility of the existing system which 
provided prompt and inexpensive settlement of cases without recourse 
to the colonial courts and also sufficient check on magisterial de-
. . 84 cisions. Similar arguments were rehearsed as lat~ as 1890, when 
the Sprigg Government was bent upon proceeding with the abolition of 
the office of chief magistrate. The way to this change in judicial 
structure, Sprigg considered, had been laid open as a result of the 
extension of circuit courts whereby the senior officers had been re-
lieved of certain judicial duties imposed upon them by the Penal Code 
in their capacity as presidents of the Special Courts. In turn, 
Stanford, while acknowledging the desirability of the progressive 
83 
84 
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assimilation of the legal system in the territories to that of the 
Colony proper, voiced his distrust of innovation and recommended in-
stead modification of the existing framework, which while curtailing 
the wide powers of the magistrates and extending the jurisdiction of 
the superior colonial courts at certain points, would not provoke 
African disaffection. He argued that even were the Chief Magistrates 
to be removed, it was essential for 'the peace and contentment of the 
Native tribes in these Territories' to station an officer, who would 
combine both judicial and administrative functions, as senior repre-
sentative of the Government in the area. With his appointment, the 
judicial authority then exercised by the Chief Magistrates could be 
transferred to the colonial courts in respect of criminal review, the 
administration of estates, appeals in civil cases where either the 
defendant or both parties involved were white, and jurisdiction in 
European divorce cases. The officer would deal with cases of appeal 
arising out of civil suits between Africans east of the Kei and would 
follow the existing practice of the magist~ates in recognising custom-
ary law, but his judgements could be appealed against to the superior 
courts of the Colony, so as to prevent maladministration and abuse. 
In some important respects this rough scheme foreshadowed later de-
velopments that saw the establishment of the Native Territories 
Appeal Court. 85 
Inasmuch as the prospective senior officer, himself an in• 
flated version of the Chief Magistrate, incorporateq two convention-
ally distinct features of government within himself, Stanford pro• 
jected a characteristically paternalist conception of the role of the 
executive. The executive was here made the sole custodian of author-
ity, with the administration of justice confided largely to its hands. 
Such a unitary form of administration; running quite counter to the 
cardinal liberal doctrine of the separation of powers, the magistrates 
85 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/108: Stanford to U.S.N.A., 18 January 
1890. 
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justified by reference to traditional African forms of government 
where no formal distinction was made between the tribal council 
sitting as a moot and as a court. In African society, the decision-
making process involved two kinds of activity and the chief•in•council 
constituted itself into two different institutions to effect this, 
but there was no formal division of powers as in classical liberal 
theory. The custodial conception of the white government's function 
demanded that an attempt be made to accommodate traditional expecta-
tions of authority roles~1fum7 the white judicial and administrative 
~t-c:___;._----~ 
systems, so as to render the colonial administration as familiar and 
accessible to the African people as possible~ As Blyth remarked on 
the Draft Transkeian Penal Code which had provided for a recorder: 
The na~ives have always been accustomed to see their 
Chief invested with full legal powers, and to have any 
real influence over them, this must ~ontinue to be the 
case, and were the proposals of the LBarry] Commission 
carried out, both the Magistrates and Chief Magistrates, 
more particularly, would be deprived of all influence 
and be perfect nonentities in the land, and I think 
this is hardly advisable, at present certainly. 
Officers placed in grave responsible positions over 
natives must be able to exercise power[;] if they abuse 
it, then replace them by others.86 
Walter Stanford's memorandum rested its recommendations on 
the perceived need to make special provision for judicial adminis-
tration in the territories in the interests of the large black popu-
lation, the indisp~nsability of which was corroborated by Elliot's 
refutation of the reasons Sprigg advanced for abolishing the chief 
. t . 1 t 87 mag1s eria cour s. He regarded it 'an error to suppose that the 
establishment of Circuit Courts will meet the requirements of the 
people in the matter of the Administration of Justice in these Terri-
tories '. In his eyes, the chief magistrates' courts~ afforded 
an inexpensive and expeditious form of justice in the settlement of 
86 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 2/63: Blyth to Secretary of the Native 
Laws and Customs Commission, 22 May 1882: 'Confidential Report 
on the Draft Transkeian Penal Code'. 
87 Ibid., C.M.T. 1/147: Elliot to U.S.N.A., 31 December 1889. 
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civil disputes among Africans, the large majority of whom were firmly 
encapsulated within their traditional culture. The introduction of 
circuit courts would not fulfil the functions performed adequately by 
,,\ 
the higher magisterial courts, and at the same time they would corn~ine 
the disadvantages of inaccessibility, unfamiliarity and infrequency 
of sitting. Presided ove'r by officers trained in western juridical 
techniques and remote in their everyday lives from the people wh_ose 
laws they administered, such courts Elliot rightly feared would in-
sist on a precision and formalism alien to the tribal legal tradition. 
As Elliot wrote: 
An ovQrwhelming majority of the inhabitants are either 
raw barbarians or at best in the earliest stages of 
civilization. They are by nature litigious to a degree 
hardly credible to more advanced stages of society. 
The petty actions in respect of matters of small con• 
sideration are innumerable and these petty actions touch 
their daily life. Hitherto cheap, speedy and substan-
tial justice has been done, both in weighty and minor 
matters, and the facility of appeal to a Court within 
easy access of their means and convenience is a safety 
valve the value of which cannot be overlooked. The 
abolition of this tribunal would involve serious consequences, 
as its place could not be taken by a Circuit Court, 
sitting but twice a year and presided over by an officer 
who, although possessing unquestionably higher legal 
capabilities than the Chief Magistrates, would be unknown 
to the litigants, pressed for time, and unapproachable 
save by Counsel instructed by attorneys. 
The introduction of the circuit courts was considered a 
premature and incongruous imposition of colonial forms 'unsuited to 
the conditions of the native people'. 88 Their lukewarm reception 
was registered, for example, in the restrained tones of Stanford's 
report: 
The Circuit Courts are working as could be expected 
considering the qualification and training of those 
who preside over them and the conspicuous ability of 
the members of the bar. As to the view taken by 
the natives I can only say that the abolition of the 
Special Court with its native assessors was passively 
received.89 
88 J.W. Macquarrie (ed.), Reminiscences, vol. 2, p.123. 
89 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2l6: Report of W.E. Stanford for 1889. 
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The new system found favour only with whites 'because it attaches 
more importance to the Territory and circulates a little money•. 90 
It was commonly conceded that the Transkeian magistrates 
exercised extensive judicial powers that far exceeded those of the 
colonial magistrates and heard cases that were usually reserved for 
the superior courts in the Colony. Because of their lack of legal 
training, they were unqualified to settle issues requiring a sure 
grasp of legal problems and a close knowledge of complicated laws, 
particularly in the case of the white community of Griqualand East 
where land transactions were common subjects of dispute. 91 At the 
same time, however much magistrates acknowledged the importance of 
having serious criminal cases and major civil cases involving whites 
tried before a judge at a circuit court, this concern was outweighed 
by other considerations which bore far greater weight in magisterial 
jurisprudence. As Blyth put it, 'No doubt a Judge would from his 
technical ••• training be better fitted to understand any legal points 
that might be raised ••• but I think more than that is wanted'. 92 
Magistrates set great store by familiarity with local circumstances, 
an ability to follow the contours of the African mind and to intuit 
a sense of the inwardness of the ethos of African society, a .capacity 
to reveal sympathetic understanding 0£ traditional patterns of social 
life - for all which the rigorous and precise application of a corpus 
of law, without regard to men or time or place - mere legalism -
could never suffice. More than this, there was a desire to simplify 
the administration of law, to.pare judicial procedures to their 
essentials, to remove excrescences and eliminate technicalities which 
encumbered, confused and complicated the law and its administration. 
By these means, the judicial process would be restored to its pristine 
90 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 1/84: Report of H.G. Elliot for 1889. 
91 Ibid., C.M.K. 2/4: Reports of Chief Magistrate for 1882 and 1883 •. 
92 Ibid., C.M.T. 2/63: Blyth to Sec. of Native Laws and Customs 
Commission, 22 May 1882. 
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vigour and efficacy, and the original function of the law, to render 
substantial justice, until then obscured by western forms, would re-
gain its primary and necessary place in the judicial system. Mind-
ful of the custodial function of the white administration, magis-
trates saw the need to shape the administration of justice in the 
territories to traditional conceptions and expectations of dispute-
settling in African society. They understood the function of juri-
dical mechanisms in indigenous·culture as one of reconciling dis-
putants in order to restore the social balance. English law on the 
other hand they saw as tending to limit itself to a strict enforce-
ment, according to rigorously applied rules>of the legal rights of 
one party to the exclusion of the other and in these terms accounted 
for its devotion to the polemics of legal casuistries. They sought 
to be arbitrators, in Aristotle's sense of the word, rather than 
judges: 'It is equity ••• to prefer arbitration to judgment, for 
the arbitrator sees what is equitable, but the judge only the law'. 93 
By their emphasis on the strongly personal nature of the 
relations between magistrate and people, the administrators also 
strove to approximate to that close, immediate and direct level of 
engagement with which the traditional chief had interacted. For in 
tribal society the chief's judicial role merged symbiotically with 
other more personalized roles (kinship for example), and his relations 
Thus with those under him tended to be particularistic and diffuse. 
Blyth, 'it· seems to me a very important matter ••• to bring [the 
natives] and their lawgiver into close contact, without the inter-
vention of Agents, Attorneys and Barristers etc. who so confuse the 
case to the unsophisticated•native mind, that all sense of justice is 
completely lost'. 94 
93 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1.13.1374b, quoted in T.O. Elias, The Nature 
of African.Customary Law, p.272. 
94 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 2/63: Blyth to Sec. of Native Laws and 
Customs Commission, 22 May 1882. 
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Another disadvantage of the colonial circuit courts was 
the delay resulting from the fact that sessions were held twice yearly 
as in the Colony. This offended against the principle of prompt 
justice administered with a minimum of inconvenience. 'In dealing 
with natives, certainly in their present condition, it is a matter of 
great importance that all offenders be promptly dealt with, and that 
punishment should follow t?e offence, as speedily as possible'. 95 
The extension of the circuit courts meant the interlocking 
of the Transkeian judicial system in an important respect with that 
of the Colony proper. However, it was commonly acknowledged by the 
magistrates that the legal situation in the Colony made no allowance 
for the realities of African society as it then existed in the border 
districts. The Cape's policy of civilizing the Africans by non-
recognition of their law was in practice unworkable, and was being 
only partially applied, and it had been found incompatible with 
genuine magisterial control. Blyth could claim, 'it is generally 
admitted that the natives are in far better order and in a more satis-
factory and progressive state than in the Colony'. Moreover, as a 
consequence of the refusal to recognise customary law, Africans pre-
ferred to take their cases to the tribal courts 'rather than face the 
expensive uncertainties of Colonial law surrounded as it is by diffi-
cult and perplexing technicalities'. 96 If, then, the magistrates 
sought to replace the chiefs as the judges in disputes between 
Africans, they had to offer a legal and judicial system which the 
African people would regard as preferable to that of the traditional 
courts. 
This lesson was amply confirmed when in the course of time 
colonial judges reversed several chief magisterial decisions in 
lobolo cases heard on appeal. In 1891 the Eastern Districts Court 
95 Ca~e Archives, C.M. T. 2/63: Blyth to Sec. of Native Laws and 
Customs Commission, 22 May 1882. 
96 Ibid. 
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in the case Nbono vs. Manoxoweni set aside customary law, according 
to which a widow's lobolo-holder was liable to repay cattle when she 
refused to remain with her relatives-in-law, since a husband's death 
did not cancel his widow's marriage; and refused to order the return 
of the lobolo cattle. Importing western legal notions of majority 
status, the court held that a deceased husband's heir could not 
assert powers of guardianship over the widow or claim her services. 
This interpretation. founded on the relevant provision of the general 
regulations which conferred the status of a major on both women and 
men who attained the age of 21 years, the President of the court added, 
purged tribal marriage of a feature 'which although it did not imply 
slavery, placed a woman in a state of dependence liable to gross 
97 abuse'. Then, in 1893 the Cape Supreme Court in the case Ngqobela 
~· Sihele declared that African customary marriages were illicit 
unions, and being de jure polygynous, were 'inconsistent with the 
very essence of the conjugal union', and entirely opposed to the 
t t 1 . d . t . t t . 
98 coun ry s po icy an ins 1 u ions. 
Botp Walter Stanford and Henry Elliot sprang to the defence 
of judicial practice in the territories where the courts sanctioned 
and gave effect to customary marriages. They argued that the African 
people were tenaciously attached to their traditional marriage system, 
the two principal components of which, polygyny and lobolo, fulfilled 
valuable and recoqnised functions in the tribal social structure. 
The Chief Magistrates advised strongly against radical interference 
in long-cherished customary arrangements as liable to produce 'dis-
turbing political effects', and looked to the civilizing agencies of 
education and Christianity for the gradual passing of these social in-
stitutions rather than to legal coercion. As a matter of judicial 
administrative policy, they urged that African civil law cases be 
97 Nbono vs. Manoxoweni, 6 EOC 62 (1891). 
93 Ngqobela vs. Sihele, 10 SC 346 (1893). 
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removed from the jurisdiction of the higher colonial courts which 
had overturned several chief magisterial decisions taken from the 
territorial courts on appeal. Elliot considered it 'a great mis-
fortune that purely Native cases should be adjudicated upon in the 
Courts of the Colony ••• where it cannot be disputed that [the judges] 
are in total ignorance of Native laws and customs, and know absolutely 
nothing of the manner in which the people are affected by them'. 99 
As the rulings of the superior colonial courts were held binding upon 
the Transkeian courts, the magistrates who were empowered to admin• 
ister customary law faced a legal dilemma resulting from the conflict 
inherent in a dual system of law and procedure. 'If they give judg-
ment according to Native custom their judgment may be upset by the 
Eastern Districts Court. If they put Native custom aside the Chief 
M . · 11 t . 1 h . t. 1 100 ag1strate w1 as cer ain y reverse t eir ac ion • A similar 
predicament confronted the senior magistrates, as the general regula-
tions left 'the mode of conducting appeals to the Chief Magistrate's 
Court absolutely to the discretion of that officer so long as the 
course adopted by him may lead to the just, speedy, and ••• inexpensive 
settlement of the case; yet when the action of the Chief Magistrate 
is appealed against on the grounds that the procedure laid down for 
the Courts in the Colony has not been adhered to, that officer's de-
cision has been quashed on the grounds of gross irregularity'. 101 
Both Stanford and Elliot recommended that a special proclamation be 
issued, confirming the magistrates in their discretionary power to 
apply tribal law in all civil cases where Africans were parties to the 
suit, and Elliot proposed that the circuit courts be replaced by a 
102 tribunal presided over by a recorder. In explicit terms, this 
amounted to a recognition of the need for a separate judicial and 
legal system for the territories, which would accommodate the social 
99 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 3/273: Elliot to U.S.N.A., 27 May 1892. 
lOJ Ibid., C.M.K. 2/7: Stanford to U.S.N.A., 31 March 1892. 
101 Ibid., C.M.T. 3/274: Report of H.G. Elliot for 1893. 
102 Ibid., C.M.K. 2/9: Stanford to U.S.N.A., 8 February 1894; 
C.M.T. 3/273: Elliot to U.S.N.A., 3 June 1892. 
171 
circumstances of the African people. To meet such need, the Native 
Territories Appeal Court, composed of the Chief .Magistrate and two 
assessors. was constituted in terms of legislation which expressly 
provided for cases of appeal arising out of civil suits between 
Africans east of the Kei. 103 The decisions of the Appeal Court 
would be final unless an application was made for a case to be for-
warded to the Supreme or Eastern Districts Court on review. For the 
very reason that the new tribunal formed the coping-stone of a separ-
ate judicial structure specially designed to serve the legal needs of 
the African population, Stanford looked upon the court as 'one of the 
most valuable institutions we have for the Natives•. 104 
The central notions of magisterial doctrines of jurisprudence, 
which have emerged as normative concepts in terms of which the organi-
zation of judicial administration in the Transkei was evaluated, can 
be more fully uncovered in isolated abstraction. As to legislation, 
magistrates insisted on the need for the widest 'publicity' in order 
to make the law certain and known. Blyth's intentions extended 
further than this, for he sought to reproduce the democratic involve-
ment of Africans in the decision-making process, that had character-
ized the traditional political society. Prior to the official 
promulgation of new regulations, a public meeting would be held to 
discuss the rules in question and so enable the local people to have 
'some voice in public affairs' l05 An advantage accrued to the ad-
ministration of gauging the popular response to new measures, and of 
preparing conservative tribesmen for innovative legislation which if 
thrust upon them without due warning·would provoke disaffection and 
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been framed. Referring to the radical action of the Eastern Dis-
tricts Court in refusing to entertain lobolo claims, Stanford re-
marked, 'For such changes to come without disturbance the people 
should be met beforehand and be allowed an opportunity to express 
th . . t 106 eir views • 
A similar desire to include Africans within the judicial 
process, modelled after traditional modes of dispute-settlement, 
where there was communal participation and in which consensus was all-
important, lay behind the use of African assessors in the magisterial 
courts. The Penal Code vested the magistrate with the discretion 
'to call to his assistance any such number of assessors not exceeding 
five, who shall be chosen by him from the principal Chiefs, councillors, 
headmen, and others, ••• to aid him in the hearing of any trial with 
a view to the advantages deriving from their observations, and par-
ticularly in the examination of witnesses', though only the magistrate 
had the poi.ver to fina. 107 This practice had been followed and advo• 
cated by Blyth for many years in Fingoland. The provision was also 
applicable to the Special Courts. Stanford believed that the use of 
African assessors sitting with the Special Courts had resulted 'in 
much good to the people by securing the hearty co-operation of their 
leading men in the trials and by diffusing a general knowledge and 
appreciation of our laws and procedure in every part of the Terri-
tory '• 108 Popular participation in judicial proceedings in this way 
helped secure the principle of popularity of justice, 'whereby the 
people could understand the machinery and purposes of judicial arrange-
ments, and the law applied by the courts. 
The magistrates laid great emphasis upon an efficient judi-
cial procedure, to ensure prompt, accessible and cheap justice with 
106 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/7: Stanford to U.S.N.A., 31 March 1892. 
J.07 A.N. Macfadyen (ed.), Sta tut-es, Proclamations:' Act 24 of 1886, 
section 262, p.144. 
108 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/6: Stanford to U.S.N.A., 21 November 1888. 
173 
the minimum of inconvenience to witnesses and parties. The demand 
for the prompt settlement of cases and prompt punishment of offenders 
and the impatience with delay lent force to the general criticism of 
the Circuit Courts, which visited the territories but twice annually. 
As the criminal procedure involved committal for trial, the deterrent 
effect which 'prompt punishment and speedy examples' would provid2J as 
in the case of stockwstealing ('the principal crime of the Territory'}, 
was weakened by the lapse of time before the case was heara. 109 
Justice, to fulfil its public exemplary function, must be swift and 
immediate. 
Frequent arguments for the abolition or reduction of insti-
tution fees and all other forms of law taxes filled magisterial 
correspondence and reports. Blyth regarded it of great importance 
'that justice should be administered with as little expense as possible 
to the parties concerned, and that they should thus be encouraged to 
bring all their cases to the magistrate's office for settlement'. 110 
In Fingoland, where the steady aim of the Chief Magistrate was to 
' 111 lessen the expenses of cases', a fixed office fee of 10s. was 
charged on lodgement of complaint in civil cases; on their conclusion 
the magistrate decided whether the plaintiff or the defendant would 
pay the fee. However, in 1885, a government notice substituted the 
colonial tariff of court fees, much to Blyth's dissatisfaction, and 
thereby brought the system in the Transkei into line with that opera-
tive in Griqualand East and Thembuland. 112 Elliot, then Chief 
Magistrate of Thembuland, wrote of 
the importance of fixing all charges in the Courts of 
this Territory upon the lowest possible scale. It 
would, in my opinion, be greatly to the advantage of 
Govt., if all native cases could be adjudicated upon 
at no expense to litigants beyond what is necessary 
109 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 1/83: Elliot to U.S.N.A., 13 January 1887. 
110 .l!2.i.Q,., c.M.T. 2/63: Blyth to u.s.N.A., 3 MaY, 1881. 
111 CPP. G.4• 183, Minutes of Evidence, no. 8492 (Matt. Blyth]. 
112 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 2/66: Blyth to U.S.N.A., 26 March 1885. 
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to cover the cost of serving summonses; so long as 
any further charge is made it will be looked upon 
by the natives as a tax for giving them justice. 
The great majority of natives in this Territory are 
~holly unable to pay any fees •••• I am confident 
that in very many instances natives who feel them-
se.lves aggrieved are deterred from seeking redress 
in the Courts of the Territory from a fear of the 
costs. While this feeling exists it is impossible 
that the Courts of the Territory can be considered 
other than institutions for the wealthy, whereas to 
be respected & of general benefit to the natives they 
should be accessible to the poorest.113 
The concept of costs was not unfamiliar to the tribesmen. 
The chief was entitled to keep part of the fine in civil and the whole 
in criminal cases in payment for his services, and such payments 
formed part of his regular income. In addition, as the defendant or 
accused had to be given notice of the case against him and the date 
of the hearing, a court messenger would have to be employed, and 
would also have to be paid from the judgement debt. The same would 
apply if his services were required to enforce the judgement. Under 
white rule, the chiefs were no longer permitted to keep fines but 
were p~id salaries instead. Moreover, the African system of messen-
gers was replaced by the colonial system of police messengers receiv-
ing no reward beyond their salaries for their court duties. Since 
in traditional society the gainer in civil law cases paid the costs, 
often a high percentage of what he recovered, the mode of law sub-
sequently introduced by the colonial magistrates was to prove prefer-
able in this respect. 
In the legal contact between black and white other forms of 
costs were introduced as the colonial system of procedure came to be 
extended. The inability to understadd this alien system was to make 
\jl 
for much disillusionment with the white man's justice. Fees charged 
by law agents, those betes noires of the Transkeian courts, were the 
_subject of hostile and unremitting complaint. Magistrates charged 
the agents wit_h fostering litigation, in which they had a vested 
113 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 1/83: Elliot to U.S.N.A., 7 June 1887. 
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interest, and with destroying, by the interposition of technical pro-
cedural forms, 'the proper feeling that should exist between the 
1 d th . t t ' 114 peop e an e magis ra e • Agents bore responsibility, it was 
claimed, for converting the informal character of traditional legal 
settlements and trials into a formal process conducted according to 
complicated rules of evidence and procedure, which rendered the magis-
terial courts remote from and inaccessible to the people they were 
meant to serve. Blyth reported a headman saying, ' 11We are confused; 
it is all Agents, and our office is now of no use to us'''. 115 The 
administrators maintained that legal expenses incurred as a result of 
written demands, stamped summonses, agents fees for appeara,nce, wit-
d th ' h d f . N t" d tll6 ness an o er expenses un.ear o in a ive proce ure were 
heaped up in minor cases, 'in which the aim should be to facilitate an 
easy and unexpensive settlement'. 117 Trivial amounts usually in dis-
pute were being swallowed up by exorbitant costs. 
In the territories as a whole, the administration allowed 
suitably qualified and duly enrolled agents, on the payment of i10, 
to practise in the magisterial courts. Instances undoubtedly occurred 
where agents or attorneys who had been struck off the ro·lls in the 
Colony and where whites or blacks without legal qualification conducted 
civil cases in the local courts. These settled costs by private 
arrangement with their clients rather than charge for their appearance 
in the taxed bill of costs. 118 For the magistrates the problem yet 
again presented itself of reconciling, balancinq, ad.iusting colonial 
and African forms and usages: for in tribal society there were no 
professional lawyers and each party in the case (as well as his 
relatives and friends) would put his case. 
114 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 2/63: ·Blyth to U.S.N.A., 3 May 1881. 
115 Ibid., C.M.T. 2/65: Blyth to U.S.N.A., 29 Oct0ber 1884. 
116 Ibid., C.M.K. 2/5: Stanford to U.S.N.A., 30 ~~ly 1886. 
117 1J2.i!:!., C.M.K. 2/6: Stanford to U.S.N.A., 29 April 1887. 
118 Ibid., C.M.K. 2/9: Stanford to U.S.N.A., 11 .January 1895. 
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opinion that the right of a litigant to employ a friend to assist 
him in court should not be withdrawn, but VK>uld give the officers 
discretionary power to grant or refuse permission to any unqualified 
119 person to conduct a case. 
In essence, the indictment of the law agents formed a par-
ticular criticism of the importation of an alien legal procedure, in-
congruent with traditional modes of dispute-settlement. Magistrates 
reported that Africans regarded the whole system of fees as an im-
position by the white government and were consequently avoiding the 
territorial courts and being driven back upon their own tribal courts. 
The common remedy suggested in this area was an amended tariff of 
costs in 'purely native cases'. 120 
In all, the administrators revealed a common concern to 
maintain an informal style of legal settlement, a process of judicial 
interaction between the lawgiver and people that would be unmediated, 
persona1~J, immediate - to administer substantive rather than formal 
;.., 
justice, simply yet equitably. This ideal reinforced the paternal 
image of the kindly autocrat, dwelling among his people, to whom he 
dispensed the justice of a Solomon. It also reflected resentment of 
the int.erloper - the law agent - with his learned lore, preoccupied 
with the niceties of legal procedure, who interposed himself between 
magistrate and people, and so encroached upon and diffracted the 
authority relationship conceived in personalized terms as holding 
the two together. As Walter Stanford observed, the magistrate who 
realized his 'true position and regard[ed] with sympathy & consider-
ation the natural feeling, and tendencies, even perhaps the prejudices 
of the native people', 'soon becomes what the natives would wish him 
to be, the chief to whom at all times they can go with confidence in 
119 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/9: Stanford to U.S.N.A,, 11 January 1895. 
120 Ibid., C.M.K. 2/j: Stanford to U.S.N~A., 30 July 1886. 
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their tribal difficulties or individual disputes[;] instead of a 
strict insistence upon forr:i or procedure he becomes more of an arbi-
trator disposing of many a knotty point to the satisfaction of all 
concerned without the observance of any technicalities in the way of 
demands, processes, and the like'. 121 At another level, this juri-
dical ideal was sustained by the magisterial desire to keep the super-
vision and control of the African people entirely and solely within 
his own hands. On it rested the claim to executive discretion, inas-
much as the administrator 'being on the spot and knowing the state of 
' 122 affairs is best capable of judqing what is applicable to the people • 
The magistrate was girded with executive power. At the same time, 
judicial discretion enabled him to temper the law and its administration 
to suit the circumstances of the particular case and the conditions of 
the local community. 
The idea of appeal carried great importance in magisterial 
notions of jurisprudence. It was the principle that answered the 
need, on the one hand, to secure prompt, accessible and inexpensive 
justice administered by local tribunals and, on the other, the need to 
establish an efficient control for preventing maladministration and 
abuse. The officers insisted that the freest right of appeal, with 
a minimum of costs, should be allowed in every case, and justified 
this by reference to tribal judicial practice. In the Transkeian 
territories, the chief magisterial courts were constituted to exercise 
appellate jurisdiction, with controlling and supervisory power over 
the district courts. Oriqinally appeals could be taken from the 
chief maqistrates and, during the period of informal rule, from the 
agents, to the Secretary for Native Affairs. Act 40 of 1882 for the 
first time provided for appeals to go to the colonial high courts. 
Criticism of the provision, however, was expressed on the grounds of 
121 
122 
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the costs attending the process of appeal and the unfamiliarity to 
the Africans of colonial forms. Elliot refused to believe 'natives 
will appr~ciate the right or advantage of appealing to a tribunal or 
person unknown to them and before whom {from poverty or ignorance) 
they cannot appear to plead their own version of the case'. 123 
Frequent reversal of magisterial verdicts on appeal to the colonial 
courts, which were not empowered to take cognizance of customary law 
in civil suits between African parties, led to the establishment of 
the Native Territories Appeal Court. By Act 26 of 1894, appellate 
jurisdiction to hear civil appeals from the magisterial courts was 
transferred exclusively to the Appeal Court, but the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court remained unaltered in respect of suits in which one 




In fine, the cardinal doctrine of ma.gist er ial jurisprudence, 
which informed and shaped the whole organization of the Transkeian 
judicial administration, was the principle of the social utility of 
the legal system. There was widespread agreement that to operate 
effectively law should respond to social realities, that the judicial 
structure should be in harmony with the needs of the society it serves. 
For the very reason that it largely met this primary desideratum, 
the legal and judicial system operative in the Transkeian Territories 
throughout the period under discussion was highly and widely valued 
as being 'specially adapted to the requirements of the natives under 
their present conditions of life'. 124 
iii Law and the Enforcement of Morals 
One of the nicest issues in the philosophy of law, which 
engaged the high seriousness of the Transkeian magistrates, is the 
123 
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permissible limits of leqal coercion. Edmund Bur1~e, himself a law-
yer by training and profession, once observed 'It is one of the 
finest problems in legislation •••• What the State ought to take 
upon itself to direct by the public wisdom, and what it ought to 
leave, with as little interference as possible to individual dis-
cretion '. To this question, concerning in particular the legal en-
forcement of morality, J.S. Mill addressed himself in his essay On 
Liberty a hundred years ago, and the famous 'one very simple principle' 
in which he couched his answer expresses the central doctrine of his 
essay. He asserted, 'the only purpose for which power can be right-
fully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against.his. 
will, is to prevent harm to others'. And to identify the many 
different things which he wished to exclude, he added, 'His own good 
either physical or moral is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot 
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for 
him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in the opinions 
of others, to do so would be wise or even right'. 125 In his own time 
the radical liberalism of Mill's doctrines did not go unchallenged. 
J.F. Stephen's Liberty, Equality, Fraternity was written explicitly 
as a critique of On Liberty, and in our own day the debate has been 
resumed with H.L.A. Hart and Lord Devlin as the two leading 
antagonists. 
In his sombre work Stephen insisted that society was per-
fectly justified in using the criminal law beyond the limits demar• 
cated by Mill, and, in particular, was entitled to compel conformity 
to the social code of morals and to punish deviations from it even 
when these do not harm others. For Stephen, the fact that certain 
conduct was by 'the oublic and accepted standard of morals' severely 
condemned as immoral was sufficient cause for making that conduct 
125 J,S. Mill, On Liberty, p.68 
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punishable by the 'rough engine' of the law. 126 He argued that the 
criminal law was not merely an instrument for the prevention of 
ff . h b t t • f th f f . . ' 127 su ering or arm, u a persecution o e grosser orms o vice • 
If the function of the criminal law lay in 'promoting virtue and pre-
venting vice', it followed, he believed, that 'it ought to put a re-
straint upon vice not to such an extent merely as is necessary for 
definite self ... protection but generally on the ground that vice is a 
bad thing ' • 
128 
Two theses have been identified as comprising the positive 
grounds advanced to justify the legal enforcement of morality. 129 
According to the moderate thesis, society is held together by a shared 
morality, infringements of which can be justifiably punished, like the 
crime of treason, so as to preserve the social body from dissolution 
or collapse. The defence of this argument rests upon the unexamined 
assumption that there is a necessary harmony of values, that all 
morality forms in H.L.A. Hart's words 'a single seamless web', 130 so 
that those who transgress any one part are likely to transgress the 
whole. The conviction is held that all the positive values in which 
men have believed must, in the end, be compatible, and perhaps even 
entail one another. Such a form of monism excludes the possibility 
of the pursuit within the same society of incompatible and incommens-
urable yet equally valid ends and ideals. 
By contrast, the more extreme thesis regards the legal en-
forcement of morality as an end in itself, apart from its beneficial 
consequences in preserving society and independent of its instrumental 
value analogous to ordered government. Yet the general principles 
underlying the several varieties of this second thesis hold up as 
values things which seem contrary to every notion of morality, for the 
126 J.F. Stephen; Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 'pp.162 and 140. 
127 Ibid., p.152. 
128 Ibid., pp.150 and 143. 
129 H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality, pp.48ff. 
130 Ibid., p.51. 
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sake of which society should impose restraints upon individual liberty 
and inflict punishments for the promotion of virtue and the prevention 
of vice. They include the gratification of the feeling of hatred and 
the desire of vengeance which, according to Stephent 'crime excites in 
a healthy mind', 131 even where there has been no victim to be avenged 
but only transgression of a moral rule. They include, too, the in-
fliction of punishment as an expression of the 'moral indignation of 
mankind', 132 whereby society vindicates and ratifies the common stan-
dards of morality; and, lastly, conformity to coercively-induced 
moral rules, which unlike voluntary restraint seems quite empty of 
moral value. 
· The relation between law and morals received an added di-
mension in the Transkeian context of cultural collision, for the 
practices and values of tribal culture at numerous vital points, 
touching the established social norms and mo~s, were at variance 
with the positive morality of colonial society. Both as a question 
of practical administrative policy and as one of a moral order 
(though the two were inextricably linked}, it exercised the thoughts 
and engaged the feelings of the colonial administrators. 
Borrowing from Matthew Arnold's searching analysis of 
Victorian society in his essay Cultu:reand Anarchy, we can characterise 
the magisterial mind as infused with the g\,irit of Hebraism, with its 
v 
typical emphasis on moral character and conduct. The Cape @)dminis-
trators brought in their baggage a heavy burden of domestic concepts 
and values, of stock notions and habits, in terms of which they 
appraised the African societies. They tended to think and act in 
moral terms. This strong desire to structure the world in moral 
categories cannot be more strikingly exemplified than in their atti-
tudes, however widely diverging, to traditional customs and law, in 
131 J.F. Stephen, Liberty, §qualitv, Fraternity, p.154. 
132 J.F. Stephen, quoted in R.J. White's introduction to Liberty, 




the moral weight attached to their cross-cultural judgements. From 
their own society the magistrates derived a single overarching stan-
dard of values in terms of which all cultuxes were evaluated. Not-
withstanding, a number of outstanding administrators displayed an ex-
ceptional tolerance, understanding and insight with regard to tradi-
tional African society, what Arnold would express as 'sweetness and 
light'. Yet such was the force of Hebraism in Victorian culture that 
their liberal tolerance and even enlightened approval of the alien 
communities, while conceding merit to customs~the circumstances 
of the tribesman's time and place, were invariably qualified by moral 
objections. 
This tendency for moral earnestness and indignation to 
interpose in the magisterial appraisal of African society can be seen 
at work in the Report of the Cape Native Laws and Customs Commission. 
In their description of the nature of law in tribal society, the 
commissioners recognised the social efficacy of customary law, as 
coping successfully with the lives of the African people. The law, 
according to the Report, 
took cognizance of certain crimes and offences; it 
enforced certain civil rights and ol)lior>.tions; it 
provided for the validity of polygamic marriages; 
and it secured succession to property ;\nd inheritance, 
according to simple and well-defined rules. 
'But intermixed with it', the Commission went on to declare, 
were a number of pernicious and degrading usages and 
supers ti t:i.cus 1)r;,liefs, as well a~ a course of judi-
cial procedure in cases of the alleged offence of 
sorcer:v 01~ "'1itcbcr.:;.ft, utterly subv~"".'sive of justicei 
and repugnant to the general princip"les of humanity. 33 
Traditionalism was seen as tainted with imperfections, even pervaded 
with evil, and presented in part an affront to Victorian morality, 
which demanded the intervention of the law. But intervention would 
not be wholesale, and in demarcating the bounds of legal coercion, 
133 rpP G A-'R? q~.~ort, ~ ..~ra. a. .;::..;...:_, , • •.• - __ ,' - _. . {J., 
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the Commission drew a relevant distinction, supported by many of the 
magistrates, between actions and practices which are harmful to others 
and those which deviate from Christian morality but harm no one. 
Only with regard to the former, the considered opinion of the com• 
missioners went, w~s the state obliged to interfere in order to pro-
tect the sanctity of human life and the integrity of the human 
134 
person. This rule governing the bounds of legal enforcement 
brought the practice of witchcraft in the territories within the 
jurisdiction of the criminal law administered by the magistrates. 
Both the General Regulations of 1879 and 1885 and the Territorial 
Penal Code of 1886 made provision for witchcraft as a punishable 
135 offence. 
Foremost among customary practices, that of witchcraft was 
universally condemned by colonist and magistrate alike, as being con• 
trary to all principles of justice, morality and reason. It was de-
nounced and reviled, in an exhaustive vocabulary, as barbarous, 
vicious, devilish, 'abominable, detestable, the 'source of almost every 
evil'. 136 The discovery and punishment of witches were looked upon 
as a Machiavellian device fraudulently employed by both chiefs and 
witchfinders for the end of personal gain, material or political. 
Magistrates represented the witchdoctor in the role of the chief's 
henchman, his strong arm, a political instrument in fact for terror-
izing his tribe into docile submission, ridding the chiefdom of oppo-
nents and curbing the power of wealthy tribesmen. By imposing on a 
credulous and superstitious people, the witchdoctor could effectively 
maintain the authority of the chief and ensure the internal security 
of the tribal polit~. As one magistrate put it, the institution 
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practice was regarded as morally vicious and the Cape Government was 
determined to root out the institution by the weapon of the law. 
The Chief_ Magistrate of Griqualand East, for one, ~ommended the ade• 
quacy of the provisions of the criminal code for the protection of 
life and property which were liable to forfeiture under tribal custom 
in witch trials. 'Considering that we have in this territory a popu• 
lation of 148,000 natives nearly all believers in sorcery and compar-
ing [the handful of convictions on witchcraft charges in the local 
courts] with the frequent deaths and confiscations in Pondoland it is 
clearly proved that witchcraft in its worst aspects has practically 
been put down under the existing system of administration'. 138 
Notwithstanding legislative enactment, however, and the 
active influence of missionary and magistrate, witchcraft continued 
to exercise a tenacious hold upon the African mind, as the annual 
magisterial reports testify. Some magistrates looked beyond legal 
sanctions to the ameliorating spread of education, Christianity and 
western medical practices, and enlisted the S~"Pport of chiefs and 
headmen to curb the practice and destroy its social rationale. So 
abhorrent to the administrators was the custom, with its consequences 
of mindless cruelty and murderous death to innocent people, that a 
magistrate like Blyth was convinced that it should be 'stamped out 
. 1 ' 139 rigorous y • But with the intensifying and determined measures, 
statutory and administrative, of the white government, the practice 
went 'underground', and while fewer cases were brought before the 
courts, frequent cases of arson, the mysterious firing of huts by 
night, slaughtering of cattle, and the quiet departure of people from 
the district were taken as reliable indications that the Africans held 
as staunchly as ever to their traditional customs and beliefs. 
'Belief in the powe~ of witchcraft, and the ability of witch-doctors 
138 
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to divine who has practised it, is as strongly rooted in the minds of 
. tl40 the masses of the people as 1t ever was •••• Even among the 
School people, belief in supernatural agency, it was reported, had not 
been abandoned entirely. Yet this was interpreted as evidence of 
moral shortcoming rather than the persistence of a traditional system 
of beliefs. 
That the complex of witch beliefs, with its related insti-
tution of divination, formed an integral part of a total religious 
system, as modern anthropological research has asserted, was scarcely 
understood by the colonial administrators. 




with the problem 
recognise 
of evil 
in the world. Because the western concepts of chance and contingency 
are absent from traditional magica.1 religions, the African people be-
lieved that all occasions of mis.fortune are caused by some agent, 
whether the supernat~,~ agency of tribal ancestors or a human being 
using supernatural means. As the causes of illness were not under-
stood, witchcraft was genuinely believed to be responsfble for such 
adversity. The sickness or death of a chief, for example, almost 
always ·resulted in a 'smelling out' of witches and a witchcraft trial. 
In traditional religion, witchcraft and sorcery (a distinction which 
magistrates rarely made) were wholly evil, regarded as ,so anti-social 
as to endanger the whole community, a belief issuing in the violent 
reaction of death whenever a witch or sorcerer was discovered. As 
for the administrators, the Victorian culture which they represented 
and disseminated, was characterized at that point of time by the 
growing displacement of the orthodox Christian religion, itself 
relatively non-magical, by a secularized world-view, which had developed 
a stringent logic of natural causality and laid heavy emphasis on the 
notion of rationality. From this culture-bound standpoint, the 
magical religious system of the Africans was denigrated as 1super-
140 Q:E., G.4-'93, RP.port of H.G. Elliot, p.46. 
186 
stitious '. A rationalist scepticism dismissed witchdoctors as mere 
•impostors' and their victims as simple 'dupes'. This amounted in 
one case to a recommendation for mercy on the grounds that the accused 
was a deluded 'victim of an evil national system'. 141 Yet another 
officer expressed his sense of incredulity that 'a native may against 
all our ideas of reason accept the dictum of a witchfinder and de-
' 142 liberately accept the social ban involved therein • 
That witchcri'ft was vigorously denounced as an evil by the 
,_,_') 
administrators is in one respect a measure of their involvement, per-
sonal and official, in their work of governing the subjected African 
societies. This involvement, strongly registered in the feelings of 
outrage and compassion which witchcraft evoked, precluded any disen-
gagement of what Arnold called the 'disinterested intelligence' that 
could investigate critically this customary practice. 
By contrast with capital crimes such as witchcraft, there 
is the special topic of sexual morality where it seems plausible that 
there are actions immoral by accepted standards and yet not harmful 
to others. With regard to the legal enforcement of a sexual code, 
magisterial attitudes towards African initiation rites can be taken as 
a representative case-study. The initiation rites, both for boys and 
girls, were singled out for special attack as they were held to vio-
late the acceptable norms of sexual behaviour. Magistrates associated 
the initiation schools with sex-instruction and the ceremonial surround-
ing the rites as occasions of sexual promiscuity. In their aversion 
to the coarsely natural world of the senses, the zealots among them 
took earnest steps to do away with the ceremonial and even prohibit 
the schools entirely. Matthew Blyth, as Fingo Agent and later as 
Chief Magistrate of the T·anskei, was in the vanguard of the moral 
crusade. He believed that for the white administration to sanction 
141 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 1/83: Elliot to U.S.N.A., 25 April 1887. 
142 Ibid., C.M.K. 2/7: Stanford to U.S.N.A., 24 April 1891. 
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or connive at these practices was to compromise its self-proclaimed 
civilizing mission, to call into question the validity of those moral 
principles which were the foundation and justification of white rule. 
Only by taking a firm and principled stand on the basis of its moral 
convictions would the colonial administration win the respect of the 
African people. 'It seems but just and right that any civilized and 
Christian government should discountenance and discourage all filthy 
and disgusting and immoral native laws and customs ••• and all the 
people admit that a Christian government are acting consistently by 
, 143 doing so • 
In 1875, Charles Brownlee, then Secretary for Native Affairf?; 
dispatched a general circular to chiefs and people, a tract for the 
times intended for their edification, calling upon them to abandon 
those 'evil customs which keep you in darkness and ignorance'. Par-
ticular mention was made of the 11abakhwetha" and "intonjane '' rites, 
by which the male and female initiation ceremonies were commonly 
144 known. Acting in the spirit of the minister's directives, Blyth 
had had a self-imposed regulation passed by a meeting of the Mfengu 
community, prior to the formal annexation of Fingoland to the Colony. 
This sought by a process of sublimation to cleur away the dross from 
the custom, prohibiting the ''abakhwetha·• dances of the male initiates, 
while tolerating at the same time the circumcision rite. When 
colonial Ngqika were located in Gcalekaland after the war of 1877-78, 
Blyth enforced similar regulations, duly approved by the Government • 
• 
However, this series of local rules lacked any legal standing in the 
territories, and such legal anomaly was to lead to a minor cause 
celebre, when in 1882 one Fynn~ a Ngqika headman, was fined by the 
Resident Magistrate of Kentani, Gcalekaland, for holding an 11intonjane '' 
dance at his homestead. On review the magisterial decision was con-
143 Q:E,, G.4- 183; Appendix c, pp.44, q.23. 
144 Cape Archives, N.A. 841: Circular of c. Brownlee, 15 August 1875. 
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firmed by Blyth in his capacity as Chief Magistrate, but after Fynn 
had made private representations to the Cape Government through a 
third party - 'some European friend' - the.Attorney•General directed . . ' . .. : . . . 
Blyth to reimburse the headman to the amount paid 'in satisfaction of 
a. judgment which cannot be sustained'. 145 
Blyth, in a stream of letters to the Under Secretary for 
Native Affairs, respectfully urged reconsideration of the Government's 
ruling. He argued that the regulations, although they carried no 
statutory force, had been duly endorsed by the Government of the day, 
and, appealing to the popular verdict, had been passed 'by the large 
majority of the natives', 'the people themselves seeing the evils 
that resulted from this custom of white boys and the unbridled licence 
that ensued'. 146 He urged that the matter be considered not only 
from the narrow vantage of strict legality but as 'one of policy and 
147 Good Government ', for, he declared, in a rather exaggerated fashion 
as events were to prove, the reversal constituted a moral victory for 
the Red people, it would open the floodgates to 'the grossest immor-
ality and vice', and would seriously retard the advance of 'civiliza• 
tion and Christianity'. Furthermore, Fynn's action in bypassing 
the usual judicial processes of the established territorial courts, 
through appealing in private to Cape Town, undermined the authority 
and standing of the white administration in the territories and 
flouted the judicial system, setting 'law and order ••• at defiance'. 
In the exchange of letters to and from the Transkei, Blyth's animus 
• 
against the initiation rites in particular and the allegedly immoral 
customary practices in general became more intensely directed, as the 
Government stood consistently to its position and as his appeal became 
correspondingly more urgent. At an early stage he denounced the 
145 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 2/63: Blyth to U.S.N.A., 8 September 1882. 
146 Ibid., c.M.T. 2/63: Blyth to u.s.N.A., 8 September 1882 and 
15 December 1882. 
147 Ibid., C.M.T. 2/63: Blyth to U.S.N.A., 10 October 1882. 
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0 intonjane 1' dances as 'openly immoral 1 ; then entered a description of 
the custom at which the female initiates were given out 'to young men 
upon paying a small fee where scenes of the utmost debauchery, and 
the grossest indecency takes place'. 148 By his third letter, Blyth· 
spoke brazenly of 'open prostitution'. While the Chief Magistrate 
advanced his cause in the pages of the Blue Books149 and secured the 
t f 1 T k i . 'i . l .SO c Go supper o severa rans e an miss onaries, the ape vernment 
refused to invoke legislative ~ans ag~inst the initiation rites, other 
than by permitting magistrates to dismiss headmen who organized or 
connived at such rites in their wards. But Blyth's conviction in the 
righteousness of his cause never faltered, and even in the late 1880s 
Fynn's case was still held responsible for retrogression towards 
heathenism among the Ngqika of the Kentani District. 
Considered in a broader perspective, the position Blyth 
adopted can be characterized, to use a term employed by H.L.A. Hart, 
as one of legal moralism. The white administration was cast into the 
role of moral educator and the courts were represented as custos 
~orum or general censor and guardian of public morality, whose function 
it was to punish moral wickedness, whatever was contra bones mores et 
decorum. According to this view, the enforcement of sexual morality 
is a proper part of the law's business. ~ ·· · 
Within the Transkeian Territories, initiation rites were 
officially discountenanced by the administration, but in the eyes of 
the law a distinction was made between the immorality of the practice 
and its aspect as a public offensive act or nuisance. A line ·divided 
the punishment of immorality from the punishment of indecency which 
was provided for under sections 124-25 of the Penal Code. The Code 
also declared that persons compelling novices to participate in the 
schools without their free consent would be liable for prosecution, 
148 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 2/63: Blyth to U.S.N.A., 8 September 1882 
149 CPP, G.8- 183, pp.130-131. 
150 ..Il2U!., G.3- 184, pp.101 and 108. 
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151 but no action was contemplated against the ceremonies per se. 
Official action was, however, taken when the initiation rites became 
the subject of local political dispute, as in the case where Mfengu 
clients of the loyalist Bhaca chief, Makhaula, had persisted in prac• 
tising circumcision in defiance of Bhaca law which prohibited the 
rite. The Chief Magistrate submitted that the provisions of the 
Penal Code in respect of initiation ceremonies were inoperative as 
both parents and novices gave their consent to the rite, and he 
recommended that a proclamation be issued to give local effect to 
Bhaca custom in the Mt. Frere District. 152 A similar case occurred 
in the location of the chief, Zibi, a Christian convert, where certain 
headmen were fined on instructions from the Under Secretary for per-
mitting the practice of the rite in their sub•locations against the 
chief's express wish. The Chief Magistrate noted that he was not 
aware of any law under which such fines could be imposed or enforced, 
but observed that had the headmen refused to pay they would have 
1-3 
rendered themselves liable to suspension from office. J In both 
cases cited, then, the implicit justification of punishment was not 
the enforcement of morality, but the prevention of local civil dispute. 
The views Blyth expressed in favour of legislation for the 
suppression of immoral traditional practices were not endorsed by the 
Government nor were they representative of chief magisterial.opinion. 
Repprting on the initiation rites, Elliot wrote, 'If it has been 
found impossible to suppress by legislation practices of even equal 
or more demoralising ef~ect in the most civilised cities in the world, 
it is I submit idle to expect success amongst a horde of barbarians'. 
The Chief Magistrate upheld the legal distinction drawn between the 
punishment of immorality and the punishment of indecency, and if the 
151 A.N. Macfadyen (ed.), Statutes, Proclamations: Native Terri-
tories Penal Code Act (24 of 1886), sections 124-125, pp.111-112 
and sections 153-154, p.119. 
152 Cape Archives, C.M.K. 2/11: Stanford to U.S.N.A. t 15 June 1896. 




distinction were to be a significant one, refused to acknowledge the 
white claim for protection from the distress inseparable from the 
bare knowledge that Africans were acting in ways considered wrong. 154 
The conception of the positive functions. of the criminal law, which 
was adopted as t~e official ruling, regarded it as designed to pro-
tect orie man from another and not to punish moral wickedness. 
Stanford, for one,, refused to consider that 'punishments should be 
provided against superstitious practices which do not endanger life 
or property'. He questioned the attribution of value to mere out-
wardly conforming behaviour, in abstraction from both motive and con-
sequence, and stressed the importance of individual self-determination 
and voluntary sel.f•discipline,. not submission to legal restraint, in 
dealing with those traditional practices condemned by western society's 
code of morals. As he wrote, · 1it seems to me very doubtful if the 
l d d f h t . l · 11 b . d b 1 . 1 . t 
15 5 mora stan ar o t e na ive peop e w1 e raise y egis ation • 
Rather than direct frontal assault on tribal culture, the Cape looked 
to the 'civili~ing agencies' of education and Christianity for the 
gradual abolition of the customary rites de passage. The civilisation 
which accompanied the extension of white rule east of the Kei would bf 
necessity be a slow but steady penetration and transformation of the 
indigenous societies, regulated rather than carried through by the 
weapon of the law. 
154 Cape Archives, C.M.T. 1/84:, Elliot to U.S.N.A., 24 April 1891. 
155 Ibid., C.M.K. 2/7: Stanford t_o U.S.N.A., 24 April 1891. 
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CHAPTER F 0 UR 
CONCLUSION: PROSPECT AND RETROSPECT 
To attempt to subsume the Transkeian territorial system 
under the generic categories of segregation or integration - those 
two irreconcilable alternatives which political scientifs=tS. have con-
t:r 
ventionally applied to describe the varieties of South African 'native 
policy' - is to fit the social evolutionism animating administration 
in the territories to the Procrustean bed of a static ideology, to 
confuse a dynamic process with an achieved or projected ordering of 
race relations. For Cape policy in the territories took cognizance 
of the vast extent of cultural cleavage dividing black and white, 
which it sought to accommodate within a separate administrative sys-
tern specially fashioned for the social conditions of the large 
African population beyond the Kei. At the same time, it remained 
attentive to the profound changes generated by more than a century 
of interaction between the two societies on the eastern frontier, 
transformations in social life that created an ever thickening nexus 
of interconnecting links enmeshing colonist and tribesmen. Indeed, 
what the Cape magistrates, who had improvised, constructed and ex• 
tended the unique 'notive territorial system', above all valued was 
its flexibility and responsiveness to changing circumstances; they 
set great store by the dynamic principle of governmental policy, im-
pelling the indigenous people along the royal highroad of civilization. 
Cape administration in the territories,. then, was tolerant of tradi-
tionalism, but sought at the same time to infuse into the tribal 
communities the necessary catalysts of social progress, to close the 
cultural gap through the long-term operation of western institutions 
upon primitive society. 
At a theoretical level, magisterial thought was pervaded 
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and shaped by a social evolutionism which in the nineteenth century 
performed the function of providing a conceptual framework that could 
accommodate the diversity of human cultures without denying the unity 
of mankind. Traditional societies were treated as lower phases or 
stages in a single line of development that culminated in the 
achieved forms of European civil~~ation. wbil~ tribal modes of social 
life were accorded a relative degree of recognition as uniquely valu-
able for the particular stage of cultural growth of a particular 
society, western civilization retained its primacy as a universal 
model, superior to earlier movements in the cosmic drama. Considered 
in these terms, the Cape magistrates regarded the social development 
of the African people under their charge as a process of assimilation 
to the single universal pattern conveniently represented by their own 
society. 
Cape 'native policy', at its most liberally optimistic, set 
up the objective and held out the promise of ~he full incorporation 
of the African people within the Colony's administrative and legal 
structures, but the final term of this assimilative process came to 
be set in the remote and unprobable future. \\7hen, moreover, colonists 
and officers were compelled at critical moments to face squarely the 
issue of the ultimate political consequenc~s of westernization, with 
all that this meant for the maintenance of white power and privilege, 
they drew back from the logical outcome of their liberal reformism, 
equivocating, to cite a telling instance, on the crucial principle of 
a non-racial franchise. 
A major shift in official thought and feeling, marking a 
broad tendency away from assimilation towards differentiation, can be 
traced to the traumatic impact of war and rebellion in the late 1870s 
and early 1880s. From this time, a new note of sober realism came 
to characterize the administration in the territories. The men on 
the ground were more sober-minded, still eager and hopeful, but with 
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longer views and more modest pretensions. Striking the new keynote 
of cautious gradualism, the Barry Commission lent the weight of its 
authority to existing arrangements which conferred a separate status 
upon the territories and gave definitive expression to the widely 
acknowledged need to recognise the special interests and circumstances 
of the African people encapsulated within their traditional culture. 
In line with this transmutation in the official administrative ethos, 
which was ~§J2:L_ii§;]~~t' a long-raging debate about the nature and de-
~ sirability of cultural change, was the altered conception magistrates 
held of tribalism. Particularly after the challenge of black re-
sistance to the white advance had been successfully met by colonial 
arms, the tribal system, for long thought antagonistic towards 
'civilization', now no longer was reckoned a serious threat to the 
Cape's position in the territories. As the tribesmen became inured 
to Cape rule, the traditional ruling elite and authority structures 
were effectively utilized by and enmeshed in the white administrative 
system, and so retained for their practical governmental value in-
stead of suffering the fate of annihilation which policy•makers and 
officials from the time of Grey had invoked in their aggressive pre-
ference for colonial institutions. This rehabilitation, as it might 
be called, of traditionalism overlapped in time with the emergence, 
chiefly from among the progressive Mfengu, of a nascent, educated 
African elite, the long expected offspring on which the Cape had 
pinned such hopes in its civilizing crusade against barbarism. Yet, 
ironically, this s~all class of evolues evoked a highly ambivalent 
response from the Cape magistrates, which revealed their fundamental 
misgivings about the consequences of the programme of social progress 
and civilized advance they had initiated in the territories. African 
resistance to white overrule, it was argued, was being channelled 
from traditional forms of warfare and rebellion into novel westernized 
political organizations by a radical minority who placed the skills 
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and techniques learned from their contact with white society at the 
service of new social and political visions. Civilization, it was 
feared, would breed its own discontents. 
The changing conceptions of Cape 'native policy' marked as 
well official attitudes towards the small peasantry and commercial 
farmers, whose fostering had, from the time of Grey, in the history 
of Cape liberal ideology, remained a cardinal tenet as representing 
a positive social and economic good. From the late 1880s, in cer-
tain areas of the Transkei, and during the 1890s1~·,the peasant communi-
:¥f 
ties began to experience the hardships of declining agricultural 
productivity; and though the magistrates expressed real concern to 
ameliorate the condition of this struggling peasantry, more and more, 
attention and energy were diverted to creating a mass migrant labour 
force, as the only viable alternative to rural stagnation. As the 
necline of ·the peasant sector coincided roughly with an intensifying 
demand from the minin0 industries for a plentiful supply of cheap 
African labour, so the administrators considered it of paramount im-
portance to feed the stream of migrant labourers flowing to the in-
dustrial growth-points of South Africa. Thus stimulated, a growing 
proportion of the African population became dependent upon employment 
in the white-controlled economy for their existence. In this way 
Africans entered white society through an economic gateway, but at 
the lower levels of the white-dominated hierarchy mostly as a land-
less proletariat, at the bottom of the economic scale. The white 
economy had incorporated the black population, but the colour bar 
that developed, registering differences between skill and lack of 
skill, between economic power and economic powerlessness, reflected 
and entrenched the racial stratification and cultural pluralism of 
Cape society and the subordination of the indigenous people. 
In the history of Cape 'native policy' there is, then, a 
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discernible movement of ideas away from assimilation towards differ-
entiation, notwithstanding the formal homage paid to the principle 
of identity,,pledge and token of which remained in such forms as the 
ostensibly colour-blind franchise. The full incorporation of the 
African people within colonial society might still be posited as a 
final goal towards which the Transkeian territorial system was tend• 
ing, but more as a remote possibility, a far-off divine event, than as 
a discrete end attainable by definite stages.· As the process of 
·~ annexation was concluded, the government of the Transkeian Africans 
settled into the sluggish channels of routine administration, slogging 
along constructively and steadily though unspectacularly in its well-
worn grooves as it kept busy with immediate tasks and concerned it-
self with finite tangible ends. The vulnerability of the liberal 
vision that had once animated Cape 'native policy' became apparent 
as the state of pupilage to which the territorial system had sub-
jected Africans beyond the Kei was transformed into a permanent status 
of subordination. The changing conceptions of Cape liberalism, 
deriving from white concern to entrench and extend its privileqe by 
effectively barring black access to the political and economic means 
of power, were working to alter the nature and purpose of colonial 
government of the African people in the Transkei. · Since African 
policy fell under the purview of a white electorate not accountable 
to the black population, it not only suffered from the equivocations 
of Cape liberalism but, more fatefully, faced the ominous prospect of 
the implementation of an id~ology embodying essentially opposed views 
as to the proper ordering of race relations. In the 1920s, an ad-
vancing host of political forces and doctrines, signalled by the ad-
vent to the premiership of General J.B.M. Hertzog, represented such 
a radical challenge to the principles that had once informed the 
Transkeian territorial system. This policy of segregation, its oppo-
nents argued, was static, whereas the facts of social and economic 
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life were dynamic; and it was precisely these organic processes of 
political adaptation and social change which the territorial system 
had been designed to accommodate. Again, while official Cape atti-
tudes to the mode of administration were experimental and pragmatic, 
the policy of segregation, on the other hand, was doctrinaire; and 
its advocates proclaimed it a solution with all the reductive sim-
plifications of a neat formula to the complex racial, economic and 
social problems of South Africa. Moreover, the narrow exclusive-
ness of segregation, which its champions insisted would 'preserve' 
white civilization, was wholly at variance with the potential in-
clusiveness of the civilizing mission as the Cape magistrates con-
ceived it. Accordingly, with the fragmentation of South Africa in 
the 1950s in terms of the grand design of separate development, the 




THE TRANSKEIAN QUADRUMVIRATE: BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 
BLYTH, Matthew Smith. Born September 1836 in Norfolk, England~ 
1853, commissioned as ensign in an Imperial Regiment at 
the Cape of Good Hope. 1861, served in British Honduras, 
where he was once secretary to the Governor of that 
Colony. 1867-69, in Natal. 1869, appointed British 
Resident in Fingoland. March 1876, Chief Magistrate of 
Griqualand East. September 1878~ Chief Magistrate of 
the Transkei. February 1883, acting Governor's Agent 
in Basutoland. March 1884, resumed duties as Chief 
Magistrate of the Transkei. Died in Cape Town, July 1889. 
BROWNLEE, Charles Pacalt. Born March 1821 at Tyume Mission, near 
Alice, the eldest son of Rev. John Brownlee. At an early 
age accompanied American missionaries to Natal as inter-
preter. On return to Eastern Cape took up farming. 
ELLIOT, 
1846, appointed clerk to the Native Commissioner, Rev. 
Henry Calderwood, who settled at Block Drift. October 
1848, appointed Commissioner of the Gaika (Ngqika) tribes. 
May 1868, civil commissioner and resident magistrate, 
Somerset East. June 1871, promoted to King Williamstown. 
December 1872, first Secretary for Native Affairs, held 
office until retirement of the Molteno ministry in 1878. 
February 1878, civil commissioner for native affairs, 
resident at King Williamstown. December 1878, Chief 
Magistrate of Griqualanst~_a~st. Retired owing to ill-
health as from November~ Died at King Williamstown, 
August 1890. 
Henry George. Born near Niagara Falls, Canada, in 
December 1826. Joined the Royal Marines, August 1847, 
and served in the Crimean War. Retired from service in 
December 1869, with the rank of major, because of ill-
health. Came to South Africa. July 1877, took up 
appointment as Chief Magistrate of Thembuland, on the 
persuasion of Sir Bartle Frere, at a time when the High 
Commissioner had anxiously reported to London that a 
general rising among the African tribes seemed likely-. 
September 1891, appointed Chief Magistrate of Thembuland 
and the Transkei, on the amalgamation of the two magis-
tracies. Retired in 1902. Died in Pietermaritzburg, 1912. 
STANFORD, Walter Ernest Mortimer. Born August 1850 at Alice. 
July 1863, appointed clerk to Tambookie Agent, Glen Grey; 
office of agent moved to Southeyville in 1865. 
January 1871, clerk to resident magistrate, Queenstown. 
February 1874, clerk to civil commissioner and resident 
magistrate, East London. July 1874, officer in charge 
of Tambookie Location, Glen Grey. April 1876, magistrate 
with Dalasile, chief of the Ama•Qwati tribe; title of 
199 
magistrate with Dalasile changed to resident magistrate, 
Engcobo, in 1882. July 1885, Chief Magistrate of 
Griqualand East. July 1897, Superintendent of Native 
Affairs; title changed to Secretary to Native Affairs 
Department, 1899. During Anglo-Boer War commanded 
British forces in Griqualand East. July 1902, appointed 
first Chief Magistrate of the united Transkeian Terri-
tories. July 1904, recalled to the headship of the 
Native Affairs Department in Cape Town. 1908, elected 
Member of Cape Parliament for Thembuland. 1909, a Cape 
representative to the· National Convention, where he fought 
for franchise rights irrespective of race or colour. 
1910-1929, served as Union Senator representing African 
interests. Died in Cape Town, September 1933. 
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CRITICAL NOTE ON SOURCES 
The greater part of the research for this thesis was con-
ducted in the Cape Archives, where the papers of the Native Affairs 
Department and those of the Chief Magistrates of the Transkei, 
Thembuland and Griqualand East, relating to the period 1872-1894, 
were consulted at some length. For a study of this kind, uncon~ 
cerned as it is with establishing particular historical facts or 
with tracing a series of chronological events, the departmental 
archives inevitably contained much that was superfluous and irrele-
vant, not to say repetitive. At times the accumulation of histori-
cal detail, besides the miasma of day-to-day administrative routine, 
threatened to obscure the broader contours of ideas and assumptions 
in which the researcher was interested. Yet it was only by immersion 
in the veritable flood of source material until one was able,,oin 
G.M. Young's words, to hear the voices of the age speak, did the 
writer come away with a valuable sense of such imponderables as the 
magisterial ethos, the characteristic style of administration, a 
subtle transmutation of attitude or even 'the temper of the times' -
all of which would give concreteness and plausibility, perhaps the 
breath of life, to the historical account. Of particular and, in 
this case, direct importance were found to be the official reports 
and memoranda penned by the Chief Magistrates of the various terri-
tories. These opened a current and authoritative view on to con-
temporary events, significant decisions and changes of policy, the 
actual operation of the administrative and legal systems, as well 
as providing insight into the magisterial mind as it concerned it-
self with the immediate desiderata, possibilities, obstacles and 
ultimate aims of African administration. 
Official publications relating to the Transkeian terri-
tories were used as an additional quarry and source for research. 
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Besides the Cape Blue Books on Native Affairs of which extensive 
use was made, the Report and Appendices of the 1883 Native Laws and 
Customs Commission proved extremely helpful. This important docu• 
ment is a mine whose every rift is loaded with historical ore. 
The private papers of Sir Waiter Stanford were employed to gain entry 
into the official mind and a representative case-study was obtained 
of magisterial responses to and evaluations of the Transkeian terri-
torial system, as viewed through the intelligent eyes of this out-
~ standing administrator. 
The author's indebtedness to a whole body of secondary 
works must be apparent at almost every turn of the thesis, for these 
were used as standard texts for understanding the general issues in-
volved in particular aspects of the work. The following may be 
singled out as studies on which special reliance was placed: 
c.c. Saunders's 'The Annexation of the Transkeian Territories'; 
the stimulating book of J.W. Burrow, Evolution and Society. which 
provided the dominant theoretical orientation of this thesis; 
S.B. Burman's 'Cape Policies Towards African Law in Cape Tribal 
Territories'; and the work of H.J. Simons, African Women, which 
offered an authoritative guide through the mazes of African law 
and customs. 
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C.M.T. 1/79 - 1/84: letter books (of C.M. Thembuland}, 
1877-1892. 
C.M.T. 1/147: miscellaneous correspondence and 
.papers (of C.M. Thembuland). 
C.M.T. 2/62 - 2/69: letter books (of C.M. Transkei), 
1879-1890. 
C.M.T. 3/273 - 3/278: letter books (of C.M. 
The~buland and the Transkei), 1891-1897, 
{iii) Chief Magistrate of Grigualand East Papers 
C.M.K. 2/2 - 2/11: letter books, 1876-1899. 
C.M.K. 2/108: confidential letter book, 1886 and 1890. 
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(iv) Magistrate of Engcobo Papers 
(v) 
(vi) 
1/ECO: 5/1/1/1 - 5/1/1/5: letter books• 1881-1885. 
l/ECO: 5/1/3/1: confidential letter book, 1881•1888. 
Colonial Office Pa2ers 
c.o. 1;9>6:: letters received from Native Affairs 
Department; 1881. 
c.o. 3163, 3179, 3193: letters received from Border 
Magistrates and Transkeian Territories, 
1869 ... 1871. 
Prime Minister's Office Pa2ers 
P.M.O. 259: correspondence and memoranda, 1875-1881. 
II GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS 
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE COLONY 
(a) ,Annexures and Ap2endices to the Votes and Proceedings of 
the Ca2e Parliament. 
(i) Blue Books on Native Affairs: 
(ii) 
G.27 - 1874 G.3 - '1889 
G.21 - 1875 G.4 - 1890 
G.16 - 1876 G.4 - 1891 
G.12 - 1877 G.7 - 1892 
G.17 - 1878 G.4 - 1893 
G.33,43 - 1879 G.9 - 1894 
G.13 • 1880 G.8 - 1895 
G.20 - 1881 G. 5 ... 1896 
G.33 - 1882 G.19 - 1897 
G.8 - 1883 G.42 - 1898 
G.3 - 1884 G.31 ... 1899 
G.2 .. 1885 G.50 - 1900 
G.5 - 1886 G.52 - 1901 
G.12 - 1887 G.25 - 1902 
G.6 - 1888 G.29 - 1903 
Government Commissions: 
Proceedings of, and Evidence taken by, the €ommission 
on Native Affairs 1865 (Grahamstown, 1865). 
G.4-1883 Report and Proceedings, with Appendices, 
of the Government Commission on Native Laws and 
Customs. 
G.1-1890 Report of the Liquor Laws Commissio@with 




(b) The Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette. 1879-1896: 
odd reference. 
OTHER 
South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903-1905. 
and Evidence (5 vols.; Cape Town, 1905). 
Report 
III PUBLISHED COLLECTIONS OF DOCUMENTS, including LAW REPORTS 
A.C. Dulcken {ed.), Reports of Cases decided in the Eastern 
Districts' Court of the Cape of Good Hope, vol. VI, 
part II (Cape Town, 1892). 
H.H. Juta and C.H. Tredgold (eds.), Reports of Cases decided 
in the Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope, vol. X, 
part III (Cape Town, 1894). 
A.N. Macfadyen (ed.), Statutes, Proclamations, and Government 
Notices in force in the Native Territories of the Colony 
of the Cape of Good Hope (Cape Town, 1907). 
H. Tennant and E. Jackson (eds.), Statutes of the Cape of Good 
Hope, 1652-1895, 3 vols. (Cape Town, 1895); vol. 4 
(1896-1900) (Cape Town, 1900). 
IV PUBLISHED WORKS 
Lord Acton, Lectures on Modern History, ed. H. Trevor-Roper 
(London, 1960) • 
Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, ed. J. Dover Wilson 
(Cambridge, 1932). 
E. Barker, Political Thought in England 1848 to 1914 {London,1915) 
c. Bolt, Victorian Attitudes to Race (London, 1971). 
E.H. Brookes, White Rule in South Africa, 1830-1910: Varieties 
in Governmental Policies Affecting Africans (Pietermaritz-
burg, 1974). 
J.W. Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian 
Social Theory (Cambrid.ge, 1966). • 
J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into Its Oriains 
and Growth (London, 1920). 
H.A.C. Cairns, Prelude to Imperialism: British Reactions to 
Central African Society; 1840-1890 (London, 1965). 
P.O. Curtin, The Image of Africa: British Ideas and Action, 
1780-1850 (London, 1965). 
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C.W. de Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor in South Africa 
(London, 1937). 
J. Dunn and A.F. Robertson, Dependence and ?Pportunity: 
Political Change in Ahafo (Cambridge, 1973). 
T.O. Elias, The Nature of African Customary Law (Manchester, 1956) 
G. Feaver, From Status to Contract: A Biography of Sir Henry 
Maine 1822-1888 (London, 1969). · · · 
M.P. Golding, Philosophy of Law (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 
197 5). 
B.H. Harrison, Drink and the Victorians: The Temperance 
Question in England, 1815-1872 (London, 1971). 
W.D. Hammond-Tooke, Command or Consensus: The Development of 
Transkeian Local Government (Cape Town, 1975). 
W.D. Hammond-Tooke (ed.), The Bantu-Speaking Peoples of Southern 
Africa (London, 1974). 
H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (Oxford, 1963). 
R. Heussler, The British in Northern Nigeria (Oxford, 1968). 
R. Heussler, British Tanganyika: An Essay and Documents on 
Disttict Administration {Durham, North Carolina, 1971). 
T. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth, 1968). 
W.E. Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830-1870 
(London, 1957). 
T.B. Macaulay, Critical and Historical Essays (London, 1872). 
J.W. Macquarrie (ed.), The Reminiscences of Sir Walter Stanford, 
2 vols. (Cape Town, 1958 and 1962). 
J.S. Mill, On Liberty, ed. G. Himmelfarb (Harmondsworth, 1974). 
D.D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy (London, 1970). 
J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey: A Study in Colonial Government 
(London, 1961). 
H.J. Simons, African Women: Their Legal Status in South Africa 
(London, 1968). 
J.F. Stephen, Liberty, Eauality. Fraternity, ed. R.J. White 
(Cambridge, 1967). 
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E. Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India (Oxford, 1959). 
L. Thompson and M. Wilson, Oxford History of South Africa, 
2 vols. (Oxford, 1969 and 1971). 
D. Welsh, The Roots of Segregation: Native Policy in Natal, 
1845•1910 (Oxford, 1971). 
G. Wilson and M. Wilson, The Analysis of Social Change 
(Cambridge, 1945). 
G.M. Young, Portrait of An Age: Victorian England (Oxford, 1936). 
(The above is a select list and includes only those works 
considered directly relevant to the study.) 
V UNPUBLISHED THESES 
c. Bundy, 'African Peasants and Economic Change in South 
Africa, 1870•1913, with Particular Reference to the 
Cape' (Oxon. D.Phil., 1976). 
S.B. Burman, 'Cape Policies Towards African Law in Cape 
r'· 
Tribal irerritories, 1872.-1883' (Oxon. D.Phil., 1973). 
R.H. Davis, 'Nineteenth Century African Education in the 
Cape Colony' (Wisconsin Ph.D., 1969). 
c.s. Manona, 'Captain Matthew Smith Blyth's Work in South 
Africa, 1869-1889 1 (Unisa M.A., 1973). 
V.M. Master, 'Colonial Control in Thembuland and Resistance 
to It, 1872-1885' (U.C.T. M.A., 1966). 
C.C. Saunders, 'The Annexation of the Transkeian Territories, 
1872~1893' (Oxon. D.Phil., 1972). 
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